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Abstract 
This thesis studies the evolution of the aircraft industry as it emerged from the 
Second World War and its relationship with the State, running through to the 
re-evaluation of this State-industry relationship from the late 1950s and into the 
1960s. 
It takes, for this purpose, major formative events which, it is argued, had a 
defining influence on the shape of industry and its relationship with government, 
beginning with the reconstruction plans for the huge war-time industry, 
formulated within the Ministry of Aircraft Production with a powerful input 
from Sir Stafford Cripps. 
Thus considerable attention is given to the development of the Whittle jet engine 
and its effect on British aviation. A new assessment stresses the importance of 
the jet to hopes in Britain for the capability of the industry, but also discusses 
and uncovers the reasons for the strains in the war-time relationship between 
Whittle and the MAP which nearly proved fatal to the project. 
The role of the government research at the Royal Aircraft Establishment, 
Farnborough, which was crucial to the industry during the competitive contest 
of Cold War aeronautical development, is also examined. Detailed case studies 
of the progress of civil and military engine and aircraft programmes are used in 
this period to examine the nature of the government/industry relationship and its 
changing pattern over time. 
This study takes the position that the progress of the British aircraft industry in 
the post-war period must be explained not only in terms of evolving national 
defence objectives and technological developments, but also in terms of day-to- 
day institutionalised government policy and episodic major political shifts. This 
analysis therefore represents the intersection of a history of technology with a 
socio-cultural and political account. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This study considers a major area of post-war industrial policy and industrial 
activity in Britain - the planned conversion of the vastly expanded wartime 
aircraft industry for the post-war era and its administration for two decades after 
the war. 
National policy towards the aircraft sector in this period represented an attempt 
to create a major structural shift in British industry and to capitalise on what 
was perceived as the type of manufacture that Britain should increasingly move 
towards -a modern industry with a high conversion ratio, relying on the 
competitive advantage of a workforce which encompassed both advanced 
technological abilities and sophisticated production skills. 
The aircraft industry had been augmented enormously before and during the 
war, growing from about 35,000 production workers in 1935 to ten times that 
by 1939 and rising to 1.7m at the peak in 1943. Accompanying this rise was a 
huge increase in plant and investment in production equipment, almost entirely 
provided at public expense. This whole production ensemble was knitted 
together by the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) into a hybrid 
industry/state organisation with a specifically British complexion. Whereas, 
during the Second World War, the USA might be said to have operated a 
national aircraft purchasing programme, Britain operated a national aircraft 
production programme which achieved an extraordinarily close integration of 
government and industry. In essence, its task was to maximise the flow of 
aircraft production in the light of the over-riding constraints of labour force and 
assembly plant. 
Howlett has argued that, for a centrally planned economy to sustain a war effort 
for six years, people must be found "with an ability to evolve and run an 
organizational structure capable of coordinating the thousands (possibly millions) 
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of interdependent decisions". ' Thus during the war the MAP became quite 
unlike a peacetime ministry and recruited businessmen, managers and 
economists. Under conditions in which the market was suspended and the 
government was the sole purchaser for the output of the industry, it became 
evident that good control and performance could only be achieved by accurate 
statistical information on production and utilisation, combined with close 
monitoring on the ground at the firms. Nevertheless, the administration of these 
complex programmes was an art that improved throughout the period. ' 
The success achieved in the MAP production programmes had a powerful effect 
on perceptions of the utility of such a highly centralised planning organisation 
for the post-war direction of industry. Edgerton has discussed Sir Stafford 
Cripps' role, as the final and longest-serving Minister for Aircraft Production, 
in arguing for the continuance of the 'expert' departments - the wartime supply 
ministries - as agents of civil industrial policy in the post-war period. In the 
reconstruction discussions Cripps made the explicit argument that appropriate 
tools were now at hand for the post-war economic management of industry: 
The Government has acquired, through the Departments ... the 
knowledge, the contact and the influence to secure the very varying 
degrees of assistance, of guidance, and of reorganisation which the 
industries ... will be found to need. 
' 
Subsequently, in public speeches, Cripps held out the prospect of a "progressive 
1 
WP Howlett, The Competition between the Supply Departments and the Allocation of Scarce 
Resources in the Second World War, PhD thesis, Cambridge July 1998, p. 169. 
2 
Sir Alec Cairncross, in Planning in Wartime, (Macmillan, London, 1991), and also in 'How 
British Aircraft Production was Planned in the Second World War', Twentieth Century British 
History, Vol. 2, No. 3,1991, pp. 344-359 has drawn attention to the importance of judgement 
in this process. 
3 
CAB 87/7, Cabinet Reconstruction Committee Minutes, 8 March 1944, R(44)42, quoted in DE 
H Edgerton, State Intervention in British Manufacturing Industry, 1931-1951: A Comparative 
Study for the Military Aircraft and Cotton Textile Industries, PhD thesis, Imperial College, 
London, 1986, pp. 193,211-219. 
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active government which will be prepared to carry through a programme after 
the war ... to make certain that we are on the right road to progress" and that 
"never in the history of the world has an unplanned and uncontrolled private 
economy succeeded in getting rid of unemployment. ... The [industrial] 
production of the country must be considered as a great public service". ' 
With regard to the aircraft industry itself, from 1943 the view began to be 
advanced, again particularly by Stafford Cripps that this national investment in 
an enormously expanded industry should be husbanded as a national asset for 
postwar reconstruction, with "the minimum retrogression" from the engineering 
capacity that had been brought into being. 
Following the election of the Labour government in 1945 MAP was 
amalgamated with the existing wartime Ministry of Supply to form a new and 
more powerful post-war Ministry of Supply (and aircraft production) with 
responsibility for the development and production of both military and civil 
aircraft. This arrangement reflected the arguments put forward by Stafford 
Cripps during the closing years of the war. However, it would be wrong to 
attribute a desire for the continuance of central planning solely to Labour party 
thought. Many Conservatives, too, were impressed by the collaborative working 
patterns of the war. For example Reginald Maudling, while working in the 
Secretary of State's Private Office at the Air Ministry during the war, came to 
believe that it would be a mistake to return to the pre-war relationship in which 
"bureaucrats and businessmen had always been very much at arm's length" and 
became convinced that government and industry would have to cooperate much 
more closely in the post-war world, using the contacts established in the war for 
"a combined effort to increase Britain's prosperity". 5 
4 
Constituency address at Bristol, 1945, and while electioneering at Widnes, 6 May 1945, quoted 
in Eric Estorick, Sir Richard Stafford Cripps, (William Heinemann: London, 1949), pp 324- 
327. At the Labour Party Conference in 1945 Cripps also referred to "a national plan for our 
industries" in the light of the achievement of MAP in which "we have had fifteen thousand 
firms to control and plan". 
5 
Reginald Maudling, Memoirs, (London, 1978). pp 35-36. Maudling served as Minister of 
Supply, Chancellor of the Exchequer and as Home Secretary in post-war Conservative 
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Britain's post-war inheritance in aviation therefore comprised both a hugely 
enlarged and now more technologically adept aircraft industry than in the inter- 
war period, but also a model of a mechanism for its administration, inherited 
from the MAP. Associated with this was an 'implicit' or institutionalised 
departmental policy which reflected the experience of civil servants in the 
wartime direction of programmes, but which also had expanded to include the 
aims and ambitions of the reconstruction agenda. What therefore passed over 
into the post-war world, was not only the now more enlarged and more capable 
aircraft companies, but a relationship with an overseeing 'expert ministry'. The 
history of the post-war industry is therefore, to a considerable extent, the history 
of this relationship, intertwined inextricably with technical developments and 
technical possibilities emerging from the government research establishments 
(and particularly RAE, Farnborough), as well as from the firms themselves. 
The Structure of the Study 
These events launched, in effect, an experiment in administration and industrial 
policy that lasted for at least two decades after the war. The intention of this 
thesis is primarily to study the progress of this relationship, although it also 
considers other MAP/MoS initiatives and institutions which are strongly linked 
to the progress of Britain's aeronautical ambitions in the post-war period. A 
major question addressed by this study concerns whether the model of the 
wartime supply ministry with its close control of projects and output translated 
to the post-war world. Did the Ministry of Supply succeed in emulating the 
planning achievements of the wartime MAP in its direction of the post-war 
industry and in performing the economic role anticipated for it? 6 
governments. 
6 
These remarks should not be taken to imply an uncritical eulogy for the MAP's direction of 
production throughout the war. Under Beaverbrook, as Minister in 1940, and subsequently 
under his successors JTC Moore-Brabazon and then Colonel JJ Llewellyn, the MAP tended to 
rely on the exhortatory effect of unrealistic production targets, with Llewellyn issuing, for 
example, a "Clarion Call" for more bombers in September 1942. There was also a temptation to 
use secrecy and competition vis-a-vis other departments in an attempt to maximise allocations of 
labour and materials. However, from late 1941; the development of a department of 
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The thesis sets out to examine the progress of the ambitions outlined above 
through case studies of specific 'formative episodes' in the evolution of the 
aircraft manufacturing industry and its relationship with government. It takes as 
its period 1943 to 1965, since 1943 marks, within MAP, the beginning of 
discussions on reconstruction, the peacetime shape of the aircraft industry, and 
the post-war pattern of administration. It will be argued that the ambitions and 
intentions set out in this late war period actually endured in the day-to-day 
implicit policies of the MoS and its successors, and also at senior levels of 
government, for two decades after the war. It is suggested that 1965 represents 
the date of a more overt perception (which actually had been growing since the 
late 1950s), that their were problematic elements in British aircraft sector, 
particularly with regard to costs, the time for projects to come to fruition and 
the ability of the industry to compete in world markets. It was also beginning to 
be understood that these were, at least in part, a consequence of the pattern of 
administration. The year 1965 therefore represents a transition or 'fault line' in 
the continuance of this policy which was set on track at the end of the war. This 
was marked, most visibly, by the cancellation of the TSR 2 strike bomber and 
by the publication of the Plowden report on the aircraft industry. 
Much of the large volume of literature on aviation concerns companies and 
individuals - engineers, designers and pilots. However, for the post-war period, 
rather few writers, with the exception of David Edgerton, have engaged with 
aviation as essentially a government-directed and financed activity. ' Thus 
programmes and statistics under John Jewkes led increasingly to informed and realistic 
production planning and coordination. See Cairncross, 'Planning in Wartime', (n. 6, above), 
pp. 9-43. However, problems still remained with the direction of advanced high technology 
programmes which will be discussed in chapter three in connection with the Whittle jet. 
7 
The general run of 'industry histories' engage little with political and administrative questions 
except to excoriate public civil servants for interference in the industry. Charles Gardner's 
British Aircraft Corporation; a history, (London, 1981) is characteristic of this genre. Thus the 
work (pp. 106,121) describes Solly Zuckerman, as Chief Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of 
Defence, as "a South African Professor of Zoology" without referring to his wartime work on 
strategic bombing, and criticises the aeronautical experience of the members of the Plowden 
Committee without acknowledging Plowden's wartime post as Chief Executive in the Ministry 
of Aircraft Production. See also Derek Wood, Project Cancelled, (London, 1975) p. vii, which 
characterises the government direction of the industry as "an incredible mixture of wrong 
decisions ... and continuous vacillation". 
9 
Edgerton has made an important contribution by pointing out the under- 
recognised role of the Ministry of Supply in the historiography of post-war 
Britain. He argues that the supply ministries "played the most active and 
innovative role" during the war and bequeathed "expertise in central direction of 
industrial resources to post-war Britain". Moreover, he points out that the MoS 
did aspire to 'pick winners' and, with the Japanese Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI) in mind, suggests that the MoS 
was the scientific technological and industrial powerhouse of the 
British state, and pursued the discriminatory, interventionist and 
technological policies which many critics have said British 
governments have not, but should have, pursued. 8 
Edgerton is concerned to counter 'declinism' in British historiography and points 
out, for example, the huge sums disbursed by the MoS for defence production 
and its R&D programme, which he assesses as the largest ever funded in 
Britain, (at £110m in 1951). 9 However, he does not (perhaps wisely) seek to 
evaluate the success of the MoS in its assigned role. By contrast, this study does 
attempt an evaluation and suggests that the "expertise in central direction of 
industrial resources" learned through war production was illusory in the changed 
conditions of peace and following the departure of much of the specially 
recruited talent that had made MAP programming effective. Moreover, this 
study suggests, as will be described in more detail below, that the effect of MoS 
patronage was actually to delay the emergence of an entrepreneurial culture in 
the British aviation sector. In the post-war era firms such as de Havilland were 
certainly not averse to operational and technological risks as their experimental 
and test flight programmes often tragically showed, but very few developments 
8 
David Edgerton, 'Whatever happened to the British warfare state? The Ministry of Supply, 
1945-1951', in H. Mercer. N. Rollings and JD Tomlinson (eds. ) Labour Governments and 
Private Industry, The Experience of 1945-1951, (Edinburgh, 1992), pp. 110- 111. 
9 
David Edgerton, 'Whatever happened to the British warfare state? The Ministry of Supply, 
1945-1951', in H. Mercer. N. Rollings and JD Tomlinson (eds), Labour Governments and 
Private Industry, The Experience of 1945-1951, (Edinburgh, 1992). pp. 102-105. 
10 
in the period, civil or military, could proceed unless the financial risks were 
fully underwritten by the Ministry of Supply. 
Another point on which this study diverges from those of Edgerton concerns 
political allegiances to the aircraft industry. To Edgerton, the financial appetite 
of the industry was finally curbed, in the mid-1960s, by Labour politicians like 
Dennis Healey and Anthony Wedgwood Benn, in the face of "continuing Tory 
and industry hostility". 10 There may well have been a coincidence of interest 
between some Tories and those directing the aircraft industry but the 
interpretation reached in this study is rather different. It argues that the essential 
late war reconstruction brief for the Ministry of Supply was taken up as 
'implicit' or institutionalised departmental policy which continued under both 
Labour and Conservative administrations until a growing tension became 
evident. According to this view, what occurred was the working out of an 
evolutionary historical process. As it happened, the 'fault line' opened up under 
a Labour administration but this study finds evidence of growing scepticism and 
'hard-heartedness' towards the industry in senior Conservative circles which, I 
suggest, would have led to a similar result under a Tory administration; 
certainly no subsequent one attempted to return to the more open-handed 
practices of the period up to 1965.11 
This study takes the position that the progress of the British aircraft industry in 
the post-war period must be explained not only in terms of evolving national 
defence objectives and technological developments, but also in terms of the day- 
to-day institutionalised departmental policy and also episodic major political 
shifts. This analysis therefore represents the intersection of a history of 
technology with a socio-cultural and political account. 
10 
David Edgerton, 'The "White Heat" Revisited; the British government and technology in the 
1960s, Twentieth Century British History, No. 1, (1986), p. 11. 
11 
The forced and unwelcome protective nationalisation of Rolls-Royce, following receivership in 
1971, by the Heath government should not be taken as evidence against this. In the long run the 
completion of the Rolls-Royce RB 211 engine proved an excellent national investment. 
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The Growth of the Industry 
To put the study in context, it is necessary to return again to the subject of the 
huge wartime enlargement of the British aircraft industry, since that was the 
essential precondition for the events studied here. To Barnett, this wartime 
effort was "a mass industry improvised" although Ritchie's more recent study 
has argued convincingly that the expansion of British aircraft production was 
carefully planned. 12 To Edgerton, high British aircraft production is unsurprising 
and results, he argues, from 'liberal militarism' or "a British Way in Warfare 
which has relied on technology rather than manpower". He also suggests that 
Britain was probably the largest exporter of aircraft in the world in the inter-war 
period. 13 
However, Edgerton's commitment to correcting critiques of British technological 
capability and to the refutation of 'declinism' in the historiography, perhaps 
leads him to overlook the disparity between developments in British and in 
America - the nation then emerging as the key comparator in the period. " The 
staples of British military exports were second-rank fighter aircraft - the type 
mainly used for training at home, such as Armstrong-Siddeley Siskins and 
Scimitars. The customers were countries such as China, Norway and Portugal - 
hardly, to use the naval term 'first rate' powers. Also popular were the sound 
but simple de Havilland small biplane airliners and sports aircraft. 
These were all useful products but a numerical assessment of export success 
ignores the vast difference in technological sophistication between these types 
12 
Corelli Barnett, The Audit of War, (London, Macmillan, 1986), pp. 125-142 and Sebastian 
Ritchie, Industry and Air Power, the Expansion of British Aircraft Production, 1935-41, 
(London, 1997). 
13 
David Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane, (Manchester, 1991), and in 'Liberal Militarism 
and the British State', New Left Review, No 185, Jan-Feb 1991, pp. 138-169. 
14 
For example, David Edgerton, 'The Prophet Militant and Industrial; the Peculiarities of Corelli 
Barnett', Twentieth Century British History, Vol 2, No. 3,1991, pp. 360-379. 
12 
and those powering the dawning American civil airline revolution. " JTC 
Moore-Brabazon registered the "severe shock" brought by a realisation of "the 
astonishing efficiency of American civil aviation" in 1935 when "the 
performance of the Douglas in the race to Melbourne opened our eyes". 16 Until 
late in the 1930s (with the de Havilland Flamingo) Britain produced no civil 
aircraft of the 'Douglas DC 3 generation' - the twin-engined, smooth skinned, 
all-metal machines with retracting undercarriages, flaps, and variable pitch 
propellers which are now regarded as the ancestors of modern airliners and 
which sprang from the rapidly evolving milieu of American air transport. 
It is certainly not suggested here that Britain was unable to produce 
technologically advanced aircraft, but that the necessarily smaller size of the 
industry meant that it could not do this across the board. In fact 1935, the date 
of Brabazon's "severe shock", was also the year in which the RAF expansion 
scheme C was launched -a demand which, as Ritchie has shown, was 
equivalent to the total UK production capacity then existing for civil and 
military aircraft. ' This re-armament eliminated the possibility of developing a 
new generation of competitive British civil types. The effects of this military 
load continued well into the post-war period and certainly also compromised the 
15 
This discussion is not intended to paint a picture of unrelieved backwardness. Technological 
capability is, necessarily, a patchwork of different techniques and capacities for practical and 
theoretical analysis, disseminated over a wide range of firms and institutions. There were, for 
instance, two first class engine makers, which enabled Britain to produce, when necessity gave 
the urgent call, first class military aircraft. However it is noteworthy, in the context here, that 
the superb Rolls-Royce Merlin, the outstanding engine of the war, was a demanding piece of 
equipment which required a military establishment for its maintenance. Post-war attempts to 
convert it to a civil application showed it to have poor serviceability compared to American 
types. (Meeting with Sir David Huddie, 29 Ocober 1997). 
16 
Papers of Lord Brabazon (J TC Moore-Brabazon) Royal Air Force Museum archives, Hendon, 
AC 71/3, Box 70. JTC Moore-Brabazon subsequently became Lord Brabazon of Tara, the 
chairman of the Brabazon committees discussed in chapter two. In the 1934 MacRobertson air 
race from London to Australia, the specially built winning de Havilland Comet racing aircraft 
was closely followed by a Douglas DC-2 operated by KLM which had followed the longer 
regular airline route and carried six passengers and 400 lbs of mail. The progenitors of the 
modem airliner can be regarded as the stressed-skin American types that entered service 
between 1932 and 1935; the Boeing 247, Douglas DC 1, DC 2, DC 3, and the Lockheed L10 
Electra. 
17 
Ritchie 'Industry and Air Power' (n. 7 above), pp 41-42. 
13 
implementation of the Brabazon committee programme for new British civil 
types. Thus, in the 1930s, the American aviation industry was undergoing a 
step-change in the capability of the whole air transport system, while, at the 
same time, Britain was re-arming and developing a new generation of military 
types. 
Chapter 2 
The theoretical basis for the type of post-war planned direction of the aircraft 
industry, emanating from Stafford Cripps, has been touched on above. This 
chapter looks in some detail at the development of the policy within MAP for 
the maintenance of war potential and the gradual realignment of that policy for 
industrial production and reconstruction. Part of these plans involved ambitious 
intentions to build new civil airliners which would be competitive with 
American types. The ensuing chapters follow the progress of these intentions. 
Chapter two also studies the conversion of the MAP into a component of the 
new 'expert' supply ministry, the implementation of conversion plans for the 
industry and the progress of British ambitions for civil air transport which had 
developed as the war came to an end. 
Chapter 3 
The story of the Whittle jet is an important thread in the development of the 
post-war aircraft industry, affecting the type of aircraft that were built but also 
contributing to the wider belief in the importance of technology, from a moral 
and psychological point of view, in post-war Britain. The surprising equanimity 
with which Britain retreated from a global Imperial role, rested, it is argued 
here, on this 'defiant modernism' and the assumption of British technological 
ability. The new 'empire' of high science and a regenerated industry, would 
sustain the nation and, in this spirit, the jet engine became regarded as one of 
14 
the important symbols of new technique. 18 
The wartime progress of the jet is, therefore, studied as an example of the 
national intention to devise new technologies. The account here takes issue with 
normal hagiographic accounts of Whittle's engine work and suggests, moreover, 
that the MAP's administration of the programme was irresolute, particularly 
after 1940 when difficulties were building up between Whittle's company, 
Power Jets, MAP and the selected production contractor, the Rover car 
company. 
There has been little independent evaluation of the Whittle programme since that 
of Schlaiffer in 1950, with the exception of Edward W Constant's notable study. 
Constant has used his concept of "the turbojet revolution" to support an 
extension of the Kuhnian analysis of the successions in scientific theories to 
explain technological change. '9 However, it is argued here that this approach 
tends to obscure the reasons for the real problems that the programme 
encountered. 
The programme suggests that MAP's greatest success was in large-scale 
production programmes, albeit administered with adequate flexibility to allow 
continual improvements to sustain the fighting quality of the aircraft. 2° By 
contrast the Whittle project was a pure advanced technology project, requiring 
other enabling scientific and technical steps that had not yet been made, but was 
18 
Robert Bud has shown how important, for the same reasons, was the story of penicillin to post- 
war Britain with the legend of its discovery by Fleming - an almost incidental act - thus 
assuming primacy, like a creative Archimedean "Eureka" moment, over the therapeutically 
more essential American perfection of bulk fermentation for its manufacture. Robert Bud, 
'Penicillin and the New Elizabethans', British Journal for the History of Science 31(1998): 
305-33. 
19 
Robert Schlaiffer and SD Heron, The Development of Aircraft Engines and Fuels, (Harvard 
School of Business Administration, 1950). Edward W Constant II, 'A Model for Technological 
Change Applied to the Turbojet Revolution', Technology and Culture, 14 (1973): pp 553-572 
and Edward W Constant II, The Origins of the Turbojet Revolution, (Baltimore, 1980). 
20 
For example see 'The Doctrine of Quality' in MM Postan, D Hay and JD Scott, Design and 
Development of Weapons, (HMSO, London, 1964), pp. 1-15. 
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intended, nevertheless, for production 'off the drawing board'. The problems 
identified in this analysis anticipate later Cold War development programmes 
when many more projects were initiated which were at or beyond the limits of 
available technology. The British war-time jet programme had been rescued, in 
effect, by the multiplication of effort across several other firms including Rolls- 
Royce and de Havilland and these events go some way towards explaining the 
wasteful post-war practice of parallel development and procurement and perhaps 
points to a reason why advanced technology projects were spread across so 
many firms. 
Chapter 4 
The reconstruction agenda, set out within the Ministry of Aircraft production 
from 1943, launched a far more deliberate programme than has generally been 
appreciated. However, apart from the organisational system, which has been 
discussed, whereby the MAP served as the model (and the actual administrative 
core) for the post-war MoS in its relationship with the aircraft industry, there 
was also substantial infrastructural support put in place towards the end of the 
war, specifically with the intention of improving the competitive position of the 
British post-war aircraft industry. 
Studies of the establishment of these new institutions are almost entirely absent 
in the historiography and they are included here because they represent concrete 
evidence for the seriousness of the MAP reconstruction plans in aeronautics. 
They included the creation of the new postgraduate Cranfield College of 
Aeronautics and ambitious plans for a new national aeronautical research centre 
at Bedford, (referred to by Cripps as being "of vital importance to the county's 
future"). The development of this latter establishment also relates to the 
nationalisation of Whittle's Power Jets company by Cripps to form a nucleus for 
national gas turbine research -a move which has been generally misinterpreted 
and which is analysed in the previous chapter. 
The immediate post-war British programme to utilise German aeronautical 
16 
science has also been widely ignored, in spite of its successful ambition to 
utilize German research hardware on a huge scale, as well as securing German 
intellectual property in aeronautics and recruiting leading aeronautical engineers 
and scientists. This exploitation programme relates closely to the Bedford and 
Cranfield initiatives. 
Chapter 5 
Britain's aircraft sector, in the 1950s is properly regarded as an ensemble which 
comprised a highly centralised government research capability, a large (many 
said excessive) number of aircraft and engine firms and a government 
procurement agency, the Ministry of Supply, which implemented the 
requirements of the Air Staff and, in principle, the civil air lines. 
This system was placed under enormous pressure, in the post-war era, to 
produce aircraft and weapons of the highest technical quality as a response to 
the emergence of the Cold War, to the continuing conviction that Britain should 
retain 'Great Power' status with a global reach, and in the light of a growing 
realisation of the offensive threat posed by Soviet nuclear capability. The Royal 
Aircraft Establishment (RAE) was the main resource for research and advanced 
projects work in this period and was crucial to these aeronautical developments. 
It was, moreover, the largest research establishment in Europe. 
The activity of the RAE has received attention in internalist histories of British 
aviation but, again, it has had little attention in the wider historiography. " It is 
studied here partly as a corrective, since so much aeronautical history has been 
written from the perspective of the firms and their designers, and has ignored 
21 
An exception is MJ Lighthill in 'The Royal Aircraft Establishment' in Sir John Cockroft (ed), 
The Organisation of Research Establishments (Cambridge, 1965, pp. 28-54. The present 
author's chapter 'The Royal Aircraft Establsihment from 1945 to Concorde' in R Bud and P 
Gummett (eds) Cold War, Hot Science: applied research in Britain's defence laboratories, 
(London 1999) pp 29-58, which draws on the work presented here, is an attempt to put the 
work of the RAE in a wider context. 
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the influence, indeed the centrality, of the RAE to much that was done in the 
post-war period. A knowledge of this influence and of the type of work done at 
the RAE is essential to an understanding of the capability of the firms and of 
British aviation in general in this period. 
Chapter 6 
The sixth chapter looks more deeply into the progress of aircraft and engine 
projects during the post-war period and follows on from some of the early post- 
war procurement decisions touched on in chapter two. 
Over much of the period aviation policy was carried forward by officials, acting 
largely in the spirit of the Crippsian reconstruction agenda, and responding to 
Cold War pressures on defence, so this is an mainly an account of 'practical' 
departmental policy as administered by officials over the period acting very 
much in the spirit discussed above where the interventionist, promotional role 
inherited from wartime and reconstruction had become institutionalised as 
implicit departmental policy. 
The under-recognised importance of the Ministry of Supply in the post-war era 
has been pointed out by David Edgerton in the work Labour Governments and 
Private Industry which set out for historians the importance of the post-war MoS 
and its enormous remit. Edgerton called the Ministry the "scientific, 
technological and industrial powerhouse of the British state" and suggested that 
it pursued "the discriminatory, interventionist and technological policies which 
many critics have said the British government have not, but should have, 
pursued". 22 The work here (particularly taken together with chapter 2) looks at 
the progress of these interventionist policies and the detail of the actual 
administration of projects through a number of case studies. Edgerton's study 
22 
David Edgerton, 'Whatever happened to the British warfare state? The Ministry of Supply, 
1945-1951', in Labour Governments & Private Industry, eds H Mercer, N Rollings and JD 
Tomlinson, (Edinburgh, 1992), p. 111. 
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necessarily finishes in 1951 (the date of the return of the Conservative 
government to power), but it is the contention in the work here that the same 
essential orientation of the MoS towards the aircraft industry continued into the 
1960s under successive Conservative administrations. This implicit policy only 
gradually became modified in the light of experience as the perception grew in 
government departments and among politicians of both major parties both that 
aviation expenditure was unsupportable and that a new method of procurement 
and administration was needed. 
The perceived centrality of the Ministry in export and explicitly commercial 
matters is evident in the records; it was a period in which government officials 
could refer to their role as "backing the aircraft industry in its joint endeavour 
with us to break into world markets". ' 
These events suggest that the popular view that Britain has never had an 
'industry ministry' comparable say, to MITI in Japan is not correct. For several 
decades after the war the Ministry of Supply, and its successors fulfilled the role 
of providing broad industrial support and the encouragement of innovation, 
coupled with the task of procuring aircraft and aeronautical material for the 
services and the civil airline corporations. The pattern of this work is therefore 
to study particular episodes which, it is argued, were critical to the development 
of industry from 1943 and for two decades after the war, and to discuss how the 
structures and habits of this wartime mechanism for the control and development 
of the industry functioned in the post-war world. 
23 
PRO AVIA 65/59, 'Comet Aircraft Production Policy', note by Sir James Helmore, January 
1955. (Author's emphasis). 
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Chapter 2: Aircraft Production and Planning for Post-War Reconstruction 
Introduction 
The post-war British aircraft industry was the offspring of the war-time 
industry. National investment in military aircraft production had established a 
far larger capacity than could have arisen from purely commercial imperatives. 
The transition of this industry to peace reflected, in part, the perceived need to 
retain production capacity for defence, but also reflected the desire to utilise this 
national investment to contribute to Britain's economic recovery, particularly 
through the development of a significant civil aircraft programme. This chapter 
studies the progress of these ambitions and some of the difficulties that were met 
in the late war and early post-war period. 
These events are closely bound up with the administrative arrangements for the 
industry and the establishment of the peacetime Ministry of Supply (MoS) out of 
the two war-time ministries of Supply and Aircraft Production. Thus these 
events are, in a sense, an example of government intervention in industry, 
although it is perhaps more informative to describe the relationship as a 
government/industry partnership since the greater part of the production capacity 
of the sector was government-created and since the design work of the firms 
was fundamentally reliant on the advanced research being done at the (MoS 
administered) Royal Aircraft Establishment, which became the largest research 
centre in Europe in the post-war period. 
For these reason also, the question of public or private ownership of the aviation 
firms does not emerge as a burning issue in the period for, in addition to the 
above factors, the government exercised immense control as the source of 
finance for almost all the projects undertaken by the industry and, in effect, as 
the customer for both its civil and military output. However, since the issue of 
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nationalisation is important in the period this chapter also looks at the question 
in the light of studies by Howlett and Edgerton on the war-time nationalisation 
of aircraft concerns. ' This issue is also touched on in a subsequent chapter on 
the Whittle jet. 
The study shows the centrality of Stafford Cripps to the development of 
reconstruction plans for the industry and their survival into the post-war period 
with the incorporation of the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) into the 
post-war MoS. The research into these events follows on from studies by 
Edgerton but extends it through research using government records of the 
development of reconstruction policy in the aircraft sector, supplemented by 
secondary sources. This study shows that Cripps was personally more involved 
in the development of these policies than has previously been described. This 
section, and episodes in subsequent chapters, also show the dilution of this 
ambitious dirigiste spirit within the MAP/MoS after the departure of Cripps in 
1945.2 
Preparing for Peace 
During the Second World War the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) 
controlled the largest industrial sector in Britain. The MAP had been formed out 
1 
David Edgerton, 'Public ownership and the British arms industry, 1920-1950', and Peter 
Howlett, 'The Thin End of the Wedge?: nationalisation and industrial structure during the 
Second World War' in Robert Millward and John Singleton (eds. ), The Political Economy of 
nationalisation in Britain 1920-1950, (Cambridge, 1995). 
2 
DEH Edgerton in State Intervention in British Manufacturing Industry, 1931-1951: A 
Comparative Study for the Military Aircraft and Cotton Textile Industries, PhD thesis, Imperial 
College, London, 1986 pp. 209-219 and subsequently David Edgerton, 'Whatever happened to 
the British warfare state? The Ministry of Supply, 1945-1951', in H. Mercer. N. Rollings and J 
D Tomlinson (eds) Labour Governments and Private Industry, The Experience of 1945-1951, 
(Edinburgh, 1992). Curiously, Cripps' biographers do not appear to have understood the 
importance of his time in the highly centralised and highly planned milieu of the MAP to his 
political development. Peter Clarke, The Cripps version; the Life of Sir Stafford Cripps, 1889- 
1952, (London 2002), the latest and in many ways the most complete biography, significantly 
entitles the chapter on this period merely as "Entr'Acte 1943-5" (interlude! ). Eric Estorick, Sir 
Richard Stafford Cripps, (William Heinemann: London, 1949), does briefly suggest the 
importance of Cripps' MAP sojourn. 
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of the Supply departments of the Air Ministry in 1940 and reflected Churchill's 
belief, formed as Minister of Munitions in the First World War, that it was "a 
fundamental principle" that the authority for production must rest in the hands 
of a separate ministry. In his view, a procurement department located within the 
Air Ministry, (the inter-war pattern) was vulnerable to the continually changing 
demands of the Service users which "would have a crippling effect on output". 3 
The foundation of MAP also reflected disquiet at the rate of build-up of the 
British air forces. 
The efficiency of British aircraft production has also been challenged but, to 
summarise recent historiography, the prevailing view is that on the basis of 
sheer numbers and of the fighting qualities of its aircraft British war production 
was a considerable success. 4 The approach of the end of the war, therefore, saw 
Britain with a hugely inflated aircraft sector. Unlike the First World War, where 
the companies had been left largely to make the best of things, a role was 
deliberately planned for the post-Second World War era. It was, after all, a 
planned war. 
What was the effect of MAP thinking on the post-war industry? This chapter 
3 
Winston Churchill, at meeting of Defence Committee, 7 March 1945, PRO CAB 70/5, quoted 
by Sir Alec Caimcross, 'How British Aircraft Production was Planned in the Second World 
War', Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 2, No. 3,1991, pp. 344-359. 
4 
The view expounded by Corelli Barnett in The Audit of War, (London, 1986) that British 
aircraft production was inefficient, is encapsulated most notably in his assertion that a Spitfire 
Mk VC required 13,000 man-hours to build, against 4000 for a Messerschmitt 109G, and that 
Britain produced 1.19 lb of aircraft structure per man-day as opposed to Germany's 2.76 lb. 
This view has been challenged by David Edgerton in England and the Aeroplane, (Manchester 
1991): 79-82 and refuted by Peter Howlett in The Economic History of Britain, Vol III 1939- 
1992, (Cambridge, 1994): 10-13. More recently Jonathan Zeitlin in 'Flexibility and Mass 
Production at War' Technology and Culture, January 1995, Vol 36, No. 1, pp. 46-79, has 
recalled the war-time emphasis on "the doctrine of quality" for RAF equipment described by 
Postan in MM Postan, D Hay and JD Scott, Design and Development of Weapons, (London, 
HMSO, 1964). Zeitlin finds, particularly in Rolls-Royce performance, an almost ideal 
relationship between quality and output that anticipated the modern concept of 'flexible 
manufacturing'. In addition he has argued that UK productivity approached American figures 
for long runs. Sebastian Ritchie, Industry and Air Power, the Expansion of British Aircraft 
Production, 1935-1941, (Frank Cass, London, 1997) has shown the careful planning that took 
place from 1935 to put in place the industrial capacity that was required for the British 
production achievement. 
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aims to show that it was pattern of administration developed during the MAP's 
period of great power administering war production, combined with the vision 
developed by Sir Stafford Cripps for the industry, that was carried forward into 
the post-war era and which set the character of government-industry relations in 
aviation for some decades, albeit in a gradually attenuating form. This is, 
therefore, a study of policy, both in the formal sense of overtly stated policy 
aims and, in the informal sense of 'micro policy' as represented by the culture 
and ethos of the MAP and its successor, the Ministry of Supply, and expressed 
in an assumption of common purpose and aims among the members of the 
Department. This derived, in large part, from the strategic plans for the future 
of the industry developed during the tenure of Stafford Cripps as Minister for 
Aircraft Production, and which was developed in large measure by him. 
British thinking about the conversion of the industry began remarkably early in 
the war, certainly in the summer of 1943 and initially the discussions centred on 
the problems of the change-over to peace-time employment, if there was to be a 
two-stage ending to the war. ' 
At the outset the MAP regarded the huge scale of the enterprise that it 
controlled as the main element of the problem. A paper to the Joint War 
Production Staff set out the extent of the Ministry's empire. It is also a useful 
summary of the aircraft production sector in 1943. It noted that: 
a) The aircraft industry employed about 35,000 in 1935, about 
360,000 at the beginning of the war and nearly 1,700,000 
today. 
b) Practically the whole of the employment given by MAP is to 
the Engineering and Allied Industries of which MAP controls 
5 
PRO AVIA 15/1915, 'MAP Reconstruction Committee', Memorandum by the Minister without 
Portfolio, 15 June 1943. Sir William Jowitt (Minister without Portfolio) noted the problems for 
production that might arise after the collapse of Germany. "After the tide of war had retreated 
10,000 miles it would be politically impossible to continue the compulsory retention of unwilling 
workers. ... 
The revival of the export trade under these twilight conditions will have its own 
special problems". 
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today 40% of the total capacity; six out of every 10 
engineering firms have some MAP work. 
c) Of the total MAP labour force, 23 % is concentrated in the 
London and South Eastern region, 20% in the Midland region 
and 18% in the North western region. 
d) Nearly a quarter of a million (about one seventh of the whole 
MAP's employment) are working in shadow factories. 
e) As a measure of the importance of sub-contracting, it should 
be noted that of the direct contractual expenditure of MAP 
three quarters is with some 50 firms, whereas altogether about 
15,000 factories are working to some extent for MAP. 6 
In addition, MAP also claimed that four fifths of the larger general engineering 
concerns with 1000 or more operatives did some MAP work. 
The three initial aims put by the Government for reconstruction which applied 
clearly to this major industrial sector controlled by the MAP were the 
maintenance of war potential, full employment, and an increase of exports by 
50% over pre-war levels. ' 
Within MAP an internal Reconstruction Committee was formed to plan for 
peace, which included the economist John Jewkes and Eric Mensforth (then 
Chief Production Adviser), as well as senior civil servants. The meetings were 
fixed once monthly from August 1943.8 A little later Edwin Plowden, then 
6 
Ibid. MAP draft policy paper on reconstruction, RC (1943) 2, February 1944. 
7 
Ibid. The MAP draft paper on reconstruction noted that: "The Chancellor of the Exchequer in 
the debate on social insurance (Hansard, Vol. 386, No. 31) gave the government's view that of 
all priorities "our contribution to international security would come first, and that whatever the 
bill, we should have to pay it. Second, in order of priority the Chancellor put the need to 
secure full employment. ". The Treasury paper on the Social Security Plan (RP [43] 5) pointed 
out that "having lost most of our dollar assets and incurred very heavy sterling liabilities, even 
with the most careful arrangements, our post-war Exchange position, itself vital for full 
employment, such be one of great anxiety. It is therefore necessary to increase the volume of 
export trade at least fifty per cent over pre-war. ". (Original emphasis). 
Ibid. Letter from the Permanent Secretary, MAP, 16 June 1943, to Sir W Lindsay Scott, 
Second Secretary, on the setting up of a special division to deal with reconstruction questions 
and the setting up of a Departmental Committee. "The committee will consist of yourself, 
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Director General of Light Metals Production (DGMP) but soon to become Chief 
Executive of MAP, was asked to join and it is a telling indication of the 
collaborative spirit of the time that Plowden was recommended to Cripps not 
just on his experience of the light alloy industry but for his ability, business 
experience and his "moderate capitalist views". 9 
At this stage in the war, and with the memories of re-armament at emergency 
pace in the late 1930s still vivid, much thought was given to the "maintenance 
of war potential". This was problematic. As we have seen from the MAP 
figures, the scale of the industry required to sustain the air war was vast and it 
was assumed that some similar scale of effort would be required in a future 
war. Thus, in the year 1943/1944, MAP expenditure was around £800m and the 
industry was producing more than 20,000 aircraft a year. Preserving industrial 
capacity on that scale by mothballing plant was discussed but would be 
obviously wasteful. Another problem was that it was extremely hard to conceive 
of alternative ways in which the huge capacity for light alloy production 
(principally aluminium alloy, and some magnesium) that had been specially built 
up, and which was essential to the scale of war-time aircraft manufacture, could 
be usefully absorbed. 
The capacity for forging, casting and forming aluminium alloy had been 
multiplied sixteen times over pre-war levels amounting to a throughput of 
365,000 tons a year. Without some method of absorbing this capacity it was felt 
Archie Forbes, Mensforth, Owen, Jewkes and myself". 
9 
Ibid. "I suggest for your consideration that Mr Plowden, DGMP, should be added to the MAP 
Reconstruction Committee. The future of the light metal industry is an important part of our 
work and Mr Plowden is more closely in touch with this than anybody. His ability, business 
experience and "moderate capitalist" views would also make him valuable over the whole field". 
Minute of 20 January 1944 to Second Secretary, Lindsay Scott, who annotated "I mentioned this 
at this morning's meeting with the Minister. Approved, LS". Plowden had, in fact, been 
involved in the Reconstruction Committee from since August 1943 onwards due to the crucial 
contribution of light alloy production, when RS Edwards wrote "Dear Plowden, I don't know 
whether you have heard of the creation of the MAP Reconstruction Committee but such a 
committee has come into existence, its members being the Personal Secretary, Second 
Secretary, PAS (L), Mr Mensforth, Professor Jewkes, R Owen, and myself as secretary. At its 
meeting this coming Friday the Committee will be discussing..... the proposal that the time is 
ripe to approach the Light Metals Industry with regard to post-war problems.... could you 
possibly arrange to be available for this item? ". 
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that an essential enabling step in aircraft manufacture would wither. Various 
discussions were held with the industry to discuss civilian uses for aluminium in 
order to keep plant in existence. The metal was still too expensive, it was 
believed, to replace steel in car bodies, but, clutching at straws, it was agreed 
that kitchen foil which had been imported before the war from Germany - an 
annual consumption of 2000 tons - should be supplied from British sources. 
Another scheme which, in fact, was realised was the manufacture of a standard 
pattern of prefabricated aluminium house to help cope with the post-war housing 
shortage. This housing project shows how all such schemes to preserve war 
potential carried an unwelcome cost, for by August 1945 the Minister of Supply 
and Aircraft Production was asking for additional funds to subsidise that 
proportion of the £1320 unit price which "could not be justified on housing 
grounds ... to tide these 
industries over the awkward transition from war to 
peace" and for the maintenance of war potential. 1° In fact, some £75m was to be 
expended on aluminium houses over the three financial years from 1946, almost 
equalling, in the period, the amount spent on aero engines (£81m) and 
substantially exceeding that spent on the procurement of radar and signals 
equipment (£35m). " 
Thus the light alloy industry could find no panacea to sustain capacity although 
it was pointed out that pre-war weight limits on trucks had been relaxed in order 
to allow the use of cast iron in gearboxes and axle casings and the restrictions 
should be re-imposed. Commercial air transport was regarded as the only real 
opening. 12 
10 
PRO AVIA 15/3857, 'Aluminium Houses - Policy Questions'. The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer demurred. "The suggestion is not one I can accept. Parliament has provided a 
specific sum for a specific purpose and it would be contrary to all the principles of 
Parliamentary control to attempt to supplement this sum by votes". There was no identifiable 
portion of the cost, he argued, "not justified on housing grounds". 
11 
PRO AVIA 49/93-98, 'Monthly Statistical Reports', quoted in PA Winston, The British 
Government and Defence Production, 1943-50, PhD thesis, Cambridge, 1982. 
12 
The scale of the transition problem can be visualised from the fact that in 1943 the aluminium 
stock in the hands of the producers and the Government was assessed at five years normal 
requirement. There is an intriguing parallel with Italy here where aluminium production had 
been stimulated both as a contribution to the aircraft industry and as a particular symbol of 
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The problem of maintenance of war potential for the actual assembly of aircraft 
and engines continued to loom large into the post-war era, but in MAP during 
the war a philosophy was developed which appeared reconcile the conflict 
between this requirement and national economic needs. 13 This was summarised 
by Sir Lindsay Scott (Second Secretary in MAP) who referred to 
the elaborate industrial planning which Germany had undertaken in 
readiness for this war.... In planning for re-expansion we must 
seriously consider the same technique. With a given peace-time 
budget we should lean towards creating a state of readiness rather 
than towards expenditure on production of a large number of 
aircraft. '4 
It appears that thinking in the MAP came to be influenced by intelligence 
appreciations of German re-armament and particularly by an article published in 
the Ministry of Economic Warfare's Intelligence Weekly. This argued that after 
1919: 
Germany [had] evolved a new economic theory, the theory of 
Wehrwirtschaft. This conceived of the state as requiring an economic 
structure that would serve it efficiently in peace today, but must serve 
it no less efficiently if the state were plunged into war tomorrow.... 
It was both the cheapest and the most secret form of re-armament. 
The Allies could destroy arms and machinery. They could not destroy 
or prevent planning. As Herr Rathenau remarked when Peace had 
scarcely been signed "They have taken away our weapons; we must 
forge a new one out of industry". " 
modernity. After the war, the 'Mussolini metal' was redeployed extensively in new ways. Its 
special suitability for casting in small production runs contributed to the sculptural forms which 
quickly developed in a whole range of Italian consumer products ranging from motorcycles to 
coffee machines. In Britain, less 'frivolous' uses were found for the material and it did not 
stimulate industrial design in the same way. 
13 
This debate took place, of course, in the light of the then current experience and the sense that 
war potential would require enormous production potential capable of supporting the "thousand 
bomber raids" of the Second World War. This was to be replaced in the post-war era by a new 
model of air power based on smaller numbers of aircraft embodying far higher technology 
designed to carry nuclear weapons. This shift, and the short war that these weapons implied, 
were to make concerns about the maintenance of a mass aircraft industry irrelevant. 
14 
PRO AVIA 15/1915. 
15 
The significance of this paper from the M. E. W. Intelligence Weekly, dated 9.9.43 is less in the 
argument it contains, which might be refuted on various grounds, than in the fact that it is filed 
in the MAP file on reconstruction and is the only extraneous piece among the departmental 
minutes and drafts in AVIA 15/1915. 
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The approach adopted by Stafford Cripps to the reconstruction problem had 
strong echoes of this analysis of Germany's preparations. He argued that in time 
of war the rapid expansion of the aircraft industries relies on "a strong and 
extensive engineering industry", and that this potential to expand would allow 
Britain to be able "to fulfil our obligations to preserve world peace without 
devoting our resources to current production of military aircraft to an extent 
which would impose a prohibitive strain on the exchequer and a serious 
restriction of social progress". 
But there was a more visionary quality in Cripps' prescription which went far 
beyond his responsibility for the aircraft industry. He wrote that: 
I conceive that there are other and purely economic grounds for 
making the maintenance of a large and vigorous engineering industry - 
both larger and more progressive that which we had before the war - 
a major aim of our industrial policy. It is to such industries, and no 
longer to coal and cotton, that we must principally look for that 
enlargement of our export trade which it is agreed we must promote, 
and the achievement of our policy of full employment in the 
immediate post-war years will hardly be attained if two million of our 
engineering workers are thrown out of employment and the factories 
and plant ... stand idle, contributing nothing to national prosperity. 
I accordingly recommend the maintenance of an engineering industry 
substantially in excess of that existing before the war, and 
representing the minimum retrogression that which now exists, be 
accepted as a major objective of the Government's industrial 
policy". " 
Cripps' policy was concerned as much with a restoration of prosperity as with 
war potential. The huge capital investment in MAP facilities should, he argued, 
be used for a major step forward in industrial regeneration. "I conceive", he 
wrote, "that a special responsibility rests on MAP to make its capital assets 
available as the basis of a large engineering industry ... Government-owned 
assets should be applied to the reconstruction of a large peacetime engineering 
16 
PRO AVIA 15/1915. Edwin Plowden has recalled that Cripps saying "I consider myself to be 
one of the best draftsmen in the country, and I itch to re-write almost every paper that crosses 
my desk. ... I refrain 
from doing so because ... I should never get the 
best out of my officials". 
Edwin Plowden, An Industrialist in the Treasury, (London, 1989), p. 21. However, In the case 
of the evolving drafts of MAP paper on reconstruction it is clear from a study of the file that 
Cripps had a very considerable role in casting and drafting it. 
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industry. ... I should welcome endorsement of my colleagues for the view that, 
to the fullest extent practicable, Government-owned assets should be applied to 
the reconstruction of a large peacetime engineering industry". " 
These proposals were taken by Cripps to the first meeting of the Cabinet 
Reconstruction Committee in December 1943 where it was suggested by 
colleagues that "if we were to aim at maintaining an engineering industry 
substantially larger than that existing before the war, some measure of planning 
and control would have to be maintained.... Before any plans could be made 
for a large engineering industry it would be necessary to determine what that 
industry would make, where it would sell its products, and how they would be 
paid for". 18 
It must be said that the Reconstruction Committee do not appear to have 
definitely endorsed the proposal, but it was considered sympathetically. Hugh 
Dalton, for example, noted that he was glad to see proposed "a measure of 
continued control by the Government in peacetime, making use of the 
experience and contacts of the Supply Departments" and, in what can be seen as 
a glimpse of the manifesto for the coming post-war Labour government, he 
agreed with Cripps that "a new approach is needed, much more in keeping with 
the great public enterprises of this war". " More explicitly, Cripps argued for a 
continuing post-war role for the 'expert Ministry' in economic regeneration. 
The problems of the major industries are complex ... and if the 
cooperation of industry is to be secured they involve personal contact 
with the leading men. The Government has acquired through the 
Departments dealing with these industries the knowledge, the contact 
and the influence to secure the very varying degrees of assistance, 
guidance, and of reorganisation which the industries ... will be found 
17 
Ibid. The Minister of Aircraft Production, The Future of Aircraft Production, [R. C. 9(43)10], 
14 October 1943. There are evolving drafts of this paper which was under preparation for the 
Cabinet Reconstruction Committee. 
18 
PRO CAB 87/5, First Meeting of the Cabinet Reconstruction Committee, 20/12/1943. 
19 
PRO CAB 87/6, 'Cabinet Reconstruction Committee'. 
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to need. 2° 
Thereafter, MAP certainly went on to act as if a role in assisting and guiding 
the aircraft industry in the transition to peace was accepted policy. Moreover, 
this function subsequently became explicit with the creation of the post-war 
Ministry of Supply by the new Labour government in October 1945, which, as 
discussed further below, merged the wartime ministries of Supply and Aircraft 
Production. 
Complex negotiations took place between the aircraft constructors and the MAP 
over the conditions under which they would take over MAP plant and factories. 
Frequently the MAP took the manufacturer's side against the Treasury, which 
wanted more rigorous conditions, and in this MAP could appeal to 'maintenance 
of war potential'. Attempts were made to persuade firms to buy some of the 
MAP-owned capacity (and some, such as Rolls-Royce did) but the Society of 
British Aircraft Constructors (SBAC) represented that "the impact of taxation 
had prevented even the provision of normal reserves". 21 MAP officials also 
noted with equanimity a tendency by mid-1944 for the aircraft firms to "restrict 
declaration of profits and in effect create secret reserves", viewing this as 
"prudent financial policy" in view of the prospects of coming cuts in production 
orders. 22 
It was also claimed by the firms that their own machinery had been "worked to 
death on expansion contracts" in the early part of the war before the MAP had 
supplied machine tools and it would be unjust to make them pay the 
20 
PRO CAB 87/7 R (44)42, Memorandum by the Minister of Aircraft Production (Sir Stafford 
Cripps) 'Government and the Major industries', 8 March 1944, quoted in David Edgerton, 
Mercer, Rollings and Tomlinson, 'Labour Governments', (n. 2 above). 
21 
PRO AVIA 65/1731, 'Post-war financing of the Aircraft Industry'. See also WK Cowing and 
MM Gowing in British War Economy, (HMSO, 1949), pp 534-546 which considers war-time 
reconstruction plans although there is no specific mention of the MAP. 
22 
Ibid. "I should, perhaps, also observe that recently one firm has published accounts declaring 
lower profits and consequent lower recoveries as EPT [Excess Profits Tax] although there 
would not appear to be any real reduction in production and presumably in profit anticipations". 
DDC (2), 26/7/1944 and reply of ADA (2) of 27/7/1944. 
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(hypothetical) market rate for the replacements. They asked for the first call on 
Crown assets (machine tools) operated by them in their works. 23 
The total value of machine tools provided by government for aircraft production 
was estimated by MAP in June 1943 at £200m. 24 This was considerably in 
excess of what could be absorbed by the post-war aircraft industry. Much of the 
stock was disposed of by MAP through sales and was bought by the general 
engineering and the automotive industries. This vast disposal exercise has led 
David Edgerton to challenge the conventional view of the condition of British 
industry in the years after the war and to remark that, contrary to the usual 
assessment, much of the production equipment "was not clapped out; it was 
brand new". 25 
In the event, most of the production capacity that the aircraft firms wished to 
retain was in fact passed to them, and this was tacitly accepted in the statement 
of the Committee on Internal Economic Problems (Production Department's 
Sub-committee) that 'whatever the long run plans with regard to location of 
industry, it will be necessary to make use as far as possible of Government 
created capacity in the immediate post-war years', while the President of the 
Board of Trade announced that 'we must first decide which factories will be 
wanted for arms production after the war. That is primarily for the Services and 
Supply Departments to settle but we are anxious that full use shall be made for 
whatever is the best peace-time purpose of all these factories after the war' . 
26 
23 
PRO AVIA 15/1915, notes of meeting at ICI House, Millbank with the SBAC, 16 September 
1943. 
24 
Ibid. "The expansion of capital equipment for the aircraft programme has involved capital 
commitments (up to June 1943) amounting to £350m, of which £150m has been incurred on 
buildings and £200m on plant". 
25 
These disposals have been discussed by David Edgerton in 'Public ownership and the British 
arms industry, 1920-1950', in Millward and Singleton (n. 1 above) and in Mercer, Rollings and 
Tomlinson, 'Labour Governments', (n. 2 above). 
26 
PRO AVIA 15/1915, (author's emphasis). 
31 
The outcome was that firms were able to rent, rather than buy, factory and 
plant, paying a percentage of a valuation that depreciated yearly. This 
arrangement was clearly attractive for, at the time of the Plowden Report in 
1965, five out of seven factories in the British Aircraft Corporation were still 
government-owned. 27 Although, by then, the Bristol company had bought the 
Filton plant and airfield it had not done so by 1950 and managed to extract 
£3559,19s 7d. from the MoS for the removal of blackout materials and the re- 
instatement of roof-glazing, in spite of an earlier view in the MoS that the 
Ministry was not liable for this. 28 
Thus the spirit in which the aircraft industry was treated in the post-war era, it 
is argued, was established to a considerable degree by the plans formulated for 
reconstruction within MAP at the end of the war. Subsequent chapters will 
adduce more evidence for the contribution of this thinking to the character and 
development of the industry. Although there was an inevitable dilution of this 
'Crippsian' vision with time, and with the departure of Stafford Cripps from 
MAP in 1945, elements of his new strategic approach survived for decades and 
were to underpin the long-standing, and often debated, policy of support to the 
industry. 
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The Civil Aircraft Programme 
In February 1943 the War Cabinet decided that work on the design of new types 
of civil aircraft and the conversion of existing military types should proceed "as 
and when this could be done without impairing the war effort. ... The 
Government's objective ... was to secure the production after the war of British 
transport aircraft, civil and military, of a scale and quality in keeping with our 
world position". 29 
Lord Brabazon, a former Minister of Aircraft Production and famous pioneer 
aviator, was asked to form a committee to study the prospects for British civil 
aircraft. 3° This episode is well known, in a general way, and has often been 
represented as an unrealistic or insufficiently serious attack on the problem. For 
instance, the Bristol aircraft designer, Archibald Russell, later opined that "Brab 
had loads of charisma. ... 
One might reflect that the hero of such experience 
and reputation, with all at his command, ought to have won greater success" 
adding that the committee's first action (defining the requirement for the future 
Bristol Brabazon de luxe transatlantic airliner) was "a high dive into the deep 
end without looking to see if there was any water there". " 
Unfortunately the problems of the overly ambitious Brabazon airliner have 
coloured views about the Committee's work but its general orientation, and 
many of its recommendations for other aircraft were sound. 32 The Committee 
worked with considerable vision and thoroughness. The failures of the British 
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civil aircraft programme to achieve all that was hoped for it, which will be 
examined in subsequent sections, are almost entirely due to factors outside the 
Brabazon committee's control. Thus it considered the provision of a range of 
aircraft types for all the important commercial sectors and routes and drew up 
detailed specifications for each. The design criteria, in particular, were highly 
considered. They specified all the relevant performance and safety criteria such 
as speed, rate of climb, behaviour with one engine shut down and so on, but 
went beyond that to define aircraft which would be competitive in the 
international airline market against American competition. The Committee drew 
attention, for example, to the need to reduce man-hours required for engine 
changes and a wide range of service operations. Passenger conditions were also 
specified, with the air conditioning on long-haul aircraft "to provide no less than 
60 lbs of air per minute. ... The ventilation of the lavatory compartment shall 
be such that any odours which originate in them will not be admitted to any 
other compartment". The targets for temperature, pressure and the noise level 
"a maximum of 60 phons" were all set out. 
It should be noted that this British civil programme took place against the 
background of a rapidly spreading American aviation network and an American 
industry that was burgeoning with advanced new transport designs. It was 
quickly evident that Britain was going to be outpaced and British negotiators, 
including Lord Beaverbrook (as Chairman of the Commercial Air Transport 
Committee) tried to slow the pace of negotiations on international air regulation 
with Adolf Berle, the American State Department's civil aviation representative, 
suggesting, in August 1944 "a postponement of your project for moving out 
onto the civil air routes of the world. Instead, we request an International Air 
Conference". " 
Berle appealed in the spirit of internationalism and free trade noting that: 
In many parts of the world it is now obvious that the war area is 
receding and civil needs are ... reasserting themselves. ... The highest 
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considerations of humanity and common sense as well as the inherent 
interest of establishing ... normal commercial life dictates the 
extension of civil air travel". ' 
Even if a conference were to produce complete agreement, Berle argued, it 
would take time to implement and he asked for an immediate interim 
arrangement to be set up. 
However, these difficult discussions were taking place in a pre-existing mood of 
suspicion between Britain and the USA over the air transport services that were 
being provided during the war, for such services were seen as laying the 
foundations for post-war airline operations, both through their role in training 
aircrew and in allowing the development of the necessary infrastructure such as 
communications and navigation aids, airport equipment and so on. In particular, 
the extension of Pan American into areas previously opened up and operated by 
Imperial Airways gave particular cause for mistrust in Britain. 
Thus when Pan American was allowed to operate a service to assist the Allied 
military effort in the Middle East and Africa, Arthur Tedder, as commander of 
Allied air forces in the theatre quickly discerned "the cloven hoof of Pan 
American ... They are about to open a booking office in Cairo for passenger 
services" and telegraphed colourfully to London that "sheep's clothing of 
USAAC [United States Army Air Corps] will not change habits or diets of the 
wolf". Tedder considered that the Americans were actively developing their 
routes in advance of any formal agreement "quite regardless of our interests 
[and] despite the fact that they are only able to do so with our active 
assistance. " 
He commented that "our American 'friends' were some of the toughest business 
men I had come across" and noted that by June 1942 Pan American had, 
without authorization and without consulting any of the authorities in Cairo, 
instituted a weekly scheduled air service between Cairo and Teheran, via 
Baghdad and Basra, "on the pretext of returning United States ferry crews.... 
34 
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Pan American ... were attempting to leave no stone unturned in infiltrating to 
the maximum extent, legally or illegally". 35 
However, from the American perspective, Britain also was guilty of bending the 
rules and Berle observed that: 
The government of the US notes that ... in substance British Overseas Airways Corporation operates as a militarised service where 
convenient, and a commercial service wherever practical, and is 
actually performing the service of a fare-carrying common carrier in 
the areas from which the war has actually receded, although on a 
priority basis. On the other hand, the American Air Transport Service 
is a wholly militarised service which neither collects fares nor 
performs any ... of the services of a common carrier. The disparity between these two arrangements is so great as to raise a real danger 
of considerable [American] public reaction". " 
The threat of hostile American public opinion was also raised with respect to 
landing rights for American carriers abroad. In order to prosecute the war the 
United States had constructed a large number of airfields throughout the world, 
many of them on the territory of the British Empire, and, it was claimed, 
American opinion demanded reasonable use of all airfields constructed by them. 
Nevertheless, Britain had a reasonably strong position. There was the American 
fear that Britain "might be driven back on an All Red policy" and retreat from 
the internationalisation of air transport. Moreover the right of any nation to 
carry passengers internally could not be challenged and Britain had hinted that, 
for this purpose, the Commonwealth might be claimed as a political unit, 
analogous to the states of the American union. " 
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The upshot of Anglo-American negotiation was the international conference in 
Bermuda in early 1946 which led to British acceptance of the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) and the establishment of the complex but 
remarkably durable rules to regulate rates and national relationships which 
thereafter regulated international air transport for many decades. 38 This 
represented a step down from the British position at the earlier conference at 
Chicago in November 1944, partly, perhaps, because of the concurrent approach 
to the USA for a major loan to assist Britain with its post-war economic 
problems and the end of Lend-Lease. 39 
However, the diplomatic contest was to prove more or less irrelevant to British 
aspirations in civil aviation for, while Britain was not without bargaining power 
for negotiations over landing rights, overflying and the whole structure of 
international air transport, the prospects for manufacturing competitive British 
civil aircraft and for organising efficient airline services were bleak. In 1943, 
American airlines were operating 300,000 route miles compared with 72,000 
operated together by RAF Transport Command and British airlines. The Civil 
Air Transport Committee, chaired by Beaverbrook, listed the advantages of the 
USA in civil air transport. This included an output of 400 airliners a month, 
with nine types in production and 13 multi-engined types under development, 
whereas Britain had none at all in production. The United States was also 
researching the problems of civil airline operation through its Civil Aeronautics 
Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration - government bodies with a 
combined staffing of 9000 people. The committee noted that: 
Britain has had no opportunity or manpower available for a detailed 
study of these questions. ... The Americans are operating more than 1000 transport aircraft on regular services. We are operating 250, 
mostly American types. Nineteen separate civil airlines are operating 
inside and outside the USA and ... have gained a great wealth of 
experience. We have only one company and hence only one line of 
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experience. 40 
At the same time British industry was unable to make any significant progress 
on the promised new civil types for, even as the war drew to a close, it was to 
prove extraordinarily difficult to prize adequate industrial and design capacity 
away from the RAF. 
Thus Beaverbrook wrote to Sir Archibald Sinclair, Secretary of State at the Air 
Ministry in August 1944 noting that: 
what we need at once is 50 Lancasters converted for long-range 
transport operations.... During my chairmanship of the C. A. T. [Civil 
Air Transport] committee there has been plenty of hope and 
expectation but no aircraft. If we can provide aircraft now there is 
still a hope for British Civil Aviation. " 
The Air Ministry expressed sympathy but suggested, from a security point of 
view, that Britain could not afford to end the war with "a second-rate air force". 
The MAP countered that as secrecy was not a problem the armed forces could 
be combed for "alien draughtsmen", although those concerned with 
implementing the civil programme made the obviously valid point that good new 
civil aircraft could only be designed by experienced designers from the industry. 
Indeed, an Air Ministry official noted that although about 260 draughtsmen had 
been found from various sources specifically for work on civil types, only 60 of 
these were actually engaged on civil work "because inexperienced men were 
useless for work in the early stages of design at which the civil types now 
were". 42 Nevertheless, the Air Ministry (representing the RAF position) refused 
to agree to the MAP suggestion that urgent civil types should enjoy equal 
priority with those military types which were not regarded as essential to front- 
line combat operations. " 
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The comments of Sir William Hildred, Director General of Civil Aviation and a 
member of the Brabazon committee, show the frustration of those who wished 
to see Britain make a start in air transport again. He queried whether all of the 
huge amount of current military work was useful, remarking that "I have no 
wish to pry into military secrets but there must surely be some military work 
which could now be set on one side ... What ... is the need for the Windsor or 
the Buckingham? ". He observed that: 
The RAF ... intend to cling the whole of the present aircraft design 
staff. ... they are going to use a lot of 
it (and indeed are doing so 
now) for post-war military work. ... They are not entitled to do this 
... they will have to face Parliament, the Treasury and the taxpayer 
... clinging like this ... to the detriment of civil work. [We are faced] with an absolute impossibility. Get 500 trained men from 
somewhere and then you can have your Brabazon designs. The 
situation ... cannot be met by half measures or shilly-shallying. This is a matter for the War Cabinet". 44 
However, in the mood of the times, the requirements of the RAF proved too 
pressing and only piecemeal design efforts were allocated at the firms to civil 
types. In fact the stated requirements for draughtsmen and designers on civil 
projects would have been quite inadequate even if they had been met in full, and 
are a measure of the slight unreality of all the initiatives to put British civil 
production on a comparable level to the American. Against the worthy desire to 
release 500 trained men to be spread over six Brabazon types can be set the 
observation by Sir Roy Fedden, the former Bristol engine chief, who found in 
1943, at the Lockheed factory, 500 staff working on the design of the new 
Constellation airliner alone. At the peak of the design effort the total for that 
aircraft had been 700 men with 1.7 million drawing office hours expended on 
it. 45 Some might consider Fedden a partial witness, as a technocratic zealot and 
tireless campaigner for his industry, but numerous observers from government, 
the RAF and elsewhere, brought by war procurement work into contact with the 
American aircraft industry, commented on the disparity with Britain. There 
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were also reservations both inside and outside MAP about the resolve of the 
aircraft manufacturers to act energetically. Lord Beaverbrook, for example, 
while representing British interests during the international civil air transport 
negotiations, observed at the same time that "this industry looks as if it's a 
hotbed of cold feet". ' 
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The Amalgamation of MAP and the Ministry of Supply 
The case for the amalgamation of the Ministry of Aircraft Production with the 
Ministry of Supply had been put by Cripps to the Machinery of Government 
Committee in November 1944.47 Although no decision was reached by the 
Coalition Government it was clearly Cripps' view that was carried over to the 
1945 Labour Government which merged the two in October 1945.48 It is hard to 
avoid the conclusion that the ethos of the MAP, with its sophisticated planning 
procedures and its amazing war-time production achievement, made it the 
dominant partner in this new body. This can, perhaps, be glimpsed from a MoS 
record of a joint meeting in September 1945 about the proposed merger which 
recorded that "The MAP representatives seemed disinclined for serious 
discussion". 49 
The strategic industrial role of the combined Ministry was clearly stated at the 
outset. In addition to "a central war potential motif" there was a wide-ranging 
responsibility for engineering which the MoS itself defined as "all kinds of 
products, mainly of metal, which involve relatively complex engineering 
procedures. "S0 It noted that the whole sector of military supply, two and a half 
47 
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million persons strong, absorbed over £750m of defence spending and 
contributed 40% of visible exports. The MoS, it argued therefore "has the best 
understanding, the frequent contacts and the technical knowledge to help it meet 
the difficult Government objectives of high exports and the dollar export 
drive". " 
When the exhibition, "Britain Can Make It" opened at the Victoria and Albert 
Museum in September 1946, Stafford Cripps, as President of the Board of 
Trade which sponsored it, saw there the visible evidence of the transformation 
of war production to produce the broad economic progress that he had argued 
for in the reconstruction debates. He wrote: 
Here we are able to prove, by selected examples of British consumer 
goods, most of them already in the shops or in quantity production, 
not only that Britain can make it - for the War proved that beyond a 
doubt - but that Britain can make goods that are new, beautifully 
designed and efficient.... Here are the goods which, because they are 
designed for economical mass production, will enrich the homes and 
daily lives of each one of us". 
The title of the exhibition was a good one, said Cripps, showing that "we have 
passed from the years of endurance to the years of achievement, from 
destruction to creation. 52 
Why was the Aircraft Industry not Nationalised? 
One curiosity about the transition of the aircraft manufacturing industry from 
war to peace is that it escaped serious consideration for nationalisation. It was 
not apparently, in spite of its huge war-time size, viewed as one of the 
"commanding heights" of the economy although civil air transport was to be in 
51 
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the hands of national corporations. 
There were several reasons for this. First we can consider the industry's 
enormous war-time prestige. Its most famous products - particularly the Spitfire, 
the Mosquito and the Lancaster bomber, with their sonorous Rolls-Royce 
engines - were the most obvious symbols of British war-time aviation technique 
and were held by press and radio reports - and their actual presence overhead - 
constantly in the public eye. Post-war nationalisation of such an obviously 
successful industry would have been seen as a clearly hostile and punitive 
action. As Edgerton has noted, after 1941 the armament and aircraft firms were 
seen "as having created new scientific weapons in full collaboration with labour. 
It was not an industry which needed the strong medicine of nationalisation to 
bring it up to scratch". " 
But there was a dislocation between the popular view and the perception within 
the MAP which was more equivocal about the industry's abilities. The talent of 
particular design teams in the airframe sector was esteemed, Vickers had a good 
reputation for production management, and Rolls-Royce had won almost 
unconditional respect through unswerving adherence to its own technical 
judgement and for being right. ' But the general organisation, the finances and 
the 'spirit' of the companies came in for considerable criticism. 
Writing in July 1945, for example, Sir Lindsay Scott, a senior official at the 
MAP, gave a detailed exposition of the department's view. 
The industry is at present highly bureaucratised, producing what it is 
told to produce by the Department, substantially guaranteed against 
unemployment and financial loss, and content to accept the low profit 
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rates which the absence of any considerable risk-bearing rightly 
entails. We have made some efforts, with the late Minister's assent, 
to stir the industry from its lethargy in the civil aircraft field, but so 
far without success. The industry which has been the largest in the 
country is ending the war inadequately financed to undertake the 
development and production which will be required in time of peace. 
Not more than half a dozen aircraft companies are in reasonably 
sound condition. ... If we continue to finance the industry, and if it 
continues in its present bureaucratised condition, there will be no 
alternative in ten years time to its nationalisation". " 
The administration of the aircraft industry by MAP was, in many respects, 
unlike a normal civil service administration. As we have seen this was, in part, 
due to the fact that the MAP directly owned much of the production facilities 
and itself disbursed enormous sums to existing manufacturers, so that normal 
pre-war contractual arrangements and practices such as competitive tendering 
were neither relevant nor practicable. The position of the MAP with regard to 
the firms can be glimpsed from the profit figures which the Ministry recorded. 
Thus in 1941 Rolls-Royce earned just 5.4% on 'cost of sales' but was allowed 
by MAP only 4.4% on the basis of calculations as to how much of that 
production relied on Ministry-owned machine tools. By 1944 the profit allowed 
to Rolls-Royce by MAP was a mere 2.05%. The justification for this, as 
implied above, was the high level of MAP investment but also the national 
emergency and the great will on all sides to contribute in the highest degree. s6 
The MAP could also point out the low commercial risk in their contracts and 
that profits were high relative to the company's own capital employed. Thus for 
Rolls-Royce the 1943 year profit figure was 33.4% on company's capital 
employed, but 4.29% on cost of sales (of which 2.35% was actually allowed by 
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MAP). A company such as Airspeed, which was poorly capitalised pre-war was 
showing a profit of 62.5 % on its own capital in 1943 while Armstrong 
Whitworth's profit on this basis peaked at 165.66%. 57 Nevertheless, whatever 
the moral case, the tiny profit earned on turnover seems to be the right indicator 
to take in assessing the ability of the companies to be able to adequately finance 
new post-war production, for this figure related more realistically to the costs of 
producing newer, more complex aircraft in larger numbers than had been 
contemplated from their own resources in the period before government- 
financed expansion. 
Of course public ownership for the industry also implied public finance, 
whereas it was the desire of the Ministry and the Treasury to escape this and to 
encourage the firms to generate their own finance for new projects. MAP 
officials referred to a "policy of carefully restricted financial assistance [to 
revive] the spirit of commercial initiative" and that "the over-riding 
consideration was to encourage contractors to put down the money in the first 
place, because ... expenditure of contractors' own money ... has a valuable 
psychological effect in tending to make them more self-reliant, and to get them 
out of the war-time habit of being spoon-fed". 58 
However, the deep and irreconcilable paradox in this argument, (which formed 
the background to the MAP's desire to have discretion in the financial 
conditions for the disposal of its own plant and facilities to the industry) was the 
continuing need or wish to use the industry as an instrument of government 
policy, whether in a strategic government-directed attack on the international air 
transport market, or in the maintenance of war potential. "It is to be borne in 
mind, and should be appreciated by the Treasury", MAP noted "that some of 
the capital and development expenditure which we want to encourage the firms 
to undertake will be near to or beyond the limits of commercial prudence. ... If 
57 
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we want rapid development in design and in productive capacity to be financed 
in any degree by industry we must be ready either to relieve the firms of some 
share of the risk or offer them higher profits". " 
Another reason for the absence of plans to nationalise the industry was that Sir 
Stafford Cripps, in his strategic planning for the sector, did not consider it 
necessary, in view of MAP's perceived success in running aircraft production, 
observing to a socialist audience in 1945 that "the fact that the actual operation 
of industry remained in private hands has not mattered seriously, since the 
Supply departments have been able to exercise the pressure necessary and in 
extreme cases to take over the control of the individual factory or firm". 6o 
Cripps' approach was ambitious, dirigiste, and strategic, but he appeared to 
consider, like his officials, that the best hope of fostering a British aviation 
industry that could make a useful contribution to national prosperity lay in 
encouraging development of its own initiative. Indeed, Cripps was offered the 
bait, one might say, by Labour members of the War Cabinet in the first meeting 
of the Reconstruction Committee where "some members expressed the view that 
a higher proportion of the post-war aircraft industry should be under direct 
Government control". 61 It was also suggested that pre-war re-armament had 
been slow, due to the reluctance of private industry to convert to war 
production, and that this constituted a strong case for government control. 
However, Cripps turned the suggestion aside by reminding colleagues of his 
proposal "that at least one factory should be retained for Government 
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operation". " 
Finally, the practical point should not be overlooked. The legislation for steel 
nationalisation took some two and a half years to prepare and implement. The 
aircraft industry, we have seen, was regarded as a problem as well as an asset; 
it was divided into numerous companies of widely differing sizes, capabilities 
and structures, and it was supported by what has been called "a vast 
archipelago" of subcontracting firms. Many of these, for example, including 
tyres, brakes, hydraulics, sparking plug and magneto makers, might not 
necessarily have aircraft work as their sole business, but their products were 
indispensable for the industry. Segregating and selecting these for nationalisation 
would have been an administrative and legislative minefield and no one sought 
to try. 
Civil Airliners: Initial Post-war Tensions 
The system set in place in the closing stages of the war for civil aircraft 
procurement by the MAP was carried over into the merged Ministry of Supply 
(MoS) which as we have seen now combined the functions the war-time 
Ministry of Supply and the MAP. 
The MoS thus entered the post-war era with the strong sense, within the new, 
that it would sponsor the design and development of civil types and promote the 
civil aircraft production programme. Although the Treasury argued for clarity in 
accounting which would reveal any element of subsidy the MAP/MoS view was 
that it should negotiate a sale price which would not include an element for 
development "unless directly related to the type" and that "while some items 
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[are] identifiable as civil aviation much of the expenditure could not be so 
segregated". Officials also advanced the idea of "favourable leases" to civil 
operators and also sought to deliberately blur the basis on which civil projects 
were being financed, emphasising to the Treasury the supposed difficulty in 
separating out the development costs "since the civil types are being financed 
out of payments made on military contracts". The argument was also advanced 
that the costs of aircraft supplied to the British Overseas Airways Corporation 
(BOAC) should also be excluded "as BOAC for the moment must be regarded 
as ... on war service". 
There was, additionally, a diplomatic reason for 
downplaying the expenditure on civil aircraft R&D, in spite of Treasury 
pressure to disclose true costs and to adhere to "orthodox financial arrangements 
to which Parliament rightly attaches importance", in that publication of a 
realistic figure, estimated at some £8m to £10m, was expected to cause 
difficulties over Lease-Lend negotiations, and raise the suspicion in America 
that its military aid was being diverted to establish a peacetime competitor 
industry in Britain. Lord Swinton, as Minister for Civil Aviation, therefore 
proposed putting the research, development and production figure at just £1.5m 
and "strongly objected to giving the US public a stick to beat us with". ' 
This manoeuvre was opposed by the Treasury and may also have been viewed 
as diplomatically risky, but the proposal underlines how far one major current in 
official thinking had diverged from the more formal ideal expressed in some 
quarters a year or so earlier that it was "important that our industry is able to 
produce civil types on commercial terms, which will enable them to compete in 
world markets" and that, if there was to be subsidy, it would be healthier that 
"it should be openly revealed, rather than hidden away in some complicated 
financing system". ' The idea of a notional civil/military split for R&D was 
therefore used by MoS but this was inevitably opaque. In the event, the 
government/industry ensemble entered the post-war era already conditioned to a 
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kind of collusive and complicated system of aircraft financing which was 
intended to serve a wide, and probably irreconcilable, array of policy aims. 
But by January 1947 the British airlines were starting to resist the statutory role 
of the MoS in aircraft development and procurement. Sir Henry Self, 
(Permanent Secretary in the MoS) noted that "certain of the airline operators are 
challenging the decision that aircraft which they require shall be ordered by the 
Ministry of Supply. They argue that they should order their aircraft direct from 
the manufacturers ... ". 
65 
MoS officials argued that only the Ministry could act in the national interest 
since the design resources must be "fairly allocated" between civil and military 
interests. "The MoS must participate in all major developments and its 
participation will be of benefit to individual users. Any other arrangements 
would mean putting the clock back and would be contrary to the whole trend of 
administration ... ". 
ý The MoS advanced a striking number of arguments to 
defend the procedure by which it supervised all development, including the fact 
that without MoS involvement "technical vetting would be in the hands of the 
Air Registration Board. A Certificate of Airworthiness from them might not in 
all instances be sufficient technical proof that the aeroplane is adequate for its 
tasks". ' This was a striking argument, and proof, one might adduce, of a 
dangerous arrogance in the department for the Air Registration Board was also a 
government organisation - the one, in fact, with the statutory responsibility to 
establish the airworthiness of new types. Falling back on the war-time habits of 
control, the argument was also put that although "it is very difficult to prove 
that money is saved through bulk purchase by the MoS on behalf of all users ... 
the Ministry's long experience of aircraft contracts and its knowledge of the 
general financial position of the aircraft firms and of their overhead costs etc. 
65 
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cannot but fail to be an advantage in price negotiation". The powerful influence 
of the RAF over procurement also surfaced in the argument that the airlines' 
desire to order directly without the mediation of the Ministry of Supply was an 
attempt to 'jump the queue', as suggested by the assertion of Sir Leslie 
Hollinghurst (AMSO) that "the [airline] Corporations could only get better 
prices and deliveries at the expense of the services". 68 
Nevertheless, BOAC and BSAA (British South American Airways) did secure 
some independence, partly by refusing to attend meetings with the MoS to 
discuss procedures for ordering, and in the case of BSAA, ignoring the MoS 
procedure and placing direct orders with the companies for spares and 
overhauls. A compromise position was proposed and the Prime Minister 
directed that "while the orders should continue to be placed by the Ministry of 
Supply and not by the Corporations themselves, in order to secure the 
advantages of bulk purchase and to co-ordinate civil and military production, the 
Ministry should place orders as the agent of, and in agreement with, the 
Corporations". 69 
However, BOAC was intransigent and RG Strauss (by then successor to John 
Wilmot as Minister of Supply) noted in November 1947 that the Prime 
Minister's directive on ordering procedure was not being followed by the 
Corporations. BOAC had refused, in writing, to discuss contracts with his 
Ministry or to co-operate in the purchase of the D. H 106 [the de Havilland 
Comet] for which the corporation was negotiating directly with de Havillands, 
and that "in the case of the D. H. 106 there were no prototypes in the accepted 
sense of the wordi7° Ministry officials also commented that the Comet "is an 
anomaly -a product of the Corporation's orders", queried whether the AID 
inspection standards were sufficiently high, and commented on the 
68 
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"uncooperative attitude of the firm", their insistence on being given a free hand, 
and the difficulty in finding any way "of checking the design standards being 
used", " 
The wider strategic implications of the Comet crashes are touched on in chapter 
five. However, it is worth noting that the Comet programme, contrary to the 
MoS views above, was not simply a response to a BOAC order but an 
imaginative idea from de Havillands which gained powerful moral support from 
Lord Brabazon. Against the background of the other civil projects which, as we 
have seen, were stalled largely by the RAF and Air Ministry insisting on the 
retention of design and production effort for military aircraft, Brabazon strongly 
recommended it to the Cabinet in June 1944, noting that "its appearance ahead 
of any rivals would be a timely reminder of the pioneering work done on jet 
propulsion in this country". He also commended the valuable operating 
experience it would provide and its "great advertising value". The jet airliner, 
he argued, would get "the best and quickest value for post-Armistice aviation 
that can be got from the diversion of a small percentage of design effort now. 
... We have no hesitation in recommending that such an aircraft should 
be 
built" . 
72 
Thus the Comet acquired a powerful symbolic status which relates closely to 
national perceptions of the importance of the Whittle jet which will be studied in 
the next chapter. The Comet's rapid progress can also be seen as a direct 
response to the impenetrable difficulties placed in the way of almost all the 
other civil programmes by the Air Ministry and the RAF. As it was, the metal 
fatigue failures that lay ahead can be viewed, in part, as the result of this 
intransigence, forcing the company, and the project, into a kind of 'maverick' 
position in order to progress at all. If it had not fallen prey to these tragic 
structural failures the Comet would certainly have been seen as full justification 
for the independence that de Havilland and the BOAC board established to bring 
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this revolutionary aircraft into service. ' 
But although officials could, perhaps, have subsequently argued that the Comet 
disasters in 1954 could be taken as justifying the centralised MoS procedures the 
other types of aircraft that continued slowly to be procured through the now 
rickety Ministry system could hardly be said to vindicate it. Writing in 1958, 
after he had left the MAP, Ely Devons as former Chief Statistician there can be 
allowed the expression of hindsight on the programme which might be 
considered ahistorical from this author. He wrote: 
It is not possible or necessary to go into the detail of the sorry story 
of the series of unsuccessful civil aircraft, either designed as such or 
converted from basic military designs, produced in the immediate 
post-war years - the Brabazon I, the Shetland, Apollo, Marathon, 
Sandringham, Solent, Tudor, Hermes and Princess Flying Boat. This 
series of misfortunes completely discredited the idea, which so 
dominated thinking in the immediate post-war years, that the Ministry 
of Supply and the Ministry of Civil Aviation together could plan 
requirements ahead and therefore place general production orders on 
behalf of British operators. 74 
The organisation of the industry and the administrative machinery was the 
subject of persistent scrutiny. Following the crash of an Avro Tudor belonging 
to BSAA in 1948 a committee under Sir John Hanbury-Williams criticised the 
system of procurement under MoS supervision and recommended that the 
airlines should deal directly with the manufacturers and that the relationship 
should be on a more directly commercial basis. However, this liberalisation of 
civil aircraft production for the airlines, which was approved by the Attlee 
73 
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government, was inevitably equivocal. There was still a complex relationship 
over ordering and funding, with the possibility of both subtle or overt pressure 
on the airlines, while, in turn, the airlines could argue for modifications to 
specifications and for subsidies to operate British types which may well have 
injured their wider saleability. Importantly too, for the aircraft manufacturing 
industry, the launch funding of civil projects and the whole framework of 
research and development finance on which they depended was still disbursed by 
the Ministry of Supply or its successors. "s The further evolution of these 
systems and relationships is explored in chapter six. 
75 
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Chapter 3: The Development of the Whittle Engine 
Introduction 
The development of the jet engine in Britain during the Second World War was 
to have a profound effect both on the national imagination and on national 
perceptions of British capability in aviation. The jet also had a major influence 
on the structure of the post-war aircraft industry and jet development also 
connects to the creation of new government-financed institutions in British 
aeronautics that will be examined in the next chapter. Thus the jet project, and 
the various structural changes made during its course, are closely bound up with 
the modernising aims that Stafford Cripps, as Minister of Aircraft Production, 
had for the aircraft industry. 
The programme, virtually from its inception, was sponsored and administered 
by the Air Ministry and, from 1940, by the Ministry of Aircraft Production 
(MAP). Therefore the progress of the jet from the original visionary promise of 
outstanding performance, through its troubled development engineering process 
and finally to production, forms the subject for a case study of unusual value in 
the context of this work. The previous chapter pointed up the size of the 
industrial sector directed by the MAP and its considerable achievement in 
maximising the production of aircraft combined with sufficient flexibility to 
allow the continual growth in performance that was essential in combat. The 
Whittle jet illustrates the management by MAP of an entirely different type of 
project -a radical innovation from a small new company which did not, in 
itself, possess sufficient resources, both human and financial, to complete the 
job alone. It will be argued that MAP direction in this case was far less sure, 
and that, contrary to the generally received view, it was too indulgent to Whittle 
for too long. Naturally high technology programmes such as this are inevitably 
harder to manage than long production runs of relatively stable products but we 
do have, as a comparator, development of the jet engine in America which 
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overtook Whittle's company in developing a reliable and airworthy unit after 
details of its design was provided to General Electric in October 1941. We 
have, also, in the case of the German jet engine, an alternative model, which 
will be examined, for the government direction and the conversion of an 
advanced concept into a viable product in war-time. 
Thus the British jet programme is of great interest as a test of MAP's direction 
of an advanced technology, high risk project, and it is suggested that the 
patterns of administration developed through the project were carried over into 
the post-war Ministry of Supply in a period when many other projects which 
represented step-changes in technology and performance were in gestation. Put 
crudely, the response of MAP to difficulties with the Whittle jet development 
was to allow the emergence of a number of projects from rival firms rather than 
to force the development of the engine to take place in one competent concern 
capable of experimental design and manufacture. This did lead to the creation of 
a number of functional engines and capable design teams, although it must be 
judged a wasteful use of war-time resources. More tellingly, in the context of 
this study, it is argued that this response to jet problems conditioned MAP and 
the MoS to the wasteful practice of multiple procurement and multiple 
experimental projects in the post-war era. 
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The Origins of the British Jet 
The linkage between jet work and government, however, begins in the 1930s 
and it is therefore necessary to step back in time for the start of this account. 
This chapter, therefore, examines the progress of the Whittle jet from pre-war 
developments and the launch of the Power Jets company, through the troubled 
war-time attempts to build and productionise the engine, and leading on to the 
development of a structure for the post-war gas turbine industry. The story is of 
great interest because the jet engine proved, in the post-war era, to be the most 
important contemporary development in aeronautics and a technology in which 
Britain had a very considerable capability which still endures. However, the 
debate is still alive about the way Whittle was treated and the episode raises 
wider questions about the British management of R&D and its translation into 
successful business. It is argued here that the jet programme was both more 
influential, in terms of providing a new orientation for the UK industry, but also 
less successful, with respect to the particular progress of the Whittle team, than 
has generally been appreciated. We must also examine the question that has 
often been raised as to whether the Air Ministry did too little to assist Whittle. 
Events in the Whittle saga are still debated and are more than a little 
mysterious. 
The jet engine programme had a complex history, both in terms of engineering 
development, the official administration of the project, inter-firm collaboration, 
and the structure of Frank Whittle's firm, Power Jets. All these strands suggest, 
contrary to the accepted view, a considerable degree of flexibility, and indeed 
originality, on the official side in fostering the new engine and the new industry. 
There was, at the outset, the establishment and funding of Power Jets, the 
company set up in 1936 to develop the Whittle engine, which, it is argued, was 
from the outset almost a surrogate official project, and not simply the 
independent entrepreneurial venture, battling against adversity, that is usually 
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depicted. Then there was the formation of the Gas Turbine Collaboration 
Committee which became an unusual mechanism for pooling experience across 
all the aero engine companies and government agencies engaged in the jet 
engine programme, almost irrespective of commercial rights. The nationalisation 
of Power Jets in 1944 and its merger with the turbine engine department of the 
RAE also suggests a contemporary open-mindedness about exploring new kinds 
of organisation, and there is finally the conversion of this government-owned 
company into a more conventional state research establishment - the National 
Gas Turbine Establishment (NGTE). 
The Historiography of the Jet 
The pioneering work of Frank Whittle on the jet engine and the subsequent 
nationalisation of his company, Power Jets, has been the subject of considerable 
attention in the history of technology; indeed the history of the jet has become 
an important case study within the subject and a paradigm for a particular kind 
of revolutionary technological change. At a more popular level, the received 
version of the British jet story has a compelling quality as "an exemplary 
episode, or mini-fable, with a simple, yet plausible before-and-after narrative 
structure. ' 
However, it is argued here that there has not been an objective or a complete 
account of these events and neither have the reasons for the nationalisation of 
Whittle's company been fully analyzed. Postan, Hay and Scott, in the official 
history, while not glossing over the difficulties encountered in development, 
certainly did not report fully the sense of frustration that existed within the MAP 
towards the project when it ran into difficulties or the resentment and even 
1 
"... of the type that is adduced to show the mechanic arts as the initiating agent of change [in] 
the received version of popular history". Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, Does Technology 
Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994). 
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hostility that developed towards Power Jets personnel. ' It seems clear that these 
authors, although having access to a great range of records and with a 
considerable team to analyze and condense them, were writing at a time when 
the difficulties were past and when the jet engine was seen not only as a great 
British success, but also as a potent symbol of a new British identity in which a 
claimed technological superiority was becoming a defining quality and a 
replacement for a now declining imperial power. There was also a sense, among 
those involved in, or informed about, policy matters that Whittle personally had 
been treated less than fairly. 
Whittle's own account, by contrast, dwells on the difficulties he and the Power 
Jets team experienced in their dealings with Government agencies and was 
written in a spirit of clear disappointment and even bitterness. ' However, 
subsequent historiography has done little to analyze the sources of conflict or to 
discover to what extent the official disenchantment may have been justified. 
Indeed, the most influential recent scholarly work, by Edward W Constant II, 
serves, in effect, to underpin Whittle's own contention that the jet engine was so 
'revolutionary' that neither piston aero engine companies nor government 
officials could judge it fairly or bring themselves to give the support that was 
merited. Thus Constant has used his concept of "the turbojet revolution" to 
support an extension of the Kuhnian analysis of the successions in scientific 
theories to explain technological change. ' 
In Constant's treatment, the established, highly successful piston engine design 
2 
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and manufacturing culture was disrupted and overthrown by the jet rather as the 
Ptolemaic view of the universe was overthrown by Copernican cosmology. 5 It is 
an important element of the Kuhnian position that this type of process will be 
accompanied by a kind of emotional resistance in the minds of practitioners, 
followed by a psychological step-change in perception "akin to a conversion 
experience". 6 Constant finds plenty of evidence, from Whittle's account, to 
support this contention but it is argued here that the analysis is problematical in 
that it tempts us to view contemporary 'anti-Whittle' opinions and actions 
merely as manifestations of a 'pre jet' mental paradigm. It certainly seems odd 
that so sophisticated an analysis as Constant's largely supports Whittle's own 
view of the difficulties he met; Constant's history and Whittle's own are, in a 
sense, complementary. However, I suggest (and have argued elsewhere) that 
officials and engineers were far more open-minded towards the gas turbine than 
Constant, or indeed Whittle, have acknowledged. ' 
The popular histories naturally take an even more emphatic line on the supposed 
poor treatment meted out to Whittle, and often adduce the jet story as 
supporting element for the familiar assertion that "Britain is good at inventing 
but bad at developing" which has been analyzed by Edgerton. ' Whittle's death 
5 
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in 1996 produced a virtual orgy of this kind of comment, with even the most 
serious newspapers peddling accounts which verged on the absurd and revealed 
a startling ignorance both of the realities of engineering development and of 
historical analysis. Typical of the genre was the obituary in The Guardian which 
depicted "a genius frustrated by official disinterest and political manipulation" 
and which asserted, quite fictitiously, that the Air Ministry "repeatedly declared 
... the 
idea was largely pie in the sky". 9 The Daily Telegraph referred to Whittle 
"at times using scrap metal" which intentionally conjured the image of the great 
inventor rootling for rusty scrap in a car breaker's yard" while The Times 
asserted that his ideas were "scoffed at" by the Air Ministry. " 
All these accounts reveal, or affect, complete ignorance of the pre-existing 
background to gas turbine work in several countries and a technological 
determinism of the most naive kind. Rather few historians, or indeed engineers, 
given a moment to reflect, would assert that there would have been no jet 
engine without Whittle but the obituary in The Independent, contended, like 
Obituary; 'Sir Frank Whittle', The Guardian, 10 August 1996. This obituary also asserted that 
the Air Ministry chose "Dr WS Farren ... as their 
'independent' consultant [who] was 
outspokenly hostile to Whittle's ideas" which shows how dangerously partial these accounts are. 
There is little evidence that Farren (later Sir William Farren, Director of the RAE and 
subsequently chief designer for the Avro company) was ever "outspokenly hostile" although in 
1936 he was sceptical about high altitude, jet propelled flight and subsequently had reservations 
about the structure and commercial intentions of Power Jets vis a vis the Government interests. 
However, Whittle himself recorded that in 1938, during a hiatus in work on the engine when he 
was considering whether to return to mainstream RAF duties, Farren (then Deputy Director of 
Scientific Research at the Air Ministry) declared that the Ministry would only continue to 
support Power Jets if "I wished to go on, because their whole interest in the job rested upon 
their confidence in me ... If I gave up ... the work could stop; they would not consider 
appointing a successor". Sir Frank Whittle, (Jet, n. 3, above), p 81. 
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those in most of the other newspapers, that "Whittle changed the lives of 
countless millions of people throughout the world". Ascribing a marvellous 
immutability to the historical account it asserted as fact that "the Ministry of 
Aircraft Production did not take the pressure off him and allow him to get on 
with the job is well documented and part of history". " 
It is clear that the notion that Whittle accomplished his engine work against a 
background of official indifference or in the teeth, as it were, of Air Ministry 
opposition is so prevalent that it has entered the folklore of the subject both at a 
scholarly and at a popular level and this contention must be examined critically. 
The account here is, I believe, largely new and will show that, contrary to the 
accepted historiography and to myth, Whittle was treated with considerable 
indulgence by the Air Ministry and by MAP. Fresh sources from the Power Jets 
side, and official papers, have made it possible to uncover the nature of the 
war-time relationship between Power Jets and the MAP and the sources of 
friction. It has also been possible to throw new light on the wartime 
nationalisation of Power Jets (an event that was particularly resented by 
Whittle's adherents) and to show that the impetus to take this politically tricky 
action gained sufficient force because it appeared to satisfy two quite different 
policy aims. There was, on the one hand, the desire of MAP officials to deal 
with the stalled jet engine programme and the acrimonious relationship with 
Power Jets. On the other hand there was Stafford Cripps' visionary and strategic 
intention to modernise Britain's industrial base (which has been examined in the 
previous chapter) and his intention to establish a vibrant aircraft sector sustained 
by vigorous government R&D establishments. In his scheme Power Jets, with 
its undoubted talents and brainpower, would become one of these centres. 
12 
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The Early History of Power Jets 
Frank Whittle entered the Royal Air Force as an aircraft apprentice in 1923. 
The three year course in which he was enrolled was designed to produce the 
aircraft mechanics and service personnel required to repair and maintain RAF 
aircraft but, by exceptional ability and effort, he was one of only five 
apprentices (out of 600 in the initial intake) selected to go on to train as an 
officer cadet and pilot at Cranwell, the RAF training college. Whittle took a 
keen interest in aeronautical developments and in 1928 his contribution for the 
cadets' termly thesis was entitled Future Developments in Aircraft Design. He 
anticipated a large improvement in aircraft speed, coupled with an increase in 
the heights at which aircraft flew, in order to take advantage of reduced air 
resistance at high altitude. He recognised that in a conventional piston engine 
power falls off with altitude and considered in some detail, as part of this 
overall view of aircraft evolution, the efficiency and thermodynamic design of a 
gas turbine. He observed that although a steam turbine would be impractical for 
aircraft owing to the weight of boiler and condenser, nevertheless "the . turbine 
is 
the most efficient prime mover known [so] it is possible that it will be 
developed for aircraft, especially if some means of driving [it] by petrol could 
be devised". 13 
At this time Whittle considered exclusively the use of an internal combustion gas 
turbine driving a propeller. However, in the following year he realised that a 
gas turbine could be constructed to produce a propulsive jet. This was original 
and transformed the gas turbine problem. The idea made the Whittle gas 
turbine/jet engine conceptually different to the well-established steam turbine, in 
which as much energy as possible is extracted as rotary shaft horsepower from 
the steam by successive turbine stages, and instead left as much energy as 
13 
Frank Whittle, Future Developments in Aircraft Design, 1928, manuscript thesis, Science 
Museum archives. 
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possible in the exhaust gas stream to form a high velocity exhaust jet. This 
simplification of the gas turbine was to make Whittle's jet proposal attractive for 
development at a time when it seemed that the combined inefficiencies of the 
compressor, the turbine and the required reduction gearing and propeller drive 
would be, in aggregate, too great to make a propeller turbine unit viable. " 
In 1929 Whittle's commanding officer arranged for him to discuss these ideas at 
the Air Ministry where he met WL Tweedie, a technical officer in the 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) and AA Griffith of the 
RAE. The result, Whittle recorded, was "depressing" and he subsequently 
received a written opinion that the engine was impracticable (for the time being) 
because materials did not then exist capable of withstanding the high 
temperatures and stresses that would occur in the turbine stage of the engine. 15 
However, the important point about this episode is that Whittle had been taken 
seriously enough to be invited to discuss his proposals at high level. 16 Whittle, 
14 
To avoid confusion it should be made clear that there are types of gas turbine today, such as 
turboprops, helicopter engines and land-based power generating sets, in which a sufficient 
number of turbine stages are provided to extract almost all the useful energy from the exhaust to 
give rotary shaft power and there is no residual jet thrust. 
15 
The widespread impression of Air Ministry prejudice against the gas turbine at this time derives 
from Whittle's account where he blamed his reception on "a very unfavourable report ... that 
had been written some years before". Whittle, Jet, (n. 3 above), pp 25 & 26). His impression 
of the tenor of this report, by WJ Stem, of the Air Ministry Laboratory, South Kensington, has 
been repeated by almost all subsequent authors ('The Internal Combustion Turbine', 
Aeronautical Research Committee, Engine Sub-Committee Reports, No. 54, September 1920). 
In fact, it was a professional piece of work which considered the parameters for an aircraft gas 
turbine (rather than rejecting it out of hand) but noted that contemporary compressor efficiency 
was too poor to support a gas turbine cycle while heat-resisting materials for the turbine stage 
were not available. He opined that "the internal combustion turbine will not be rendered 
practical by the revolutionary design of some lucky inventor. The steam turbine engineer and 
the metallurgist ... are the people with whom the future development of the turbine rests". It 
should also be noted that Stern, as a member of a special panel of the Aeronautical Research 
Committee in 1930, did recommend construction of a turbine to the design of AA Griffith "if it 
would provide an unequivocal check on the theory". (Report of HE 1 Panel of the ARC Engine 
Sub-Committee, PRO DSIR 22/68). 
16 
Although the letter (probably written by AA Griffith) intimated that the Air Ministry did not 
(continued... ) 
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in his memoir, appeared not to realise how exceptional such access must have 
been for a newly commissioned Pilot Officer since Griffith was then one of the 
most eminent Air Ministry scientists, a member of the Aeronautical Research 
Committee (ARC), and had an important voice, through the ARC's Engine Sub- 
Committee, in the national direction of aero engine policy. ' Griffith had also 
proposed his own gas turbine project (to drive an airscrew) as early as 1926, 
which derived from his new, and highly influential, aerodynamic theory for 
axial flow turbine and axial flow compressor design. It is an interesting 
historical point that, from 1937 workers at the RAE (in particular Hayne 
Constant) began a parallel 'government' gas turbine programme, though with 
less priority than Whittle was to receive. Ultimately, the main axial flow 
development of post-war British aero engines was to flow his work. 18 
From this perspective, the attitude of the Air Ministry can scarcely be viewed as 
16(... continued) 
wish to pursue Whittle's scheme at that time it observed that "the internal combustion turbine 
will almost certainly be developed into a successful engine, but before this can be done the 
performance of both compressors and turbines will have to be greatly improved. However it has 
been of real interest to investigate your scheme and I can assure you that any suggestion 
submitted by people in the Service is always welcome". Quoted by W. Bailey, The Early 
Development of the Aircraft Jet Engine, 1995, (unpublished account from a wartime gas turbine 
worker at RAE, deposited with Royal Aeronautical Society, 1996, p. 9. ) It was, Bailey 
observes, "a kind letter". 
17 
The ARC gave advice to the Air Ministry on future directions for research at the RAE and NPL 
as well as helping to set out desirable developments to explore in the Ministry's contracts with 
its industrial suppliers. For a study of the role of the ARC in inter-war aero engine development 
see Nahum, 'Two-stroke or Turbine', (n. 7 above). 
18 
AA Griffith, An Aerodynamic Theory of Turbine Design, RAE Report No. H. 1111,7 July 
1926. Griffith's paper indicated that the then current axial flow compressors were inefficient 
because they operated with the blades in a stalled condition. Designing them in the light of 
aerodynamic theory and regarding them as rotating wings would, he argued, allow a large 
increase in efficiency and make possible a practical gas turbine. Griffith's ideas led to a line of 
transmission through the war-time RAE turbine work, which was the basis of an engine built by 
Metropolitan Vickers, to its successor, the post-war Armstrong Siddeley Sapphire, and thence to 
Avon and the main post-war Rolls-Royce engines. Griffith, in fact, joined Rolls-Royce as Chief 
Scientist in May 1939. From this perspective, the Whittle engine, with its use of a centrifugal 
compressor could be regarded merely as a temporary expedient. Griffith has another 
independent reputation in the field of materials science, also developed while at the RAE, for 
developing a new understanding and method of analysis for the initiation and propagation of 
cracks in materials under load. 
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negative or discouraging and its actions should be viewed as showing 
sympathetic recognition of Whittle's aptitude and potential. This can also be 
seen in the Ministry's decision to allow him to attend Cambridge University. 
Whittle completed the Officer's Engineering Course in 1933 with distinction. 
The Air Ministry had, in the past, sent one or two outstanding officers from this 
course on to Cambridge to take the Mechanical Sciences Tripos but this scheme 
had been officially terminated in the preceding year. However, Whittle asked 
for special consideration and, in view of his excellent results in the RAF 
engineering course, the Air Ministry, exceptionally, revived the scheme for 
him. " Additional evidence of favourable treatment for Whittle can be adduced 
from the fact that, following his achieving First Class Honours in the 
examinations in June 1936 at Cambridge, the Ministry approved an application 
from his tutor for him to spend an additional post-graduate year there working 
with the eminent aerodynamicist Sir Brian Melvill Jones. 
The Formation of Power Jets Limited 
While at Cambridge Whittle received, in May 1935, a letter from a former RAF 
colleague, Ralph Dudley Williams, c/o General Enterprises Ltd, Canard House, 
Regent Street, (Manufacturers of Genterprise All British Products)". Williams 
wrote; 
just a hurried note to tell you that I have just met a man who is a bit 
of a big noise in an engineering concern and to whom I mentioned 
your invention of an aeroplane, sans propeller as it were, and who is 
very interested ... Do give'this your earnest consideration and even if 
19 
"The Air Ministry had, a short time before, discontinued the practice of sending one or two 
officers selected from the [RAF] Engineering Course to Cambridge University to take the 
Mechanical Sciences Tripos. I therefore sent in a formal application that my case should be 
specially considered". The Air Ministry noted that "in view of this Officer's excellent work on 
the specialist [engineering] course they have decided as an exceptional case to allow this Officer 
to proceed to Cambridge University". Frank Whittle, Jet, (n. 3 above), p. 42. 
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you can't you might have something else that is good". " 
General Enterprises, the unlikely bridgehead for the "turbojet revolution", in 
fact marketed an unglamorous and technically undemanding product -a coin- 
operated cigarette vending machine and had been formed with by Williams and 
his partner, JCB Tinling, also a retired RAF officer, with a loan of £1500 
from Williams's sister. Williams recalled that the spur to his contacting Whittle 
again was a chance meeting at lunch with Tinling's father, a consulting engineer 
who observed, "there's a war coming - why don't you chaps get into the aircraft 
business". " 
RD Williams had been a fellow cadet with Whittle at the RAF College, 
Cranwell, in the September 1926 intake. Their batman introduced them as they 
were to share "digs". Williams, in a striking phase that echoed the impact 
Whittle had on many of his associates, recalled later "I just fell for him". 22 
Whittle struck a deal with Williams and Tinling, whereby they would seek 
20 
In the post-war period Ralph Williams changed his name to Rolph Dudley-Williams and 
embarked on a career in politics. He was elected Member of Parliament for Exeter, (1951- 
1956), Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for War (1958), and to the 
Minister of Agriculture, (1960-1964). He was created Baronet in 1964. 
21 
Sir Rolph Dudley-Williams (Personal communication, 1985), recalled that "Tinling's father was 
a consulting engineer - very able". . Subsequently Tinling's 
father, JA Tinling, attempted to 
claim a share of credit for the development of the jet, writing in 1944, that "an entirely false 
impression had been given to the world at large". His second wife, Daisy Tinling, claimed that 
"it should be known and publicly acknowledged that it was primarily my husband's vision and 
foresight in 1934 which led to the discovery of Whittle ... my step-son was merely an 
interloper 
who evidently set out from the start to crib his father's idea and only made a success through 
his father's fmancial connections. That may be very clever but it's not cricket. ". In an article, 
('A Wife's Part'), she expanded "but for my fancying a lobster at Verrey's, on that particular 
day, 
... the Whittle plans would still be in the bottom drawer". JA Tinling to Power Jets Ltd, 
21 January 1944, Daisy Tinling to Sir Maurice Bonham Carter, 27 January 1944, Daisy 
Tinling, 'Developing the Jet Plane', The Recorder, 1 April 1944, in Bonham Carter Papers, 
Science Museum archives. 
22 
Sir Rolf Dudley Williams, (n. 21 above). Sir Rolf recalled that "I was the person who got on 
with Frank best". They remained lifelong friends and, after the war, Whittle even gave an 'eve 
of poll' address for Williams, who was standing as Conservative candidate, although Whittle then 
was a socialist. 
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commercial backing for the engine and would finance further patents. In return, 
they were to have each a quarter share of the commercial rights in the engine. 
Various approaches failed, until Tinling's father put them in touch with an able 
consulting engineer and patent agent, Mogens Bramson, who took the engine 
proposal to the City investment bank 0T Falk. 
Little has been written about the firm of O. T. Falk but its particular quality of 
unconventionality, compared to other merchant banks, and the personalities of 
its members, which included Lancelot Law Whyte and Sir Maurice Bonham 
Carter, forms a crucial part of the British jet engine story. The founder, Oswald 
Falk, had been Treasury Delegate to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and had 
been described as "the only high-brow in the city". Whyte considered Falk 
personally to be "one of the Englishmen best informed on the political and 
military developments in Germany and the partners and senior employees as "all 
exceptionally intelligent men, ethically liberal, and intellectually radical". The 
bank was, he believed, "one of the important nuclei of anti-Hitler and pro- 
Churchill opinion in London at that time". ' 
Whyte was himself an unusual figure -a philosopher and an intellectual who 
had worked in, and kept up with, theoretical physics and who had a powerful 
interest in and sense of historical process. 24 After Cambridge, where he worked 
for a time in Rutherford's laboratory, he travelled to Göttingen in 1924, 
23 
LL Whyte, Focus and Diversions, (New York, George Braziller, 1963), pp. 114-115. The 
status of 0T Falk's as a nucleus of anti-Hitler opinion was stimulated by the period between 
1927 and 1934 when Violet Bonham Carter, one of the most influential anti-appeasement 
campaigners (and wife of Maurice) conducted a menage ä trois with her husband and 0T 
('Foxy') Falk. Champion Redoubtable: the Diaries and Letters of Violet Bonham Carter, 1914- 
1945, Mark Pottle (ed), (Weidenfield, London, 1997). 
24 
Ibid., pp. 54-55. Whyte took a scholarship for Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1914, but served 
in the artillery in the First World War. Returning to Cambridge he completed his degree and 
began experimental physics in Rutherford's laboratory but was unable to continue - an emotional 
dislocation he attributed to "almost monotonously happy" schooldays at the progressive Bedales 
school followed by the shock of the Battle of the Somme - "an image and a proof of how 
European idealism had befouled its home". 
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becoming friendly with Max Born and hearing Neils Bohr lecture on the new 
theory of the atom. Subsequently, in Germany, he met and had discussions with 
Einstein before deciding to leave academic life. He entered merchant banking 
through the mediation of Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England. ' 
Norman sent him to see Sir Maurice Bonham Carter, a partner at 0T Falk. 
Through his scientific training Whyte became the member of the bank most 
concerned with venture capital for proposals with a scientific or technical 
element, "raising money for the rare deserving cases". Thus he became a 
director in the early 1930s of Scophony, the company established to exploit John 
Logie Baird's television system but nursed "a secret hope ... that something 
wonderful would turn up for which I would throw over everything else". And 
although at first reluctant to meet when told by Bonham Carter that "a young 
flight lieutenant had invented a new aero-engine" he found this with Whittle. He 
wrote: 
It was like love at first sight, the impression he made was 
overwhelming. I have never been so quickly convinced, nor so happy 
to find one's highest standards met. Whittle held all the winning 
cards: imagination, ability, enthusiasm, determination, respect for 
science, and practical experience - all at the service of a stunningly 
simple idea: 2,000 h. p. with one moving part. This was genius, not 
talent. ... That night I told my wife that I had met one of the great inventive engineers of our time. ... it was like what I imagined was 
the experience of meeting a saint in a much earlier religious epoch: 
one surrendered to the enchantment of a single-minded personality 
born to a great task. 26 
Whyte's background in physics, his semi-mystical personality and his historical 
overview of the subject were crucial in conditioning his response to the Whittle 
jet. His reaction was more that of a historian of science and a physicist than that 
25 
Ibid., pp. 112-113. According to Whyte, Norman broke his rule not to use his influence in City 
appointments because Whyte's sister and Norman's mother were both Christian Scientists. The 
City appealed to Whyte intellectually because "in the City one saw human desires being 
expressed in quantitative form. ... Did stock market prices quantify human lusts in the same 
way as the clinical thermometer converted human pathology into a numerical temperature? ". 
26 
Ibid., pp. 138-139. 
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of a banker for, in evaluating it, he transferred directly to aero engineering the 
concept of 'elegance' which so often is advanced as a touchstone for the 
evaluation of mathematical proofs and scientific theories. 27 "The elegance of the 
idea won me. Every great advance replaces traditional complexities by a new 
simplicity. Here it was in the iron world of engineering". 28 
Armed with a favourable report from Bramson, who had now been asked 
formally by the bank to analyze the Whittle scheme, Whyte set out to raise 
capital and contacted Sir Henry Tizard for a supporting opinion. Tizard was, at 
that time, the chairman of the Aeronautical Research Committee (ARC) and the 
defence scientist who was uniquely trusted by the Air Ministry and the RAF. 29 
At the time of Whyte's approach Tizard was deeply immersed in the debate 
about the possibility of German bombers delivering 'a knock-out blow' to 
Britain and in the development of the revived air defence system for the UK. 
The Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defence, (more usually known 
as the Tizard Committee) had first met in January 1935, and, from the outset, 
became the nursemaid for the emerging technique of radar. 3° Tizard personally 
27 
See, for example Graham Farmelo (ed. ), It Must Be Beautiful; Great Equations of Modern 
Science, (London, 2002). 
28 
LL Whyte, 'Focus', (n. 23 above), pp 77-90. Whyte's immersion in the history of science may 
be glimpsed in his semi-mystical attachment to Kepler, the 16th century astronomer, to whom 
he wrote in his journal. He was fascinated by Kepler's emotional and imaginative search "to 
read the work of God" in the Heavens and his search for concealed numerical harmonies, 
finding in it a striking anticipation of Einstein's hopes for a unified theory. "Your unique 
significance in the history of physical theory became evident to me in the 1920s, and slowly I 
began the search for Kepler. This hunt had to go on beside my astrology (using Elephantine 
Tables of dividends to tell innocent folk which shares should go up)". 
29 
Tizard had experience of the technical and scientific evaluation of aircraft and weapons going 
back to the First World War when, as a scientist, he had learned to fly and had become 
involved with the new field of testing military aircraft but the respect in which he was held also 
derived from his incisive and pragmatic judgement. See Nahum 'Two-stroke or Turbine', (n. 7 
above) for a discussion of Tizard's influence on the wider field of aero engine development and 
its linkage, through him, with the emerging technique of radar-directed interception. 
30 
PRO AIR 2/4481, 'Formation of a Scientific Committee on Air Defence'. 
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was central to the promotion of radar research and its implementation to create 
the radar 'chain' around the eastern and southern coast of Britain. However, he 
showed a striking strategic vision which went far beyond the actual technique of 
radar, for he realised that in order for it to become a powerful addition to air 
defence it had to be integrated into the operational control of aircraft. Thus even 
before radar was available to the service he set up a series of experiments which 
were performed by the RAF (the Biggin Hill Interception Trials) in which 
controllers used radio to set defending fighters onto 'dummy' intruders flying a 
known track, in order to explore the technique of interception and the 
'vectoring' of the defenders. 31 These trials enabled the crucial new techniques 
for communication and for ground control of fighters to be developed, together 
with procedures for reporting, plotting and directing them to the intruders. 32 
The trial also showed that radar detection was only one element in successful 
defence and that "the interception problem was different to the detection 
problem". " The analysis of this work thus indicated a new direction for engine 
work. Prior to radar, defending aircraft (in which little reliance was actually 
placed) were expected to spend considerable time ready at height in "standing 
patrols" and a reasonable fuel consumption was needed. The Biggin Hill trials 
showed that the emphasis should change towards very high power engines, 
giving the maximum speed and rate of climb from take-off on receipt of the 
radar warning, even at the expense of heavy fuel consumption, and Tizard 
31 
PRO AIR 2/2642, 'Interception Experiments for the Tizard Committee'. 
32 
_ An enormous amount of detailed work has been subsumed, in most accounts of British air re- 
armament, under the rubric of 'radar'. Thus the Biggin Hill Interception Trials, designed to 
assess and develop the accuracy with which fighters could be set onto intruding aircraft, are 
evidence of his forward thinking as they were put in hand, at Tizard's instigation before the 
radar chain was in being and while it was still a hope rather than a reality. ('Interception 
Experiments', n. 31 above). See also RV Jones, 'Tizard's Task in the War Years' in WS 
Farren, "Henry Thomas Tizard", Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol 7, 
1961, pp 331-348). 
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argued explicitly from 1935 for "the maximum excess speed over the bomber". 
Privately, he wrote to his friend Harry Ricardo, the engine research engineer 
(also an influential fellow member of the ARC Engine Sub-Committee), that 
"what I want is an engine which gives a terrific power for its size and weight ... 
through a high consumption so that long distance bombing machines could not 
compete". ' 
The Whittle engine clearly fell into this category and the tactical defence 
thinking outlined here clearly lay behind the encouraging terms in which he 
wrote to Whyte stating that "I am particularly interested in this work because I 
think that, if we are to provide the high powers which will be necessary for the 
aircraft of the future, we must develop some kind of turbine". Indeed, one could 
go farther and suggest that it was only because the hypothetical jet (which had 
not yet run) appeared to fit closely into this emerging tactical requirement that it 
was considered at all, given the high level of demand on both the R&D and the 
productive capacity of the industry imposed by the RAF expansion programme. 
Tizard, however, noted that he had a very high opinion of Whittle, who had 
"the ability, energy and enthusiasm for work of this nature" and an intimate 
knowledge of practical conditions. "This combination of qualities is rare", he 
wrote, "and deserves the utmost encouragement". 35 Tizard rated it highly 
probable, given adequate finance, that Whittle would succeed in producing the 
new powerplant. - 
0T Falk put considerable store on Tizard's letter, quoting it to possible 
34 
HIT 77, letter to Harry Ricardo, 25 May 1938, and paper 'Future Designs of Fighting 
Machines', September 1938, HTT 10/1, Tizard Papers, Imperial War Museum. Also PRO 
DSIR 22/58 to 22/68, ARC Engine Sub-Committee minutes, particularly for 10 January 1936. 
35 
HT Tizard to LL Whyte, 22 June 1937, Tizard Papers, Imperial War Museum, HTT 153a. 
Tizard added as postscript "Of course I do not mean to imply that success is certain. All new 
schemes of this kind must be regarded as 'gambles' in the initial stages. I do think however that 
this is a better gamble than many I know of, on which much money has been spent! ". 
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investors and it is interesting to note another point that Tizard made which also 
confirms the linkage with re-armament for he observed that "my general opinion 
of the importance of this work leads me to express the hope that the money will 
be raised privately so that the knowledge that it is going on will not be 
widespread". This and other observations suggest that the capitalization of 
Power Jets could be regarded almost as a surrogate official venture, or certainly 
an officially sanctioned one. A letter drafted by Maurice Bonham Carter to Lord 
Wakefield, head of the Castrol petroleum company and a well-known promoter 
of aviation, summarised the thinking behind this position, which appears to have 
been tacitly accepted both within the Air Ministry and in Power Jets. 
It is generally agreed ... that at this stage, both to avoid delay and the 
restrictions necessarily imposed by finance from the Treasury, the 
initial expenditure should come from private sources. ... I am 
approaching a very few private individuals only who recognise the 
nature of the business and its public interest. 36 
Within this circle the phrase "public interest", I suggest, then signified air re- 
armament. To the banker Peter Samuel, Bonham Carter made more explicit the 
quasi-official support for the project and the understanding, among those 
responsible for finding finance for Power Jets, of the essential contribution that 
it was expected public money would make. He noted that: 
it is of course accepted by all concerned that the development of such 
an engine to the stage of commercial production requires a large 
expenditure far beyond any sum which we have in mind to raise now. 
We anticipate that material contributions towards this expenditure will 
be provided in due course from official sources by way of 
development grants. As you are aware, we are already in negotiation 
for an initial research grant. But it is agreed by all concerned 
(including, as you will see from his letter, Sir Henry Tizard) that in 
order to avoid the delay and the restrictions imposed by finance from 
the Treasury, the initial expenditure should be raised from private 
36 
Papers of Sir Maurice Bonham Carter relating to Power lets, (hereafter Bonham-Carter papers), 
Science Museum archives. Sir Maurice Bonham Carter to Lord Wakefield, 14 July 1937 (draft, 
possibly not sent). There were also some less politically aware clients of 0T Falk who were 
nevertheless steered into the shares by Whyte or Bonham Carter and this led to trouble later. 
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sources. 37 
The new company was registered on 19 March 1936 and the basis of its 
constitution was the so-called Four Party Agreement between 0T Falk, the Air 
Ministry, Whittle, and, together, Williams and Tinling. 0T Falk were 
represented on the board of the new company by LL Whyte (as chairman) and 
Sir Maurice Bonham Carter as a director. The other directors were RD 
Williams and JCB Tinling, while the Air Ministry contributed Whittle as Chief 
Engineer at no cost to the company. 38 
Various authors, and Whittle himself, have made much play with the 
arrangement set out in the Four-Party Agreement whereby Whittle could act as 
honorary Chief Engineer to the new company "provided that the work ... shall 
not conflict with his official duties and ... shall not ... in any one week exceed a 
total of six hours". This is disingenuous. The Air Ministry may not have wished 
to openly admit that Whittle was assigned full-time to a privately financed 
company for the purposes of developing an engine that many regarded as 
fanciful, but that clearly was what occurred. During his extra postgraduate year 
at Cambridge up to June 1937, which the Air Ministry had approved, Whittle 
worked largely on his engine design. After this he was placed on the "Special 
37 
Ibid. Sir Maurice Bonham Carter to The Hon. Peter Samuel, 20 July 1937. Bonham Carter also 
stressed that the company's expenditure was being conducted "on a very conservative basis", 
that the Board was receiving no fees and that "Fit. Lt. Whittle, who is seconded for service for 
this work, is remunerated by his normal pay as an officer in the Air Force". 
38 
The exact constitution of Power Jets, share allocations and voting rights is not germane to the 
arguments here but the financial history of the company is extremely well treated by R 
Schlaiffer in R Schlaiffer and S Heron, Development of Aircraft Engines and Fuels, (Boston, 
1950), pp 336-348. This study, conducted principally by Schlaiffer at the Graduate School of 
Business Administration, Harvard, remains the most authoritative work on the technical and 
financial history of pre-war and wartime engine work conducted in the USA, Germany and 
Britain. At the first meeting of the Directors of Power Jets held on 26 March 1936 it was 
"resolved that Flight Lieutenant Whittle be appointed honorary chief engineer and technical 
consultant of the company for a period of five years ... at the 
discretion of the President of the 
Air Council". Bonham Carter Papers, (n. 36 above). 
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Duty" list and was not assigned to a squadron or to an RAF station. 39 These 
measures make it clear that there was tacit acceptance of his central role at 
Power Jets and this, in itself, was a substantial contribution -a pilot who was 
acknowledged to be of the highest quality, trained at substantial public expense, 
was, at a time of deep foreboding about national defence, contributed to a rather 
risky engine development programme. As further evidence of exceptionally 
favourable treatment we should note that in this period Whittle was promoted to 
the rank of Squadron Leader, although he was excused the usual examination. 40 
We can see from the outset that the structure put in place to finance the Whittle 
jet was odd. It is true that it initially used private capital, although the single 
most substantial investment was from Lord Weir who was prepared to deploy 
funds in the national interest. Weir had been Controller of Aeronautical Supplies 
at the Ministry of Munitions in the First World War, where he had been assisted 
by Sir Maurice Bonham Carter and a firm friendship between them dated from 
that time. By May 1935 Weir had returned to munitions production, joining the 
Air Ministry as a special adviser to the Secretary of State. However, he took up 
shares in Power Jets privately through his engineering company G. & J. Weir. 
following a direct approach from Bonham Carter. " 
Power Jets and the Air Ministry now began negotiations to establish a form of 
development contract whereby the Ministry would pay progressively for 
39 
Quoted in Whittle, Jet, (n. 3 above), p 50. 
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Bonham-Carter papers (n. 36 above). Sir Maurice Bonham Carter to Lord Weir, 15 October 
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serving officer". Also Sir Maurice Bonham Carter to JG Weir, 15 and 27 October 1937, and 
reply, accompanying cheque for £3000,2 November 1937. See also WJ Reader, Architect of 
Air Power, the Life of the First Viscount Weir of Eastwood, (London, 1968), pp. 57,200-225. 
Weir refused payment for his public service during re-armament and seems possible that he 
approached the Power Jets investment in the same spirit. 
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research and running experience with the engine. David Pye as Deputy Director 
of Scientific Research (DDSR) at the Air Ministry, with a special responsibility 
for engine development, proposed a series of staged payments to Whyte in July 
1937 amounting to £5000. After twenty hours running and when the engine had 
reached a designated speed, the Air Ministry was then to purchase the unit for a 
further £5000 but would put it at the disposal of Power Jets for further running. 
This schedule was arrived at by Pye in discussion with his assistant, William 
Farren. Both these men have been depicted by Whittle as being sceptical about 
jet propulsion, and as obstacles to him, but this account prefers to take Pye's 
letter to Whyte, as Chairman at Power Jets, at face value. He wrote that "my 
only concern is to devise some kind of co-operation which would be financially 
acceptable to the Air Ministry, and would ensure that research proceeds actively 
with present unit". " 
Pye also added that the series of contracts he proposed was "quite outside the 
normal run of such things [but] the whole project is exceptional and calls for 
exceptional treatment and if an arrangement on these lines would be acceptable 
to you I will do my best to see it through. It leaves no room for doubt that we 
at the Air Ministry regard the scheme ... as theoretically sound". 
" 
In fact the sum offered was subsequently reduced to £5000, possibly on the 
advice of the Ministry's Contracts Directorate, which appeared to be uneasy 
about the firm's standing and its close relationship to a merchant bank. At this 
time the share capital raised by 0T Falk and Partners was only of the order of 
42 
Bonham-Carter papers (n. 36 above), DR Pye, Air Ministry to LL Whyte, 5 July 1937. 
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Ibid. The schedule proposed was: 
1 £1000 for a full report on all work to end of July, running unit up to 12,000 rpm. 
2 £2000 for 10 hours further observed running up to 14,000 rpm. 
3 £2000 for 10 hours at speeds up to 18,000 rpm. 
4 On completion of this research running, £5000 to be paid for the unit, with the 
intention to put it at your disposal for further running. 
5 Separate research contracts for associated work such as experimental combustion 
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£5000 and, furthermore, Falks did not take up its option to extend its own 
shareholding to £20,000. Even Whittle's sympathetic biographer has had to 
admit the quandary in which this placed officials. "The Air Ministry ... Wished 
to make an offer to the Company which would be sufficient to encourage further 
finance to back the project, but they mistrusted a group of financiers who began 
to get cold feet, after raising only £5000". ' 
Although these sums may now seem small the proposed initial government 
contributions amounting to £10,000 equates to about £240,000 in 2002 prices 
and should be related to the total authorised share capital for Power Jets of 
£25,000. In relation to the scale of the company's operations these were 
substantial payments. However, they were not adequate to sustain the 
experimental programme and it is fair to note that Air Ministry officials did 
have some misgivings about Power Jets. Certainly the capabilities of the new 
firm were meagre, compared to the companies they usually dealt with like 
Rolls-Royce and Bristol with huge numbers of operatives, draughtsmen, design 
engineers and so on. In 1938 Whyte approached the Air Ministry for further 
funding. The official history notes that: 
the Air Ministry did not rate the judgement or the resources of the 
firm very highly. The Director of Scientific_Research had early 
expressed the fear that the Directors of Power Jets were over- 
optimistic about the speed with which results would be obtained. 
When Power Jets began to ask for help at the first hint of 
development difficulties, which were no greater than those which 
experienced engineering firms would have considered inevitable and 
taken in their stride, the authorities in the Air Ministry felt confirmed 
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in their low opinion of Power Jets. 45 
We have seen that the constitution of Power Jets was unusual. There was the 
low-key Air Ministry contribution of Whittle, with partial official funding and 
encouragement. These were elements that were not, with hindsight, ideal, and 
which may have helped to sow the seeds of trouble later, but it is hard to see 
how a fully funded experimental jet programme could have been created, unless 
the Air Ministry had insisted on the development programme being placed with 
one of the Ministry's trusted contractors, such as Rolls-Royce. It is to the credit 
of officials they took the risk of proceeding with Power Jets at all and it seems 
clear that the basis on which the company was established was tacitly 
understood by both sides. Robert Schlaiffer, who wrote a masterly history of 
aero engine development in the immediate post-war period, and who had the 
advantage of communication with Sir Maurice Bonham Carter, noted that "it 
was realised by Falk and Partners from the beginning that the entire undertaking 
would ultimately have to be a partnership with the state, and the extensive rights 
granted to Whittle were granted to him in large part as a representative of the 
state". " The closeness of the enterprise to British re-armament efforts was also 
underlined by the understanding that Power Jets would abstain from approaching 
foreign sources for funds. 
By 1938 there was a variety of high power engine work being conducted in 
Britain in response to the bomber threat. The Whittle jet was at one, more 
speculative, end of the "portfolio" of the R&D investments sponsored by the Air 
Ministry, and there was also an axial flow jet engine emerging at the RAE 
under the auspices of Griffith's 'disciple' Hayne Constant. Tizard had a great 
sense for energy in people and projects and also sought to promote the rival 
'government' gas turbine at the RAE being built in association with 
Metropolitan-Vickers, but he noted that the company "was making progress but 
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only slowly. There was no real drive behind it". 47 By contrast he did sense this 
drive in Whittle. Unfortunately, his influence in engine developments, and 
defence science in general, waned during the war as a result of the well-known 
antipathy between him and Churchill's preferred scientific adviser, Frederick 
Lindemann. This was a tragic loss in many fields, but for the Whittle project in 
particular, Tizard's tremendous pragmatism and good sense, both for 
engineering development and for professional arrangements, might well have 
helped the jet enterprise 
Radical and ambitious piston engine projects were also under way, including the 
Napier Sabre, a massively complex 24 cylinder H pattern engine designed by 
Frank Halford intended ultimately to give 3000 hp, and the Rolls-Royce Crecy, 
a novel 12 cylinder two-stroke designed by the eminent engine consultant Harry 
Ricardo and enthusiastically promoted by Sir Henry Tizard as a 'sprint' engine 
for interceptors. Finally, there was the 'blue chip' investment, the relatively 
conventional but highly optimised V-12 cylinder Rolls-Royce Merlin, then 
giving about 1000 hp and developed to take advantage of the newly available 
100 octane fuel. 48 
It is important therefore, to see the Air Ministry's support for the Whittle 
engine, as one element in a strategic initiative in the engine field which, in 
itself, was part of a larger programme for the expansion and re-equipment of 
the Royal Air Force from 1935 onwards. In the context of this re-armament the 
Whittle engine was given, it is argued here, quite a reasonable share of 
resources, given that, by 1938, it was considered by the Air Ministry that 
47 
HTT 11/27, Tizard Papers, Imperial War Museum. In 1941, perhaps in response to the 
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production had risen to "the utmost capacity of aircraft firms". 49 In these few 
years the RAF moved from biplane fighters with engines of 500 horsepower, 
capable of 200 mph, carrying two machine guns and which weighed about 3000 
lbs (1360 kgs) to a new generation of equipment - the new Spitfire and 
Hurricane monoplane fighters with 1000 horsepower, eight machine guns, a 330 
mph top speed and a weight of 6000 lbs (2724 kgs). In addition, there were 
entirely new techniques for the operation and control of these aircraft to be 
developed. 
This re-equipment and training programme in itself constituted a revolution in 
equipment and in tactics for RAF and it must be acknowledged as a brilliant 
success. " The force that was created proved to be just adequate, during the 
Battle of Britain, to hold the Luftwaffe which had been established specifically 
to wage offensive war by one of the most technologically advanced and 
industrially competent nations on earth. Against the urgent needs of this radical 
re-equipment and re-training of the RAF it is reasonable to ask how much more 
resource should have been devoted to the Whittle jet or to any other long-range 
piece of weapons research. 
This account, therefore, strongly contests the notion that the Air Ministry was 
remiss in not supporting Whittle more. As we have seen, the Air Ministry did 
find ways to facilitate Whittle's work, using an unconventional route, and came, 
by 1939, to support the work almost entirely from public funds. Thus the point 
at issue about Air Ministry involvement for the Whittle jet is not so much 
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whether the invention was adequately supported but whether the Ministry should 
have done what it did in 1939 earlier - perhaps in 1935, or even in 1929. 
However, the essential point to note about the jet engine, which events were to 
prove, was that its development was premature. By 1939 the metallurgy, the 
techniques for machining complex shapes and for fabricating the new 
components needed for the engine, instruments for vibration measurement and 
even the theoretical tools for analysing airflow through a jet engine, were barely 
adequate for the task of creating a functioning engine. Had it not been for the 
urgent expansion of the Royal Air Force and the attention to British fighter 
defence capability, there would have been little rational reason to force 
development so far from what was known. The troubled war-time development 
of the Whittle jet, which we shall review below, supports the view that this was 
not an invention whose natural time had comes' 
Wartime Development, the Relationship with the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production, Disillusion 
Since the story of the British jet engine is, in the early and mid-war years, one 
of conflict and disappointment, it is intriguing to ask whether the causes of this 
conflict can be teased out beyond the simplistic identification of 'official 
disinterest and political manipulation' or 'the apathetic malaise of industry and 
government' - opinions that have already been touched on. For this it is 
necessary to follow the steps that were taken to convert the prototype into a 
51 
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production engine for service use in some detail. 
The new Power Jets company had no production facilities of its own and so had 
entered into an agreement with the steam turbine specialists British Thomson- 
Houston at Rugby for detailed design drawings and the manufacture of an 
experimental prototype. Whittle and the small number of Power Jets personnel 
also took up residence at the BTH factory and began conducting tests there from 
October 1936 although, after some frightening incidents during test runs, Power 
Jets were moved to a former BTH foundry nearby at Lutterworth. The engine 
went through two redesigns and, in October 1938, testing began on the third 
version which defined, in its general architecture, the form the Whittle jet 
engine was to take during the period that the inventor remained in control. 
Successful results began to accumulate and by June 1939 Pye (now Director of 
Scientific Research) witnessed a twenty minutes test run at speeds of up to 
16,000 rpm - an experience which, in Whittle's opinion, marked "a dramatic 
change in D. S. R's attitude", while Sir Henry Tizard who was present at a trial 
in January 1940 remarked, with an insouciance that he may have come to 
regret, that "a demonstration which does not break down in my presence is a 
production job". 52 Air Vice Marshall Tedder, as DGRD (Director General of 
Research and Development) at the Air Ministry also saw a test run and felt he 
was in the presence of "a real war winner, justifying the manufacture of an 
initial batch of engines and aircraft to match, straight off the drawing board". " 
The ground test engine (known as the Whittle Unit or W. U. ) then served as a 
model for a geometrically similar unit, the W. 1, which was built from new 
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components, developed and certificated for initial trials of the Gloster-Whittle 
E. 28/39 aircraft. These trials were strikingly successful. In particular, the 
engine was regarded as remarkably trouble-free in view of the entirely new 
principle of operation. However, the E. 28/39, conceived from the outset as a 
research and test vehicle, was not suited for development into a fighter since the 
thrust of the W. 1 design was inadequate to allow a reasonable load of fuel and 
armament. For this reason, the design was put in hand in 1940 with the Gloster 
company for a twin-engined fighter aircraft, the F. 9/40, (subsequently known as 
the Gloster Meteor), while a design contract was also placed with Power Jets 
for a development suggested by Whittle - anenlarged and more powerful (but 
architecturally similar) version of the engine, known as the W. 2, intended for 
this aircraft. Many of the ensuing problems of the Whittle engine programme 
stemmed from this apparently unproblematical decision to enlarge the engine. ' 
The W. 2 thus became a new design, for which no direct test experience existed. 
As we have noted Power Jets did not have the production resources to build 
aero engines in the quantity required for the RAF. Moreover, its relationship 
with the BTH company was deteriorating and Power Jets were coming 
increasingly to suspect that BTH was attempting to appropriate the jet engine as 
its own product. Neither did BTH have any experience of aero engine practice 
and so Whittle and Air Ministry officials looked for a technically competent 
engineering firm to build the jet and the Rover car company appeared to be an 
attractive candidate. It had a reputation for building good quality cars and could 
be regarded as an 'engineering led', rather than a 'production-led' company and 
therefore suitable for a new type of job like this. It was involved in the aero 
piston engine 'shadow' production scheme and the engineering direction of the 
company was in the hands of Maurice Wilks, as chief engineer, while his 
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brother Spencer was managing director. " Air Vice Marshall Tedder announced 
the selection of the Rover company in March 1940 and noted that the Ministry 
had decided to call in a firm with production experience and suitable plant "to 
undertake development manufacture" and to co-operate closely with Power Jets 
"to ensure that development designs went along suitable production lines". 56 
Tedder also expressed the hope that there would be "a very intimate basis of co- 
operation" between Rover and Power Jets. However he certainly appreciated the 
possibility of friction between the firms and in a discussion with Power Jets and 
MAP officials in April 1940 he stated that he required "complete frankness 
between the engineers concerned" and that some arrangement would have to be 
made over the rights to future inventions arising from the engine development 
"so that there would be no barrier to this". 57 
By May 1940 difficulties were building up and Tedder noted that he had been 
worried by the way things were going and that "Mr Whyte had gone to quite 
unreasonable lengths in trying to safeguard [Power Jets'] position". However, 
"in spite of much provocation" he intended to keep Power Jets alive and was 
still resolved not to let it be swallowed by two larger companies". " These 
remarks imply a deep unease with Power Jets on Tedder's part and it is worth 
noting just how early in the war the relationship between Power Jets and 
government officials became strained. To Power Jets, though, it appeared that 
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the Rover managing director SB Wilks "was fighting hard to get a commercial 
position to which he was not entitled" and was "very persistent" in refusing to 
agree to safeguards for Power Jets. The Power Jets position was that Rover 
would make their profit on the production contract and they were increasingly 
suspicious of any actions which seemed to show that the company was seeking 
to consolidate commercial rights for the developed engine in post-war markets. 
WEP Johnson, the patent agent at Power Jets, and a friend and former RAF 
colleague of Whittle's, was intensely loyal to the inventor and displayed a deep 
personal resentment of any action from Rover or from the official side which 
appeared to prejudice Whittle's rights. His suspicions appear to have had a 
foundation but one must also consider whether more measured responses, even 
in the face of great provocation, might not have been more productive. By 
August 1940 Johnson put it to an MAP official that: 
the Rover people had not the shadow of an excuse for wanting 
commercial rights outside the Air Ministry contract ... they were 
therefore trying to get something to which they were in no sense 
entitled. I asked him how on earth he expected me to co-operate 
willingly with people who were trying to get something to which they 
had no right". 59 
In discussing the relationship between the companies it must also be understood 
that the Rover company was faced with an enormous task. The enlargement of the 
Whittle W. 1 design meant that the W. 2 was an unknown and unproven article. In 
spite of Power Jets' jealousy over all the details of the engine this proprietorial 
attitude seems, in retrospect, hard to justify since the W. 2 was not even at 
prototype stage. GBR Fielden, one of Whittle's most able engineers, opined many 
years later that "the W. 2 engine was not a mechanically complete design when the 
decision was made to put it into production" and that what Rovers got, in the main, 
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was an aerodynamic design which was "not quite right". 60 Another Power Jets 
engineer, Jim Boal, who had a rare continuity of experience of working on the 
W. 2 engine at Power Jets, then at Rover, and finally with Rolls-Royce, also 
considered that initially "there was no W. 2 design". 6" 
Thus the situation was that in 1940 the Whittle team contribution to the W. 2 was 
an aerodynamic design, which covered the characteristics of the compressor, 
combustion chambers and the turbine, and a general mechanical scheme for the 
engine. The actual engineering solutions for the construction of W. 2 had not been 
fully established, but were being developed by extrapolation from the successful 
W. U and W. 1 in the light of test results with prototypes of the W. 2 design which 
revealed a continual stream of new problems. Rover, as contractor, also had to 
accommodate input from Gloster engineers on aircraft installation requirements as 
well as reacting to continuously evolving thinking from Power Jets and from their 
own engineers on materials, performance improvements and manufacturing 
solutions. It is not surprising, given the magnitude of the development task, that a 
sense of ownership should also have arisen from the Rover side. The position over 
the engine, with regard to production at Rover, was therefore quite different to the 
more familiar situation where a complex, but developed, product is built under 
licence by another manufacturer. The Bristol air-cooled piston engines, for 
example, were manufactured under licence by Gnome-Rhone in France during the 
inter-war period. In such a case the licensee generally trusts the originator of the 
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design, is most anxious to obtain all the drawings and 'tacit knowledge' which will 
enable it to succeed, and is, in the early stages at least, most reluctant to deviate 
from the design and practice of the 'parent'. 62 
In the rather different circumstances which obtained between Power Jets and 
Rover, technical disputes could be regarded as almost inevitable, given the 
magnitude of the task and the fluid nature of the design, although they were 
perhaps exacerbated by being played out as a kind of three-cornered negotiation 
between Power Jets, MAP and the Rover company. However, the tension between 
them was increased immeasurably when Power Jets learned in 1942 that the Rover 
company was attempting a radical redesign of the engine. 
The engine, in the form evolved by Power Jets had an odd feature which 
independent engineers were bound to question -a double reversal of airflow, with 
the gas following, in effect, an S-shaped path between compressor and turbine. The 
Whittle team had done this to make the engine as short as possible in order to 
overcome the possibility of the destructive "whirling" of the shaft coupling the 
turbine and compressor (swinging out of line like a skipping rope) and to reduce 
the effect of thermal expansion between the outer sheet metal combustion parts and 
the inner shaft. 
The disadvantage was that the reverse flow arrangement imposed extremely 
complex shapes for the combustion chambers and associated gas trunking which 
required highly skilled and laborious sheet metal manufacturing operations. This 
high requirement for the most skilled type of sheet metal work must have caused 
serious concern about the possibility of manufacturing the engine in quantity. " 
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Another factor against the reverse flow arrangement was that the two 180 degree 
changes of direction of airflow caused internal air resistance and cost a significant 
amount of power. It appeared early on in W. 2 development that the projected 
power would not easily be achieved and this performance deficit seriously 
undermined the military case for the aircraft. 
The response of the Rover engineers was to re-arrange the layout to get rid of the 
reverse flow feature. The compressor and turbine were kept to the same pattern, 
but the double wall counter-flow combustion chambers were replaced by "straight 
through" cans which had the form of simple cones and were far easier to make. 
The only additional problem brought by this re-arrangement was the requirement to 
provide a third bearing to support the longer shaft in the middle, and the need to 
provide a sliding coupling to allow the shaft to adapt to the thermal expansion of 
the hotter outer engine parts. Both of these considerations were accommodated by 
an ingenious coupling devised by the Rover engineer supervising the project, 
Adrian Lombard. ' 
It now appears that Rover had, in this period, encouragement for the re-design 
from Major GP Bulman, then in charge of engine development (as Director of 
Engine Development at the MAP) and his deputy Major AA Ross. The design 
work and construction of this straight-through engine was carried out in secrecy, 
and news of the development was kept for some time from Power Jets and from 
63( ... continued) 
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the more junior MAP representatives at the firm. 65 This was because the Power 
Jets view that MAP were unfairly partial to Rover was also matched by a feeling at 
Rover that sections of the MAP were overly sympathetic to Power Jets and that 
great pressure would be brought to bear to make them desist from the straight- 
through arrangement which they genuinely felt to be superior. " 
The Rover company first officially presented the design (known as the B. 26) at a 
meeting on Rover premises in February 1942 where it was described as a "re- 
arranged assembly for ease of production" and, to the subsequent fury of Power 
Jets personnel as "the first serious attempt to productionise the design". ' Whittle 
took the view that a "straight through" engine was under consideration by Power 
Jets anyway, but that time could not be spared from development of the proven 
layout in order that jet fighters should reach the RAF as early as possible and, in 
any event, Rover had no remit to do development work. 68 The re-design seemed to 
bear out all their suspicions about Rover's intentions "to gain a commercial 
position to which they are not entitled" and WEP Johnson set out the grievances 
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of the company in a long memorandum entitled "The Rover Independent 
Development". 69 Apart from the criticisms of Rover from a technical point of view 
it made explicit his own views about the bad faith of MAP officials. A relatively 
small extract from the paper shows its general tenor. He noted that: 
it seems to be fairly clear that in the middle of February this engine 
must have been well on the way to completion and it is inconceivable 
that Major Ross was not aware of the fact. If he was aware of it, then 
he has shown a measure of duplicity not only in his attitude at the 
meeting itself, but also in his Minutes which seems to be so incredible 
in an experienced Government Servant that I hesitate to express it, let 
alone accept it. ... I believe the incident to demonstrate clearly that 
there is collusion between a Dept. and Rover, to defeat the objects of 
Collaboration, a secondary effect of which will be to enable Rover to 
build up prestige and weight as designers and originators, such as will 
stand them in good stead after the War. There can in my opinion be 
no doubt whatever as to the collusion. 70 
Whittle and his team made vehement representations to MAP about the Rover 
straight-through engine and Whittle explicitly took up with MAP the direct 
attack on the judgement of government servants that Johnson was suggesting in 
internal company papers, asking for a full enquiry to examine, among other 
things, "the qualifications, judgement, and experience, of the Civil Servants who 
have had such a powerful influence on the project" and offering to step down 
from the jet project "if my judgement and experience in such matters are 
believed to be inept". " The eventual outcome of the dispute was that Rover was 
allowed to continue with the straight-through engine "but that this should not be 
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at the expense of the W. 2B production programme". 72 Major GP Bulman, for 
his part, later recorded the view that "Whittle was his own worst enemy, quick 
to invest every discussion with the venom of suspicion". 73 
Whatever the merits of Power Jets' moral case, it has to be noted that the Rover 
B. 26 was a rational solution and, moreover, it became the eventual successor to 
the Whittle layout. When Rolls-Royce eventually took over the Rover 
production plant (of which more below) they manufactured only enough reverse 
flow Whittle W. 2. Bs (under the name 'Welland') to equip twenty Gloster 
Meteor Mk 1 aircraft before converting to the more aerodynamically efficient 
straight-through engine, based on Lombard's Rover B. 26, and called the RB 37 
Derwent I in Rolls-Royce terminology. ' Lombard remained the supervising 
engineer on the project so there was absolute continuity from the Rover straight- 
through proposal to the highly successful Rolls-Royce Derwent (of which 500 
were made) and which raised the speed of the Meteor from 415 to 470 mph. 
Adrian Lombard went on to become the most eminent director of engineering at 
Rolls-Royce in the post-war period. 
There is an almost tragic quality of hubris about this episode, epitomised by 
Johnson's conclusions and policy recommendation: 
I am certain that if it is possible to put the whole position clearly to 
responsible and impartial officials, a radical revision of affairs must 
follow. We should, however, make it clear that our feelings are as 
much against certain Officials as against Rover, for these parties are, 
on the evidence, indistinguishable. It is our duty to badger the MAP, 
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letters and minutes of meetings for odd words or phrases which he 
could pick on to suggest that they were deliberately ambiguous and revealing of a sinister 
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at the risk of unpopularity, into seeing the way it is heading. 'S 
There seems little doubt that the emotional temperature of the whole project at 
Power Jets was extraordinarily high and rather different, for example, to the 
milieu at Rolls-Royce, where technology was being pushed just as far and as 
fast. Thus LL Whyte, who was a real asset, and the only member of the team 
with the stature and managerial expertise to hold his own with MAP officials, 
fell out with Whittle and resigned as Chairman and Managing Director of Power 
Jets in July 1941. He recorded merely that "difficulties had accumulated.... 
Early in that month my association with Whittle, which had lasted nearly six 
years, came to an end. There were too many difficulties between us, and I was 
not sorry to leave Power Jets". 76 
Whyte was a loss, for in spite of earlier friction with officials he had the 'savoir 
faire' to represent Power Jets to MAP and to Rover. In his place Williams and 
Tinling became joint managing directors although, in GBR Fielden's view, - 
they were "worthy, straightforward", but "not even amateurs" and thus Whittle 
had "no one to lean on". ' Williams, Tinling and Johnson, while intensely loyal 
to him, echoed and amplified Whittle's own suspicion and jealousy about outside 
intervention, intellectual ownership, modifications by Rover and so on, rather 
than moderating his reaction. Their continual interventions with MAP after 
Whyte had gone were almost certainly unhelpful to Whittle's cause. Fielden 
recalled that "there was a general xenophobic feeling at Power Jets" and, on the 
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basis of this reading of both official and company papers, the senior 
management came to be seen as suspicious, resentful, 'prickly' and became 
increasingly unpopular with officials. " 
The senior management of the company was not a good psychological mix, and 
it also held an exaggerated view of the company's potential and bargaining 
strength. Perhaps too there was a naivety and an insufficient awareness of the 
danger they faced for even as these controversies with MAP were running Ralph 
Dudley Williams looked forward to the time when "the Management would be 
able to say we are practically inheriting the Rolls-Royce position as the leading 
aero engine manufacturers of the day". 79 
Because Power Jets had not evolved over years in contact with Government 
departments it had not developed the mechanisms, habits and the experience for 
dealing with them and, from the point of view of some officials, Power Jets was 
a problem. Many public servants approached the venture in an open-minded 
spirit, accepting that a new engine must be the product of unusual minds, 
although others were concerned by the continually deferred W. 2 programme, 
the poor relationship between Power Jets and the Rover company as well as the 
combative approach of Power Jets towards MAP. 
There was, after all, the example of the de Havilland jet engine - promising, 
powerful and actually overtaking the stalled Whittle programme so that de 
Havilland engines replaced Power Jets ones for the Meteor's first flight on 5 
March 1943. De Havilland had started to study of the gas turbine in early 1941 
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at the request of MAP when Tizard "harassed with the vicissitudes of Whittle, 
cast around for some more normal character to tackle the design of a jet 
engine". 80 In under two years the de Havilland team, led by the freelance engine 
designer Frank Halford achieved a functioning engine capable of 1700 lbs 
thrust. At this time the Rover-built engines were restricted to 1000 lbs thrust 
and, additionally, on account of impeller bursting problems, were restricted to 
taxying trials only. De Havilland had received, it is true, unrestricted access to 
all the Power Jets data and considerable help from the RAE but it must also be 
noted that Power Jets itself had received a huge amount of assistance from the 
RAE which had seconded some of its best compressor and turbine specialists to 
the project and subordinated work on its own axial flow F2 engine. 
Although the straight-through engine was put to one side by Rover following the 
fracas between Power Jets and MAP a stream of difficulties and complaints 
continued to emanate from Power Jets. Moreover, the results obtained with the 
basic W. 2. B over the next ten months were poor. Against this background of 
disappointing engineering development Power Jets kept up a continual campaign 
of argument with MAP. Much of this was concerned with the division of design 
responsibility between Power Jets and Rover and with Power Jets' unresolvable 
claim for a formula which would recognise them as the ultimate design 
authority. This was problematic, since the design was continually evolving, and 
since creative engineers (as Lombard and his Rover colleagues clearly were) 
would be bound to have personal or original views on possible solutions. 
MAP attempted to resolve these disputes by drafting "terms of reference" which 
were intended to regulate affairs between Rover and Power Jets. The growing 
exasperation of FJ Linnell, Controller of Research and Development (CRD) at 
MAP, and in overall control of the jet engine programme, can be glimpsed from 
his letter enclosing these terms of reference and making the appeal that: 
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It is quite impossible to define with complete precision all the points 
which may arise. The Terms of Reference... must ... be used as a 
general guide and interpreted in a liberal sense on matters which are 
not explicitly covered ... A similar letter has been sent to Mr SB Wilks of Rovers. 81 
Linnell observed that the urgent need to produce a jet aircraft had "forced us 
into a position where we must attempt to manufacture the W. 2B concurrently 
with the development and testing of experimental models", but reflected that this 
process "lends itself to misunderstandings as regards responsibilities" and that 
success would depend on "the fullest possible collaboration". 82 He also proposed 
a Technical Committee set up by MAP to rule on modifications and points at 
issue between the firms. Meanwhile Williams wrote to Bulman a long historical 
summary of past grievances. Bulman replied: 
Thank you for your letter of July 23rd. ... For my many other 
correspondents do not regale me with such lengthy epistles, though 
their matter is frequently of equal moment. Following our frank and 
to me very happy and most useful talk on July 20th, I think no further 
purpose would be served in further inquest on the past, with so much 
for all of us to do now. ... I attach a copy of the working procedure for the MAP Technical Committee which has been approved by CRD 
who is not prepared to have any further discussion either on the terms 
of reference on this particular document. 83 
Williams continued to object that the proposed procedure "was a great 
disappointment to us. I fear that 'row' you asked for when we last met is not 
long in coming. May we see you soon and get it over? ". " Bulman replied, one 
senses, wearily: 
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The Terms of Reference ... have been laid down by CRD after immense expenditure of time and discussion. ... There is nothing I 
can see to be usefully added ... in relation to the actual progress of development and production of the W. 2B engine, which is our sole 
objective, and not argumentation about the past, of which there has 
been more than enough already. 85 
We have seen that there were factions within MAP with respect to Power Jets 
although the company's actions progressively distanced its supporters. Whittle's 
admitted brilliance had won support from Tedder (before he left to become 
deputy commander of the RAF in the Middle East from December 1940), from 
Tizard, Pye and, perhaps, from Linnell. Bulman though, as the most important 
commissioning agent for RAF engines in the interwar period, was a strong 
supporter of the established companies, particularly Rolls-Royce and Bristol, 
and was quite sceptical about Power Jets. This polarisation also reflected a 
division of responsibility within MAP for the jet. Bulman, as DED, was 
responsible for engines actually commissioned for production for service, while 
Power Jets came under the direction of the DSR (Director of Scientific 
Research), through Harold Roxbee Cox as DDSR (later Director, Special 
Projects) -a situation that reflected the experimental nature of the jet and the 
original sponsorship of it by the Engine Sub-Committee of the ARC and by 
DSR. But by late 1942 the stock of goodwill within MAP towards Power Jets 
was largely exhausted. Whittle himself succumbed to two nervous breakdowns 
and it also seems that, while hospitalised, he was given electro-convulsive shock 
treatment. 86 However unfair this may seem, some officials must certainly have 
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considered his nervous troubles as evidence of unfitness to control the jet 
programme and Fielden has suggested that "most of the officials regarded 
Whittle virtually as a nutcase". 87 Whyte described the episode more poetically, 
recalling: 
Unbroken tension and excitement, with its result in nerves and illness. 
At one critical stage Whittle himself could stand it no longer and as 
he lay in bed day after day the whole enterprise was shaken by the 
appalling doubt: had too much been gambled on one man and had that 
man taken on too much? i88 
The disillusionment with the jet programme is reflected in a note from Air Vice 
Marshall FJ Linnell, as Controller of Research and Development (CRD) at 
MAP, in November 1942 to Sir Henry Tizard, in which he expressed 
disappointment with jet progress and anticipated that the F9/40 aircraft fitted 
W. 2B power units, then achieving 1450 lbs thrust, would be "of such inferior 
performance in climb ... and of so little superiority in speed" as to be 
unacceptable and "useless for operations by the time it is introduced". 89 
86(... continued) 
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"From 1939 to 1941 the tension was never relaxed for a moment. We would leave board or 
committee meetings after exhausting battles with civil servants or with collaborating firms to 
return at once to engine tests at Lutterworth ... and 
frequently finish with night duty listening to 
the German bombers, as for example on the night of the first mass raid on Coventry, only 
twelve miles away. ... and this against the 
fall of France, the rally under Churchill, the Battle 
of Britain, and the risks of an invasion". LL Whyte, 'Focus', (n. 23 above), p 146. 
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Tizard agreed that the jet position was disappointing but although "the gamble of 
preparing for the production of the W. 2B engine on a large scale has not quite 
come off' he felt that "even with all the mistakes, human and otherwise" it had 
been justified. 40 Shortly afterwards Linnell summarised the problems that had 
befallen the jet project for Air Marshall Sir Wilfrid Freeman, then Chief 
Executive at the MAP. He observed that the piston-engined Typhoon aircraft 
(designed by Hawkers but produced at Glosters) and the W. 2B had taught that 
"bitter experience has proved that the only sound way to introduce a new design 
is for the design firm to be charged with the initial production". The major 
causes of the troubles with the W. 2B he attributed to this mistake, to the attempt 
to produce a completely undeveloped design and to "undue optimism". " 
Linnell recommended that Rolls-Royce should take over Power Jets with their 
factory at Whetstone and run it as the jet section of Rolls-Royce, while Rovers 
should "finish out the salvage of the W. 2B engine from which I should hope to 
build between 150-200 training and development engines". Freeman then 
advised Cripps that he had ordered the production of W. 2B engines to be 
stopped at 200 examples and the Meteor aircraft run would be cut short at about 
fifty. "Fifty [aircraft] should be about right" he noted, in a comment which 
certainly shows how little faith there was in potential reliability, "as I imagine 
we will run through the engines pretty quickly". ' 
Sir Wilfrid Freeman then proposed to Whittle a take-over of Power Jets by 
Rolls-Royce in December 1942 but did not force it through. The reason for this 
is not entirely clear but possibly resulted from Whittle's wish to be Chief 
Engineer of a future integrated scheme and Freeman's view that "he could not 
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very well put Rolls-Royce under [Whittle's] orders". 93 Perhaps of more 
significance was the absence of any administrative or financial mechanism open 
to MAP for forcing the acquisition of one private company by another. ' 
Instead, Rolls-Royce took over the Rover production facility at Barnoldswick 
from early 1943, leaving Power Jets to carry on research and development of 
continuation engines to the basic Whittle design as an independent concern. 
Bringing Rolls-Royce into the project quickly transformed the outlook for the 
Whittle engine. Ernest Hives, at the head of the company, nurtured a company- 
culture with an exceptional attitude to engineering quality and a ruthless 
approach to research and development. His tough pragmatic view is captured in 
his letter to Linnell in March 1943 which promised to treat the jet "as just 
another aero engine" and not as a piece of scientific apparatus. "We do not look 
upon the turbine engine as a new secret weapon, it is just another way of 
pushing an aeroplane along, except that at the present time it is not as good as 
the conventional engine". He also noted for their next meeting that; 
I shall be bringing with me a report which will give the performance 
of the F. 9/40 with various stages of progress of the [jet engine] and 
the dates at which we think these will be available. We want it to be 
understood that these are Rolls estimates, and therefore have to be 
taken seriously. ... We are satisfied that we are going to make a 
success of it ... the progress will be in keeping with our reputation". 
" 
Rolls-Royce did in fact develop the W. 2B to become a reliable -unit but, as we 
have seen, it was quickly replaced by a development of the Rover-originated 
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straight-through variant. 
The Nationalisation of Power Jets 
The take-over of the Rover gas turbine programme by Rolls-Royce transformed 
the outlook for the series production of the Whittle engine, but the position of 
Power Jets still remained an irritant within MAP. 
Bulman remained among the most formidable opponents and objected to the 
company having "the autonomy of a private firm, whilst being entirely 
supported on both current and capital accounts by M. A. P", arguing that, in its 
relationship with the producer firms, Power Jets was, in effect, functioning like 
a government research establishment and it should therefore be brought within 
the Engine Department of the RAE. ' Friction was also caused by Whittle's 
unquenchable desire to build about twelve prototype engines a year in the new 
factory that had been provided for Power Jets at Whetstone with MAP funds. 97 
This kind of prototyping was unlike anything done in government establishments 
and added to the anomalous position of the company. But in addition to the 
dissatisfaction within MAP, there was added internal company criticism of the 
management which was expressed by workers at Power Jets to Sir Stafford 
Cripps when he visited the Whetstone factory in 1943.98 
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The question of the ongoing Treasury finance for Power Jets was also on 
Cripps' mind and he initiated discussions as to how the benefit of this public 
expenditure could be secured for the nation. His own view was that: 
since substantially the whole cost of developing the gas turbine engine 
had been defrayed by the Government, arrangements ought to be 
made to secure the benefits of this development as Government 
property. Power Jets were entitled to be rewarded for having worked 
on the original idea and for having backed it when the Air Ministry 
were lukewarm about it, but for this and nothing more". " 
The outcome of these discussions was a proposal for the nationalisation of 
Power Jets. This action was certainly problematic in view of the anxiety about 
upsetting the fragile jet programme in any way and feelings over the moral and 
commercial rights of Whittle and his original associates in the venture. Indeed, 
it seems unlikely that so final a step would have been taken at all, were it not 
for the constellation of forces pushing in this direction, and, in particular, the 
fact that the nationalisation was seen as being able to satisfy two quite different 
policy aims. As we have seen, for some MAP officials the administrative 
relationship with Power Jets appeared deeply unsatisfactory and the attitude to 
Power Jets of the 'hard line' faction within the Ministry can be seen in a noted 
from Sir Lindsay Scott, successor to Linnell as CRD whose expressed the view 
a little later that: 
we poured money into that company far in excess of its own capital 
until it became merely an inadequately organised and controlled organ 
of public policy and nationalisation, effected at the cost of relatively 
heavy compensation to private interests, became inevitable. 10° 
98(... continued) 
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Stafford Cripps was concerned about the ethical situation regarding Power Jets 
and public investment in the engine, but he seems, in reaching the final decision 
to nationalise the company, to have been also swayed by his strong desire to 
create new institutions to advance the technological base of the whole British 
aircraft industry. Thus his thoughts on Power Jets crystallised into the view the 
view that an equivalent to the projected new National Aeronautical 
Establishment (to be discussed in the next chapter) was needed for the new gas 
turbine engine. Evidence that his thinking on this was indeed strategic, and not 
simply an expedient solution to the continuing problem of Power Jets, may also 
be adduced from the fact that, some time before nationalisation was proposed, 
he sought advice on the best structure and role for a jet engine research centre 
from the foremost independent internal combustion engine consultant, Harry 
Ricardo. "' 
The odd position of the Power Jets company offered a vehicle for an analogous 
establishment in the new jet engine field. It was clearly a creative concern, but 
was not set up for quantity production. Cripps seems to have held a genuine 
respect for Whittle and to have believed that a new organisation could be a 
vehicle for his abilities. Thus the decision to convert Power Jets into a research 
establishment is entirely consistent with Cripps' other initiatives for fostering 
new establishments for education and for research to support the aviation 
industry in the post-war era. 
Discussions about the valuation of Power Jets assets ensued between MAP and 
the company but agreement could not be reached and on 26 November 1943 
Cripps wrote to Bonham Carter that there was "no basis between us for 
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acquiring the assets of the company". He proposed therefore to consider "the 
other alternative" but significantly, added that "we urgently need the plant for 
general experimental purposes". 102 A subsequent letter from Sam Brown, an 
undersecretary in MAP and head of the Capital Finance Department, reinforces 
this reading of a clear desire in the mind of Cripps to set up a research centre to 
for the new jet industry. 
The Minister reached the definite opinion that the national interests 
demanded the setting up of a Government-owned centre of gas turbine 
technology. The present stringency of building labour and resources 
generally renders it quite impossible for the Government now to 
construct a suitable new establishment. In these circumstances the 
Minister was forced to the conclusion that he had no option but to 
exercise his rights, which are not, I think, in dispute, to retake 
possession of the facilities occupied by the Company at Whetstone, 
but constructed wholly at the Government's expense, and which are 
now and always have been the property of the Crown. 103 
The decision came, understandably, as a brutal blow to the directors of Power 
Jets, and the terms that were put left no room for argument. Cripps stated that: 
if there was no quick agreement on the sum to be paid, [he] would 
take the alternative course of taking over possession of all the plant 
operated by the Company and directing all the labour to a new 
Government Company, leaving Power Jets in possession of its paper 
assets, such as patents, etc., and nothing else. 104 
As Schlaiffer succinctly put it, "the government's chief argument in driving so 
hard a bargain was that without the government financing after July -1,1939, 
which amounted ... to about £1,300,000, or over sixty times the private 
investment, the company could not possibly have succeeded in producing a 
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useable product and must necessarily have been liquidated". 'os There was also 
the substantial investment in Rover, amounting to some £1.5m which had 
produced almost no visible return in terms of useable engines and although this 
expenditure was independent of Power Jets finance it seems likely that it would 
have influenced MAP thinking on compensation. 106 
Williams and Tinling received each approximately £46,786 for their 'A stock' 
while Whittle had waived his financial interest. The actual investors of cash or 
services (the holders of the B stock) received just over three times their initial 
investment and the total cost to the government of the acquisition was 
£135,500.107 
The investors in the company found themselves in the curious position of having 
their hopes raised by press announcements of the successful development of the 
jet aircraft while, almost simultaneously, learning from the directors that MAP 
had taken steps to nationalise the company. Lawyers for a dissident shareholder 
began an action against the directors of Power Jets for accepting the government 
terms, putting the powerful argument that investors had waited patiently for 
nearly eight years for a return on their investments and that the directors had 
agreed to this sale "just at a time when the genius of Group Captain Whittle had 
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Use of Government Funds by Power Jets Limited 
Year Revenue Machinery Buildings Total 
1939 £ 12,000 ... ... £12,000 1940 72,000 £ 1500 ... 73,500 
1941 160,000 21,000 £ 10,000 191,000 
1942 270,000 93,000 160,000 523,000 
1943 370,000 98,000 30,000 498,000 
Total £884,000 £213,500 £200,000 £1,297,500 
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given a phenomenal and almost unlimited value to the Company's Undertaking 
and assets including its patent rights". 108 
However, in reality the company's negotiating position was weak and was set 
out for shareholders by the directors. 
The facilities occupied by your company had been provided largely by 
the government. The proposed utilisation for a Government-owned 
centre of gas turbine technology would necessitate the Ministry re- 
taking possession of the facilities and the continuance of the 
development [of the jet engine] being carried on by the Ministry; the 
staff being if necessary removed from the Company under appropriate 
war-time powers. The result ... would be that your company would 
perforce remain inactive until the cessation of hostilities and 
restoration of more normal conditions enabled it to take up once more 
the development and commercial exploitation of the invention.... 
While your Directors would have liked to have been able to get better 
terms and have tried their best to do so, they are satisfied that'this is 
the best the Minister will offer and, if not accepted, the Minister will 
re-take possession of all the important facilities now enjoyed by the 
Company, operate the patents for the service of the Crown as well as 
he thinks fit and the shareholders may ultimately find that all, or . the 
greater part, of their money has been lost. 109 
Although the directors of Power Jets were obliged to recognise force majeure in 
these dealings with the MAP the nationalisation was understandably a bitter 
experience. Williams subsequently stood for Parliament and much later said "I 
went into politics because I was so annoyed with Sir Stafford Cripps that I 
wanted to wipe the floor with him". llo 
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Whittle was placed in an extraordinary position - converted into a national icon 
at the same time that his company was taken from him. It was, LL Whyte 
observed "Greek tragedy in the modern world: the hero publicly acclaimed at 
the very moment when his deeper ambition is frustrated". "' On 6 January 1944 
the jet engine programme was publicly announced with Whittle credited as the 
inventor - the same day that the directors of Power Jets were informed that the 
company was to be nationalised. 
Whittle himself believed that he "triggered off the train of events which led to 
this result" for in April 1943 he wrote to Cripps arguing that the whole gas 
turbine industry should be nationalised. 12 Edgerton has also given weight to the 
influence of Whittle's propagandising efforts for nationalisation. 113 However, it 
seems unlikely, on the basis of reading here of company and other papers, that 
Whittle's intervention had any decisive influence on the outcome. 
One side effect of. nationalisation was to solve at a stroke the almost impossible 
tangle of rights over intellectual and moral ownership of much that had been 
done, resulting partly from the dissemination of Whittle's ideas through the Gas 
Turbine Collaboration Committee and on the patent question, discussion of 
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which had been postponed until after the war. Lord Kings Norton (the 
government scientist who, as Harold Roxbee Cox, ran the wartime gas turbine 
programme for the MAP) did not consider these that these secondary 
considerations influenced Cripps. Although he felt that Power Jets was very 
badly treated, in effect by Cripps, he made the reservation that "I don't think it 
was wilful - because he was too good a man". "4 
The Establishment of Power Jets (R&D) Ltd 
The nationalisation of Power Jets was not simply a matter of state acquisition of 
a company, for it included another rather novel element - the merger into the 
new organisation of all the government scientists in the Engine Experimental 
Department of the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) at Farnborough who 
were working on gas turbines. "' This action underlines the seriousness of 
Cripps's attempt to create a powerful national research centre for the emerging 
gas turbine industry, for Farnborough was a national institution with a proud 
history and a record of success in aeronautical affairs, especially in response to 
the challenge of the Second World War. To change the status of these 
government scientists who were active in this new and promising field seems, in 
the context of the times, almost as radical as the actual nationalisation of Power 
Jets. It is another example of the asymmetry in the existing historiography of the 
jet that the creation of Power Jets (R&D) Ltd has been criticised frequently 
from the perspective of Whittle and other Power Jets personnel but it is far less 
well known that the merger was also resented by senior RAE staff working on 
gas turbines at Farnborough including Hayne Constant, as head of the turbine 
section, and Sir William Hawthorne, both of whom had been engaged in close 
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liaison with Power Jets. Hawthorne, in fact, described it from the RAE 
perspective as "a great tragedy". 16 
Power Jets (R&D) Ltd 
Power Jets (R&D) Ltd was formally established as a government-owned 
company on 28 April 1944 but although direct government control was intended 
"to cut a number of Gordian knots in personal relationships" the ending of 
Power Jets' independence did not fully resolve the problems which continued to 
exist both between Power Jets and on the one hand, the aero engine industry 
and, on the other, MAP officials. "7 
Bulman, who now was planning the new National Aeronautical Establishment 
(NAE), which will be discussed in the next chapter, cast doubt on the need for 
an ongoing research and development role for of Power Jets, since "a major 
objective [of the NAE] is to bring together aerodynamic and powerplant 
research". His opposition certainly reflected the poor opinion of Power Jets 
which he formed while he was in overall charge of engine development and he 
questioned "whether Power Jets was to continue as the chosen instrument for 
turbine R&D", when logically it should be absorbed into the NAE; which was 
beginning to be established on airfields near Bedford. "' 
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Cripps however, did not accept this advice and this note to Power Jets from an 
aide shows the sincerity of the intentions he had declared earlier during the 
nationalisation to secure the talent in the company as a national resource: 
I am directed by the Minister of Aircraft Production to refer to his 
decision that you should act as the recognised national establishment 
for furthering, ... the advancement of knowledge on gas turbine 
engines. ... The Minister feels that this decision involves the installation at Whetstone, and not in the new National Establishment 
... the equipment ... which will be required exclusively for the testing 
of gas turbine engines. "' 
This action certainly demonstrates that for Cripps, at least, the nationalisation of 
Power Jets had not been a punitive act and the genuine commitment to build 
something worthwhile on the bones of the Whittle concern is visible from the 
resources that were brought to the company. The new board, strengthened in 
accordance with Sir Eric Mensforth's recommendations, was an extremely 
powerful assembly, comprising Sir William Stanier (the distinguished chief 
engineer to the LMS railway, then serving as Scientific Adviser to the Minister 
of Aircraft Production), Harry Ricardo (the most eminent British engineering 
consultant on internal combustion engines), and from MAP, Sam Brown, head 
of the Capital Finance Department and Edwin Plowden. 12° Williams and Tinling 
continued as directors while Roxbee Cox, who had managed to get the trust of 
118(... continued) 
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all the factions in the industry and the Ministry in a unique way, became 
Chairman and Managing Director. 'Z' 
Power Jets R&D Ltd was now a sizeable facility and occupied, at Whetstone, a 
factory of 80,000 square feet (8000 square metres) and expansion to 120,000 
square feet was planned. It was well equipped with machine tools and capital 
plant and the research equipment included a 6000 hp steam turbine driving a 
compressor to produce the powerful air supply needed to test components for jet 
engines. The supply of three wind tunnels for testing 'cascades' of turbine or 
compressor blades was in train, as well as the manufacture of a supersonic 
tunnel. 122 The former RAE turbine facilities at Pyestock near Farnborough were 
also kept on and these included a 4000 hp electrically driven compressor. The 
company had a flight test section at Bruntingthorpe airfield, near Whetstone, 
with two Lancasters and a Wellington bomber, adapted as 'flying test beds' to 
carry jet engines aloft for airborne tests, and two Meteor jet-engined fighters. 
Over the first year of operation the staffing of the establishment rose from 1086 
to 1327 employees, while the cost of the first year's experimental work, given 
in the first annual report in April 1945, was estimated at £600,000.1 
These figures and resources make it clear that, overall, MAP initially acted fully 
in the spirit of Cripps' directive that Power Jets (R&D) Ltd should become "the 
recognised national establishment for gas turbine engines" . 
124 Power Jets was not 
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government-owned company did not fully materialise and it eventually 
disappeared. 
Power Jets (R&D) Limited becomes the National Gas Turbine 
Establishment 
The life of the company was short. In early 1946 moves were made for putting 
turbine research under the same kind of government research establishment 
structure as that used for aerodynamics, radar, telecommunications and so on. " 
Whittle's continuing plan to build complete engines also contributed to wider 
industry opposition to cooperation with the new Power Jets structure. Whittle's 
notion was that Power jets would develop engines up to production standard, 
manufacturing a large enough trial batch to standardise the design which would 
then be handed over to the producer company. 
This model of design and development was strongly resisted by the aero engine 
industry, and particularly by Rolls-Royce and de Havilland. Their opposition has 
usually been interpreted in terms of resentment of unfair competition and they 
had certainly threatened not to collaborate with Power Jets if this model was 
followed. 126 However, these major engine builders could clearly not place 
themselves under the direction of an outside design body - particularly Whittle's 
firm. Rolls-Royce had rescued the engine from the Power Jets-Rover debacle 
and had, throughout the war, followed their own engineering judgement. 127 De 
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Havilland, as we have seen had also independently produced a highly effective 
jet design. 
Whittle's plans were completely unrealistic by this time for the mainstream 
engine companies had begun to push ahead with their own designs. Rolls-Royce 
showed that they had mastered the design and development of Whittle-type 
centrifugal engines by building a new, large jet engine, the Nene, which ran in 
October 1944, just six months after the project was initiated, achieving 5000 lbs 
thrust - making it the highest powered jet at the time in the world. `8 The 
company had successfully resisted the notion of over-riding control of the 
programme by Whittle in 1943 and it was not credible that they would now 
accept it in 1945 when their own understanding of the gas turbine had increased 
enormously. 12' GBR Fielden felt that Whittle could have retained a useful role 
in the industry if he had gone to a "Ricardo type" consultancy but that "the idea 
of Power Jets at the centre of a spider's web in the post-war jet industry was a 
total illusion". 130 
Thus, in spite of nationalisation, Power Jets (R&D) Ltd was still "an elaborate 
organisation with an elaborate relationship with the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production" and the process for bringing programmes into being was 
128 
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characterised as "somewhat complicated and even mysterious". "' It was also 
suggested that "the dilemma of public financial backing without public 
administrative control" was a continuing concern. 132 Power Jets (R&D) Ltd was 
formally converted to the National Gas Turbine Establishment on 1 July 1946 
and though sixteen Power Jets engineers resigned, provoking a question in 
Parliament, the residue of Whittle's company passed from public view without 
further protest or comment. 
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Conclusions 
We can see in the Whittle story a taxing problem for historical study. Even his 
contemporaries, and those closest to the jet programme were divided - often 
bitterly - over his potential and capacity. 133 One problem which complicates the 
analysis is that the Whittle story came to be deeply bound up with national 
myth. Although the Short aircraft company had been nationalised during the war 
as a response to poor production performance and management, the action 
proved remarkably uncontentious. 1M The case of Whittle was rather different 
because the jet engine became part of a new and emerging national identity. ' 
Thus even as the administrative arrangements for nationalisation were being 
confirmed, the achievement of jet flight was being trumpeted as a symbol of 
superior British technique. For example, news of the jet was the headline and 
lead story in the Daily Express early in 1944 ("Britain has fighter with no 
propeller"), with a portrait and profile of the inventor. 115 Whittle was given full 
credit for the invention - and in fact was exploited by Government agencies for 
public relations purposes. Little hint of the tensions within the programme 
reached the public until the release of his book Jet in 1953. 
In this aspect of its manipulation the Whittle jet story joined, but surpassed, 
other claims, in the latter part of the war, for superior national technique, such 
133 
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as the discovery of penicillin, 'asdic' submarine detection and developments in 
radar - revelations which had been used to boost national morale in the interests 
of the prosecution of the war and war production. The Whittle story, falling as 
it did towards the end of the war in Europe, became extended beyond this more 
limited aim and became an intrinsic part of the self-re-invention of Britain in the 
post-war era. 
Partly in the service of this heroic myth, it has always been argued that the 
officials gave too little support to Power Jets and withdrew it too soon. This 
argument is another strand in the declinist analysis of recent British history 
which characterises its public servants and opinion formers as classicists with a 
remote disdain for technology. 136 But the striking point about the Whittle venture 
is that officials repeatedly gave the inventor the benefit of the doubt, in spite of 
his own personal problems and the increasingly difficult relationship with his 
company and colleagues. It can be argued that, contrary to the received view, 
British officials during the Second World War were particularly open to 
inventors with potential 'war-winning schemes' and the acceptance of proposals, 
both built and unbuilt, ranging from the Barnes Wallis bouncing bomb, Pluto 
(petroleum supply 'pipeline under the ocean') and indestructible floating island 
airfields made of "Pyecrete" (a frozen mixture of ice and sawdust) could be 
taken to show that their attitude was rather open-minded. 
Certainly the messianic inventor can exercise great power and we have noted 
that even as hard-headed an airman as Lord Tedder fell under the spell of the 
early Whittle engine and promoted it as "a real war winner". The physical 
surroundings of the early test he witnessed were completely antithetical, say, to 
the ordered workshop environment of Rolls-Royce, and may well have added to 
136 
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the magical power of the occasion. Tedder noted that the test rig "was pure 
unadulterated Heath Robinson ... in what looked like, and I believe was, a 
derelict motor garage" he saw "a typical Emett design" but was impressed by 
the glowing combustion chamber and "the blazing blue jet flame roaring out into 
the open" . 
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From the perspective of this study the problems of the Whittle project were a 
too ready faith in invention and individual brilliance, and an insufficient 
attention to development and management - virtually the opposite of the faults 
which Whittle and his supporters have ascribed to wartime control. 
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Jet Counterfactuals 
We should, though, also consider the long-term effect of Power Jets and what 
might have occurred if Whittle had not obtained official support. In such a case 
intelligence reports of German jet developments in 1942 would, one assumes, 
have energised a crash programme in which the work of the RAE, where a 
sophisticated axial flow compressor had been developed, would have been put 
together with a major aero engine company, such as Rolls-Royce. 138 A viable 
engine would certainly have resulted, for a type not unlike this hypothetical 
motor was, in fact, produced as the Metrovick F2 Beryl during the war arising 
out of the partnership between RAE and Metropolitan-Vickers. 139 
However, in the absence of a Power Jets/government relationship it seems 
unlikely that so high a degree of administrative attention would have been 
focused on the jet programme. The "spoon-feeding" of Power Jets, the drawn 
out negotiations, and the personality of the inventor himself, combined to 
underpin the idea of the jet engine as something exceptional and extraordinarily 
hard to engineer. Having engineered it the British state came to regard it as a 
great prize, to be nurtured for strategic and economic reasons. As a 
propagandist for the jet, Whittle certainly succeeded and without him there 
would also have been fewer specially designated posts within MAP to nursemaid 
138 
Generalised reports of German jet engine work had reached British intelligence from 1939. 
However, in May 1942, photo-reconnaissance following a bombing raid of the Heinkel works 
near Rostock showed a Heinkel 280 twin jet fighter prototype. Constance Babington-Smith, 
Evidence in Camera, (Chatto and Windus, London, 1958), p 280. In November 1942 an Air 
Intelligence report on German jet aircraft work had been prepared (PRO AIR 20/290) showing 
the considerable extent of the work. This is discussed in FH Hinsley, EE Thomas, CFG 
Ransom and the late RC Knight, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol III, Part 1, 
(HMSO, London, 1984), p. 334. 
139 
The successor design to this, the Sapphire, was passed to Armstrong-Siddeley when Metrovick 
opted to leave the aero gas turbine field at the end of the war. It first ran in 1948 and was also 
licence-built in large numbers by the Wright corporation. The Avon, built by Rolls-Royce in 
1948 can also be viewed as the implementation of the 'government' axial flow line in 
compressors by a major maker. 
116 
the gas turbine, probably no National Gas Turbine Establishment, and perhaps a 
less developed national sense of the jet engine as a triumph of British endeavour 
and technique. In the absence of this overt commitment there would also have 
been less likelihood of British companies winning a substantial share of global 
business jet engine business. 
The counterfactual experimental question "what if there had been no support 
for the Whittle jet engine" could also be approached from the alternative 
proposition "what if there had been no war to provoke the development of the 
jet engine? ". In such a case, it seems likely that the gas turbine would have 
been deferred by ten or fifteen years and, in the civil field, the new, high 
altitude pressurised airliners, such as the Lockheed Constellation would have 
had a longer life with their turbo-supercharged piston engines before the 
extension of services round the world prepared the ground for another jump in 
performance, comfort and speed, with a new turbine powerplant. In this case 
seems highly probable that the successful commercial development of such a 
powerplant (as opposed to its 'invention') would have been in the USA for a 
study of the 1920s and 1930s in American aviation shows a growing technical 
lead in the civil field and a growing ability for the industry to capitalise 
development. 
As touched on in chapter one the American aviation industry in the 1930s was 
undergoing a step-change in the capability of the whole air transport system. It 
appears unlikely, in the absence of a major war, that in Britain finance would 
have been found to support a major new development like the jet and we have 
already reviewed the quite modest private finance available to Whittle prior to 
1939. 
It is also not generally realised that in the USA several gas turbine projects were 
under way in the late 1930s, none of which, it appears, derived from any 
knowledge of Whittle's experiments. Northrop was fostering research on a 
turboprop arrangement, anticipating a simpler, lighter engine with less vibration. 
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Lockheed had initiated studies for a pure jet design and were aiming at a 600 
mph aircraft, flying at 50,000 feet. 14° There was also turbine research at the 
engine builders Pratt & Whitney while the turbo-supercharger department of 
General Electric, which was developing these devices for piston engines, was 
under the direction of Stanford Moss, an engineer who, as an engineering 
student, had been an enthusiastic exponent of the gas turbine and published his 
doctoral thesis on it in 1903. '4' In fact for these turbo-superchargers General 
Electric solved the materials and manufacturing problems of turbine blades 
capable of standing the heat of the piston engine exhaust gas, and partly for this 
reason, subsequently made a success of the Whittle engine when this was passed 
to them in 1941. (For a while during the war General Electric compressor 
impellers were shipped to Power Jets because British-made ones were bursting 
at full speed). 14' However, the point made here is that it hardly needed the 
Whittle engine to provoke interest at GE in the gas turbine. To answer the 
question posed at the beginning of this section, there is a powerful supposition 
that if re-armament in Britain had not brought government support to Whittle the 
practical aircraft gas turbine would have been realised in the USA as part of the 
broad sweep of improving aeronautical technologies. 
The handling of the jet programme in Britain can also be usefully compared 
with development of the engine in Germany for there, events initially showed a 
remarkable parallel to those in Britain. A young German physicist and inventor, 
Hans von Ohain, began work on a jet engine from 1934. Thus in both Britain 
and Germany the gas turbine work was launched by a lone inventor, outside the 
140 
Schlaiffer, (n. 38 above), pp. 440-479. 
141 
Sanford Moss, 'Gas Turbines and Turbosuperchargers', Transactions of the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers, July 1944, pp 351-370. Moss commented "like most of the other 
inventors, the author at first thought he was alone in the gas-turbine field". 
142 
The existence of the Whittle jet was disclosed in general terms to the USA by the Tizard 
mission in 1940. In October 1941 a complete, dismantled, engine of W. 1 type (the W. 1. X) and 
a full set of drawings for the W. 2B were shipped to the General Electric's plant in Lynn, 
Massachusetts, by air, accompanied by two Power Jets engineers. 
118 
mainstream of the aero engine establishment. Ernst Heinkel, a mercurial 
industrialist and self-propagandist took up von Ohain and an experimental jet- 
powered Heinkel aircraft made a rather marginal demonstration flight in 1939. 
However, Heinkel was an airframe company and the German air ministry was 
not greatly interested in an individualistic 'sport' development. Helmut Schelp, 
the visionary official at the air ministry who did most to stimulate the jet 
programme then approached the more established engineering-based companies 
BMW, Daimler-Benz and Junkers. 'a3 
BMW and Junkers agreed to take up the gas turbine and were given the latest 
results of axial flow compressor research emanating from Professor Albert Betz 
and W. Encke at the AVA aerodynamics research institute at Göttingen (in 
effect, the German equivalent to RAE Farnborough). Moreover these two firms 
were "very rigidly directed by the Reichsluftfahrtministerium". 111 
Thus the greatest weight of support went to established companies, with the 
original inventor being sidelined. The parallel in Britain would have been if 
Rolls-Royce and, say Bristol or de Havilland were given the bulk of the 
development funds and instructions to incorporate the RAE ideas on compressor 
design. In fact, as we have seen, the reverse happened. The analytical work of 
the RAE was put at the service of Whittle's company which also got the lion's 
share of attention and development finance, until a crisis was reached in 1943. 
The independent RAE work on axial flow compressors got rather low priority, 
going forward not with an aviation company, but with a steam turbine concern 
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unused to aviation requirements. 145 
After 1943, as we have seen, MAP felt impelled to bring Rolls-Royce fully into 
the gas turbine programme, although Tizard's initiative in 1941 to broaden it to 
other companies was perhaps the first implicit acceptance of the fact that Power 
Jets was inadequate. Also, it should be noted, in 1941 a rather unique type of 
inter-firm communication was set up, known as the Gas Turbine Collaboration 
Committee (GTCC) to involve all the companies that were working on the new 
engine. The original suggestion was credited to Ernest Hives, of Rolls-Royce 
(who apocryphally remarked that "as we are giving so much information to the 
Americans we might as well give it to each other"). " Roxbee-Cox was also a 
keen advocate for such a body and although the normal practice for engine 
procurement within the Air Ministry and MAP relied, in effect, on competitive 
development between firms it was accepted, for the jet that the problems were 
so new and various that a forum would be helpful and Linnell, as CRD, took 
the view that it would be worthwhile if it brought "the various factions within 
speaking distance of each other". "' In fact the committee worked well and 
Roxbee Cox secured the cooperation of all the firms, arguing that they were 
ushering in a new age and that it was up to them "not to fumble the job". The 
greatest issue between firms - the question of patenting new ideas - was 
"banished from the agenda" on the assumption that it would ultimately be solved 
and the Committee served as a really valuable agency for the exchange of 
information on aerodynamic or mechanical problems and their solutions which 
were new to all the participants. The GTCC certainly made a powerful 
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contribution to the speed with which de Havilland and Rolls-Royce picked up 
gas turbine work and to the quality of their engines. "' 
On the basis of this study, therefore, it is argued that Whittle got exceptional 
backing until the programme ran deeply into trouble. Even then, Whittle's 
personal conviction, the charm to which his collaborators have attested, and, it 
must be said, his great talent, secured tremendous indulgence from officials, 
even though doubts were rife as to whether Power Jets could mature into the 
type of organisation which was going to be able to bring the engine into 
production and to serve as the ultimate design authority for it. This forbearance 
almost certainly delayed development and makes an interesting contrast with 
German policy for the conduct of the jet engine programme. 
From these perspectives, it is argued that the official handling of the jet 
programme in Britain was a mixed achievement. Government officials and 
advisers picked up the project during re-armament, nurtured it through all the 
bitter technical and personal wartime disputes, and Britain thus ended the war 
with a substantial gas turbine industry nurtured by a government research 
establishment and an informed cadre of officials within MAP and the Ministry 
of Supply. However, this study shows the MAP to have been too supportive to 
the inventor and too slow to transfer control and industrial support away from 
Power Jets to the mainstream industry. Nevertheless, if survival in the market 
can be taken as an indicator of success it has to be acknowledged that British jet 
engines in the post-war period had a significant technical superiority over their 
competitors, while British aero engine production has now maintained 
technological parity and a major presence in international markets for over fifty 
years. 
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Chapter 4: New Resources and New Institutions 
Introduction 
The long-range planning within the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) for 
the conversion to post-war production has been discussed in chapter two and it 
was argued that these plans were well considered and ambitious although one 
might query whether the aspirations behind much of the planning could ever, 
realistically, have achieved what was hoped for them. 
In fact, the new institutions which arose out of the war-time planning in 
aeronautics were concrete evidence for the seriousness of these intentions. Much 
was achieved and the efforts did go some way to shifting the centre of gravity 
of industrial R&D in Britain. These various initiatives could not have been 
accomplished under normal conditions and the particular importance of air 
power to British strategic conceptions in the Second World War and the 
consequent great importance and power of the MAP during the war were 
indispensable pre-conditions. Indeed, it is surprising how much was done and 
how little comment these initiatives have aroused either in the historiography or 
among commentators on public affairs at the time. 
This chapter therefore examines the creation of important new institutions which 
have had little attention in the historiography but were directly intended to 
advance the British aeronautical industry. These are the creation of the new 
College of Aeronautics at Cranfield and the planning and partial realisation of 
an ambitious new National Aeronautical Experimental Establishment at Bedford. 
The systematic exploitation of German aeronautical research work in the post- 
war period and the recruitment of a substantial number of German 
aerodynamics, electronics and control specialists for the RAE and other 
establishments can also be regarded as an aspect of these institutional changes 
and is examined here. This episode has had remarkably little study in the British 
context and it has been widely assumed that all the worthwhile scientific spoils 
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from Germany went to the USA. Thus Bill Gunston, a writer well regarded by 
the industry itself and the former Technical Editor of Flight magazine asserted, 
as we shall see quite erroneously, that, in post-war Britain, designers struggled 
to create advanced aircraft without proper equipment because "all the transonic 
windtunnels found in Germany were pinched by our allies". ' 
In fact Britain was well equipped with advanced research equipment in the post- 
war era, much of it designed and built here, but also supplemented by a 
substantial haul of German material. This study shows that, contrary to the usual 
perception, a major, and highly selective, effort was mounted to bring German 
equipment and German personnel to Britain to augment the work of research 
organisations and aircraft companies after the war. The programmes made an 
important contribution to the resources available to the postwar British aircraft 
industry. 
The College of Aeronautics 
The College of Aeronautics at Cranfield (today Cranfield University) is, 
arguably, one of the striking successes of post-war British scientific and 
technological education. It has been, however, an anomaly in the British higher 
eduction sector set up as the only science and technology institution with a 
purely post-graduate intake, and until the 1960s with a remit solely to cover 
aeronautical subjects. ' For these reasons, perhaps, it has had little attention in 
studies of education for the postwar period and it does not feature at all in 
Sanderson's otherwise comprehensive review of British higher education in 
1 
Bill Gunston, Bombers of the West, (Ian Allan, 1973). 
2 
Cranfield diversified into other areas of engineering and technology from 1960 and after a brief 
spell as the Cranfield Institute of Technology became Cranfield University on 31 December 
1969. As a purely post-graduate college, Cranfield initially awarded its own College of 
Aeronautics Diploma (DCAe) -a respected qualification in the industry. It subsequently also 
acquired the unusual power (for so new and small an institution) to award its own doctoral 
degrees. 
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relation to industry, perhaps because of its unusual status. 3 Neither has Barnett, 
in a passage excoriating the "petty scope of wartime plans for technical and 
higher education" noted the establishment of this important institution. ' His 
general position has been challenged by David Edgerton, but without mention of 
the case of the College of Aeronautics although it has made, in its special field, 
a material contribution to the creation of a British 'technocratic elite' that has 
been studied by Edgerton. ' 
Nevertheless, Cranfield has proved important, with a substantial research 
programme, a contribution to the research and development of the industry, a 
large output of students with doctoral and higher qualifications, and a strong 
representation of former students at senior level in the industry. 
It has been noted in the preceding chapter that MAP officials were uneasy about 
the skill and managerial resources within British aircraft companies. In 
particular, the limited diffusion of competence in basic design and the 
centralisation of design ability in a few master practitioners gave particular 
cause for concern. 
The initiative to attack this problem in a radical way appears to have initially 
come from Sir Roy Fedden, the former chief engineer of the Engine Department 
of the Bristol Aeroplane Company. Fedden was an exceptional character -a 
3 
Michael Sanderson, The Universities and British Industry, 1850-1970, (London, Routledge, 
1972). For example, although Flight, 13 May 1943, p. 508, proclaimed the "Need for a 
University of Aeronautics"and followed the progress of the college, there is no mention at all of 
its formation and start-up in more general journals such as Political Quarterly, or the Journal of 
Public Administration. 
4 
Corelli Barnett, The Audit of War, (London, 1986). Barnett discusses training and education 
under the rubric 'The Lost Victory", pp. 276-304, but has little to say about higher level 
technical education, except to observe that "it was not until 1960 that Britain was to create her 
first colleges of advanced technology, some 120 years after Germany". This position has been 
challenged by David Edgerton in Science, Technology and the British Industrial Decline, 
(Cambridge, 1996) although the specific example of Cranfield is not mentioned. 
5 
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(Cambridge, 1996), pp. 15-28. 
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'gentleman engineer' with a private school background in the days when this 
was rare in design and production. For several decades he had driven the engine 
work of the Bristol company, devising successive generations of the highly 
respected Bristol radial engines. His extraordinarily single-minded (many said 
ruthless) approach both to engineering design and to industrial management 
successfully accomplished the taxing development of the high power Bristol 
sleeve-valve engines which powered a large proportion of British combat 
aircraft in the Second World War. ' However, his style brought him into 
increasing conflict with the Bristol board which dismissed him in September 
1942.7 
Colonel Llewellyn, the Minister of Aircraft Production, wished to utilise 
Fedden's experience for the war effort and then created a special post within the 
MAP as 'Special Technical Advisor to the Minister' (STAM). He took up this 
post just as Stafford Cripps replaced Llewellyn as the new Minister. ' 
One the first tasks was to lead the 'Fedden Mission to America', partly to select 
American aircraft for the RAF, but also to review American production 
techniques and to suggest where these might be adopted by the British aircraft 
industry. To Fedden "the whole standard of training of aeronautical engineers 
6 
Something of Fedden's powerful character and reputation can be glimpsed from the recollections 
of his development engineers at Bristol in the 1930s. Stanley Mansell recalled "it was just about 
possible to cope if one never let up for an instant, if one had the innate capability not to tire or 
to start making mistakes even at the end of perhaps 24 hours non-stop, and if one never ran into 
any kind of bad luck". Fedden tried to be sociable and charming, Mansell recalled, "but it was 
hard work for him. It conflicted with his wish to get on with the job". Bill Gunton, By Jupiter: 
the Life of Sir Roy Fedden, (Royal Aeronautical Society, London, 1978). This work has been 
re-published in expanded form as Fedden - the life of Sir Roy Fedden, (Rolls-Royce Heritage 
Trust, Derby, 1998). 
7 
The background to his dismissal has always been obscure. However it appears that Colonel 
Llewellyn, as Minister of Aircraft Production, tried hard through 1942 to bring about a 
reconciliation between Fedden and the Bristol management which foundered on the intransigence 
of the family members of the Bristol board. Sir Roy Fedden papers, Royal Air Force Museum 
Archives. 
8 
The two appeared to hit it off. Fedden called Cripps "absolutely splendid" while Cripps told 
Fedden "You have the reputation of being a stormy petrel. That does not bother me in the least. 
I like people who are prepared to shoulder responsibility". Bill Gunston, 'By Jupiter' (n. 5 
above). 
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was so impressive" that he went beyond his remit to study it, contrasted the 
large number of apprentice-trained artisans in England given limited theoretical 
training, with the very high number of university educated engineers in the USA 
and observing that in the USA some 14,000 engineers graduated annually, of 
which 10% were aeronautical engineers. On his return he recommended that the 
MAP establish a major university as "the main seat of learning in aeronautics". 
Fedden was clearly considering a new institution for he noted that space 
necessary for wind tunnels would be required and that the college should be 
adjacent to an airfield. ' 
Fedden had the opportunity to propagandise for these ideas for, in addition to 
his regular meetings with Cripps, he frequently accompanied him on industrial 
visits and argued for this new initiative which would "bridge the gap between 
the academic approach of the universities and the hard practical needs of 
industry for all-round engineers with ... a sense of vision, dedicated enthusiasm 
and high moral fibre". " The proposal clearly resonated with Cripps' 
technocratic and dirigiste approach and he asked for comments on the proposed 
new college "generously equipped and endowed ... for advanced studies" from a 
range of organisations including the Royal Aircraft Establishment, the National 
Physical Laboratory, the RAF, and the Royal Navy, but particularly from the 
Aeronautical Research Committee, writing to Sir Brian Melvill Jones, the 
eminent Cambridge aerodynamicist and Chairman of the ARC in May 1943. " 
The ARC collated the responses from its members, who were agreed on the 
need for a new, independent institution. Professor WJ Duncan, for example, 
9 
The Fedden Mission to America, Final Report, Section 6, Education and Research, (Ministry of 
Aircraft Production, June 1943), Science Museum Archives. 
10 
Gunton, 'By Jupiter', (n. 5 above), p. 123. "I want you to create something unique" was the 
charge Fedden recalled receiving from Cripps. 
11 
Sir R. Stafford Cripps to Prof. Sir Melvill Jones, 6 May 1943, ARC 6707, T. 4231. "The 
project which I have been considering is the establishment of a School of Aeronautical Science". 
David Owen, 'Note on a Proposed School of Aeronautical Science', ARC 6737, T. 4236). The 
comments of the ARC are in the ARC ledger pages for 15 and 22 June 1943 (RAE Library). 
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argued that "the School must not be strangled at birth by the deathly hand of the 
civil service. It must be as free from bureaucratic control as the Universities and 
the report to the Minister unanimously recommended the establishment of "a 
single central and comprehensive postgraduate school of Aeronautical Science 
financed by the State". " The School should, it argued, provide high level 
scientific and technical training in aeronautics and should fit selected students 
"for leadership in industry, civil aviation, the Services, the research institutions 
and the universities". 13 A central post-graduate centre for aeronautics, rather 
than expanded facilities across existing university engineering departments, was 
much preferred on the grounds that it would otherwise be impracticable to 
provide "practical experience of the technique of flight experiments and ... 
laboratory methods on the very large scale on which they will be carried out". " 
There is also a suggestion, in the Cranfield 'folk memory' that the idea of a 
new and separate institution received a boost from Churchill who was said to 
have averred that "the universities had failed the country" in the light of 
growing evidence of German achievements in jet aircraft and V weapons. " 
The progress of ensuing attempts by MAP to create the College of Aeronautics 
is interesting in that it makes a striking lesson about the limits of political power 
in a complex governmental structure - even for a man such as Cripps with a 
strong and directed view of what he wished to achieve. The difficulties that 
were encountered, from many directions, are all the more surprising in view of 
12 
WJ Duncan, 'Post-war Higher Education in Aeronautical Engineering', ARC note T. 4244,1 
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the prestige of the British aircraft industry in the latter part of the war, the 
common view that British aeronautical production was a great national asset for 
the future, and the obvious reliance of the RAF on good equipment. 
In August 1943 Cripps began to approach Cabinet colleagues about the proposed 
college, including Sir Archibald Sinclair at the head of the Air Ministry, arguing 
that "the creation of a post-graduate School of Aeronautical Science ... is, I 
believe, essential'to the future of British Aviation". " Lord Hankey (then 
Chairman of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Education and Training) 
replied quickly and positively to Cripps' proposals, with the perceptive 
observation that "I have been troubled in mind lately by the fact that so many of 
our wonderful aircraft and their engines owe their origins to a few men of flair 
and genius", but he noted ominously that setting such a college up "is not all 
going to be plain sailing" and suggested a joint MAP/Air Ministry committee. " 
In spite of the promised boost to the technical calibre of the aircraft industry, 
the Air Ministry seemed either lukewarm, or perhaps positively obstructive, 
suggesting further consultation and noting, with perhaps excessive solicitude, 
that the Treasury "have strong views on the matter" and "are by no means 
happy with [the] proposals". This could, perhaps, be attributed to mistrust 
between MAP and the Air Ministry, although this had moderated considerably 
since Lord Beaverbrook's period as Minister for Aircraft Production in 1940 
and 1941.18 It may also have been a factor that Sinclair was thought to be "not 
16 
PRO AIR 19/389, 'College of Aeronautics, - Proposal for Establishment', letter of 26 August 
1943. Cripps enclosed the ARC report and his own draft paper on the college. "We can 
maintain pre-eminence in military aviation, and achieve it in civil aviation, only by technical 
advance and this will depend on a standard of higher engineering education and research such as 
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17 
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particularly decisive". 19 
Cripps wrote repeatedly to Sinclair urging that "I am most anxious to get ahead 
with this project". Sinclair stalled, suggesting "soundings from London 
University authorities" and noting that the Treasury objected to "a cut-and-dried 
plan". Sinclair retailed the opinion that Cripps' proposals should be re-drafted in 
such a way as to present "a case for consideration in principle" leaving the exact 
form of the facility to be determined by a future committee on which relevant 
government departments and outside interests would sit. Cripps became more 
emphatic, arguing that "we cannot wait until another Committee has deliberated" 
and writing to Sir John Anderson (as Lord President of the Council) that "I do 
not feel I can wait indefinitely if I am to discharge my responsibility for the 
organisation and efficiency of the aircraft industry. ... All I want 
is the general 
approval to go ahead under the chairmanship of someone like Sir Roy Fedden to 
get ahead ... with a 
detailed practical plan". " 
This proposal was agreed. Fedden set to work with his customary energy but 
the objections continued. 21 Some critics argued for an "elastic ideal plan" on the 
grounds that expenditure on research "is subject to an unusually large degree to 
the law of diminishing returns. A good man can do much with comparatively 
slender resources". A few thousands spent in existing universities, it was 
Resources in the Second World War, PhD thesis, Cambridge, July 1988, pp. 92-94. 
19 
Reginald Maudling, Memoirs, (London, 1978), p. 34. Maudling served in the Air Ministry 
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let us not neglect B" and added that "in fact this worked pretty well", 
20 
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suggested, might achieve as much as many millions on a big scheme. " Even the 
aircraft industry had reservations about the school and, at a meeting with the 
MAP Reconstruction Committee in September 1943, SBAC representatives 
indicated that they were not keen on a School of Aeronautical Science, giving 
their view that "shop-trained engineers ... were more valuable than the 
University product who had not been through the shops" and, in apparent 
disregard of the various British reports emphasising the resource of trained 
engineering designers and sophisticated production facilities in American 
companies, doggedly asserted that "craftsmanship in engineering design was one 
of our strong points competing with America" and that design was a creative 
process - "an art, rather than a science". " 
By February 1944 it was reported that "the older and more conservative firms 
with large resources of their own for technical education were inclined to hang 
back, but the younger and more vigorous firms were- strongly in support.... 
The [existing] universities entertained some misgivings about the effects ... on 
their interests". 24 
The Treasury continued to be doubtful, questioning the claimed economic 
benefit of a college and pressing the wisdom of "a more modest scheme". It is 
interesting, in view of Cripps' forecast, noted in the previous chapter, that 
"industries such as coal and cotton" would prove inadequate to sustain Britain in 
the post-war era, to note that in these discussions Sir Alan Barlow, for the 
Treasury, queried whether an investment in textile research might not be more 
22 
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productive than putting funds to the new college. The ARC replied that "these 
views take too narrow a view of the possible development of civilian air 
transport". If aviation was expected merely to replace sea passenger travel the 
market was small but "it is far more likely that the air will create its own traffic 
- much as the railways did a hundred years ago. ... The 
importance of the civil 
aviation industry may turn out to be as great as that of shipbuilding at the 
present time"25 
The decisive point in these discussions came when RA Butler who, as Minister 
for Education, had been brought into the discussion through the 
interdepartmental committee requested by Cripps. Butler agreed that "existing 
facilities for post-graduate training were wholly inadequate", that he would 
welcome the establishment of a college and that he would be "prepared to take 
responsibility for it". 26 
Surprisingly, this agreement still was barely sufficient to impel the proposal to a 
conclusion. The Air Ministry offered to vacate the RAF station at Abingdon for 
the college but quickly back-tracked, on the objections of an Air Ministry 
official, HH Balfour, who argued that Abingdon "was one of our permanent 
peace-time stations of which we have not got too many". Cripps replied that "it 
is precisely because it is a peace-time station and has permanent buildings that 
the Committee recommended its use ... it seems to me out of the question that 
... you should now seek to go back on this decision". However, he did not 
manage to reverse the decision. 2' 
The reasons for the remarkably lukewarm attitude of the RAF and the Air 
25 
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Ministry remain mysterious. No suggestion has been found that, for instance, 
the RAF saw the college as a threat to its own training programmes, but it did 
appear to feel self-sufficient with its two year course at the RAF School of 
Aeronautical Engineering at Henlow ("roughly equivalent to a University 
engineering degree") and the dispatch of selected officers subsequently to 
Cambridge or the Imperial College. " This attitude should perhaps be seen in the 
context of the RAF's period of great prestige and confidence - perhaps even 
arrogance - resulting from its prominent and highly publicised role in the British 
war effort - an attitude which we have previously noted with respect to 
competition for design capacity for civil aircraft. The RAF was winning the 
War. 29 
After considerable procrastination, the advantages of a new college did become 
apparent and, looking forward to a post-war period when the MAP might 
disappear, Sir Archibald Sinclair mused, in an internal Air Ministry note, that 
"If this [the Air Ministry] is to be the great Air Department of the future, we 
shall be the principal beneficiaries of the scheme and I suppose that it is not 
unlikely that when the Ministry of Aircraft Production falls out, the 
responsibility will devolve upon [us]". 30 He proposed honouring the original 
commitment to Abingdon or placating Cripps with another station and Cranfield 
in Bedfordshire was then offered. This was attractive as plans for the new 
National Aeronautical Experimental Establishment were now crystallising nearby 
on Bedford. 
28 
In the responses sought by the ARC to the proposed college in June 1943 Air Commodore H 
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enthusiastic support of the Admiralty". (ARC T. 4260 and T. 4246). 
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The Air Ministry, however, again attempted to renege, advising Sinclair that 
Cranfield housed an OTU (operational training unit) of Mosquito crews which 
were used as night fighters to support RAF bombers and it was argued that 
when the offer had been made in December 1944, "the official estimate for 
planning purposes was that the war with Germany would be over by the 31 
December. ... This prospect has receded". It was important, the Air Ministry 
argued, not to disturb the flow of trained aircrew from the night fighter training 
unit at Cranfield while operations against Germany continued. " 
Even an offer of temporary accommodation at Cranfield was tempered by a 
warning from the Air Ministry that it might wish to reclaim the site in 1948 and 
it seems likely that the wrangling would have continued without issue 
indefinitely had not RA Butler written to Sinclair with his typical subtlety that 
"although your Ministry has already offered to find us temporary houseroom at 
Cranfield ... I have also had an offer [from the Admiralty] to find us temporary 
accommodation at Manadon [Plymouth] where the Naval Engineering College 
from Keyham is being established". Butler suggested that the Portsmouth site 
offered certain advantages in that accommodation and instructional equipment 
was already in place and went on to ask for Air Ministry advice on flying 
facilities from the nearby Harrobeer field "which I believe is now used only for 
transport planes". 32 
Butler's ploy clearly worked for Sinclair's Parliamentary Secretary noted to him 
that "the light in which we should view the Admiralty offer ... is necessarily 
darkened by the suspicion that their Lordships may not have acted in a spirit of 
entirely disinterested beneficence". The Air Ministry feared that a College of 
Aeronautics sited at Manadon would run a risk of being "unduly influenced by 
the Navy" with its neighbouring Engineering College. "We should prefer" the 
Air Ministry noted, "the present arrangements to locate the College in the 
31 
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Bedford area to stand". " 
Meanwhile Butler let the Air Ministry know of his intention to visit Manadon 
even though the interdepartmental committee had by then recommended 
Cranfield "not only on a temporary but on a permanent basis". Butler forwarded 
this report to Sinclair but his secretary then added (an especially light touch! ) 
that "the letter should not be taken as a definite request to make Cranfield 
available ... Mr Butler's letter is for information only at this stage". 
' 
Decisively out-manoeuvred, the Air Ministry then did cede Cranfield for the 
new project without further objection as a permanent home. Air Chief Marshall 
Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt was appointed as Chairman of the Board of Governors 
and attacked the project with great energy. 35 In the wake of the German 
surrender he was quick to see the potential of the equipment in German 
aeronautical establishments for help in fitting out the College and in August 
1945 Ellen Wilkinson, from the Ministry. of Education, wrote to Viscount 
Stansgate, at the Air Ministry, noting that "Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt ... has 
just 
been out to Germany, and tells me that it would be possible to secure a great 
deal of the technical equipment required for the College from German sources. I 
understand that the British Air Forces of Occupation with their disarmament 
staff are able and willing to collect this equipment for the College". Stansgate 
gave the necessary authorization. Ellen Wilkinson kept up the pressure from the 
Ministry of Education, writing again in March 1946 to him that "I am a little 
33 
Ibid. As a desperate gambit the Air Ministry noted that "Harrowbeer is partly situated on 
common land, and while we cannot of course air to Mr Butler any suspicions of the Admiralty 
we may have, it is reasonable to argue that in view of the political pressure which will be 
brought to bear to evacuate common land, his tenure of Harrowbeer may be uncertain on that 
account". 
34 
Ibid. Visit to Manadon on 19 March. Letter to Sinclair, Air Ministry, 27 March 1945. 
35 
Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt was noted for the contribution he made in stepping up and improving 
RAF aircrew training in the pre-war period. Sir John Slessor's verdict on him was "A great Air 
Force officer and a fine airman in every sense of the word ... one of the few senior Air Force 
Commanders of the Kaiser's war ... deeply knowledgeable not only of the 
higher direction of 
air forces but also, to an exceptional degree for a man of his age, of the technique of 
airmanship, Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue, (Cassell, London, 1956), pp. 114,208-209. 
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anxious about the progress being made ... My purpose in writing to you is 
simply to enlist your personal interest in securing that everything possible is 
done to enable the College to open by the date proposed". By hand she also 
wrote "Dear Wedgie, Do buck them up. It is as essential for your crowd as ours 
that this job gets done in time. Really it has hung about rather long". Ever 
yours, Ellen". ` 
The Cranfield College of Aeronautics opened on time in October 1946. It has 
earned a first class reputation and has certainly fulfilled its mission to be a 
major part of the educational underpinning of the British aerospace sector. 
During the post-war era it has consistently maintained a position as the largest 
post-graduate aeronautical department in Britain and although today it has 
expanded into Cranfield University, with many other specialisms, the 
aeronautical school within it remains an important element with one of the 
biggest academic aeronautical research programmes in the world. 37 
The National Aeronautical Establishment, Bedford 
Another important contemporary proposal, which had links with the proposal for 
a new College, was for a major new research facility, a 'National Aeronautical 
Experimental Establishment' which was conceived on a most ambitious scale. 
At the same time that Cripps sought help from the Aeronautical Research 
Committee (ARC) over the new College of Aeronautics he also asked it for a 
study on the facilities which would be required for research and development by 
the industry within the next fifteen years. 38 
36 
PRO AIR 19/389. 
37 
In 1996 the College of Aeronautics, within Cranfield University, had about 270 post-graduate 
students and a throughput of approximately 80 Ph. D. students per year. 
38 
PRO AVIA 15/2361, 'Full Scale Flight Research, Proposed Establishment for'). Attempts to 
create a major new centre dated back to 1939, when David Pye, as Director of Scientific 
Research (DSR) at the Air Ministry, proposed new a flight research centre, arguing that 
fundamental research at Farnborough had been displaced by the need to deal with short-term 
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As with aeronautical. education, the effect of contacts with America during the 
war again persuaded British engineers and scientists that the scale of research 
effort here was too small and once again, Roy Fedden's 'Mission to America' 
report took a propagandist line, observing that there were some thirty "good 
sized tunnels" in use in America, with a further ten under design or 
construction. Drawings and photographs of American wind tunnel facilities were 
included in his report, which argued for the need for increased research 
equipment in Britain and warned that facilities of the type seen in America 
would place them "far ahead of [a country] in which aircraft designers and 
engineers must of necessity design as an art rather than an applied science". " 
The ARC committee, under the chairmanship of Melvill Jones, produced a bold 
document proposing a radical enlargement of research and development 
facilities. Aviation "was entering an era in which revolutionary changes are 
inevitable" it argued, and that now "apparatus of very large size is essential". " 
The development of the jet engine and the discovery that aircraft could fly at 
speeds approaching that of sound heralded a new, more scientific, age in 
aeronautics which would require far more sophisticated equipment. 
One important requirement was a five mile runway ("the great length is required 
to enable aircraft of new and untried types to take off and land again without 
turning") but there were also to be some nine "new national wind tunnels" 
including four low speed (i. e. up to about 400 mph) tunnels with large working 
sections of 16 by 12 ft., three transonic tunnels (600-700 mph) and a supersonic 
problems associated with re-armament. 
39 
The Fedden Mission to America, Final Report, (Ministry of Aircraft Production, 1943), Section 
6, Part D, Ch 1., 6D-1.01 - 6D-6.04. The influence Fedden had in the aeronautical community 
was not purely mediated by the report; he was in frequent personal contact with almost all 
senior figures involved in aeronautical research and development. 
40 
Aeronautical Research Committee paper; 'National Requirements for Aeronautical Research and 
Development', 23 March 1944, DSIR 23/13337. David Pye was also a member. For a brief 
account of the ARC, its history, role and influence, see Andrew Nahum, 'Two-stroke or 
Turbine? The Aeronautical Research Committee and British Aero Engine Development in World 
War II', Technology and Culture, April 1997, Vol 38, pp 312-354. 
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(Mach 2) 4 ft. tunnel. 4' The low speed tunnels were expected to need about 
4000 h. p. to drive them and the high speed and supersonic tunnels about 40,000 
h. p. There were also envisaged extensive engine test facilities and materials 
laboratories. In aggregate, the wind tunnels and test equipment would need 
about 200,000 hp -a demand that would require an electrical supply from the 
National Grid capable of providing 150,000 kW or 180,000 kW at peak - 
equivalent to the demand of a medium-sized town. The establishment was costed 
by the ARC at around £18 million - nearly £500m in today's prices. 42 
Like the College of Aeronautics Cripps responded to these proposals with 
enthusiasm, asking George Bulman, then Director of Engine Development (and 
scourge of Whittle) to take on the job of constructing it and offering "a prospect 
of rendering the country the greatest service". The new research centre, Cripps 
stressed, was "of vital importance for the country's future". " 
In spite of the enormous anticipated cost of these facilities the plans were 
inserted into the national programme with surprising ease, in contrast to the 
much harder fought struggle to establish the new College of Aeronautics at 
Cranfield which was only expected to cost £2.65 million, (or £400,000 if based 
on an existing RAF airfield site). It appears that education was a more 
41 
It should be appreciated that tunnels of this type are substantial civil engineering structures. The 
working section of 16 x 12 ft. for the low-speed tunnels required a circuit some 400 ft. (120 m) 
long to return the air, substantially build to resist a pressure that could be as high as six times 
that of the atmosphere. 
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PRO DSIR 23/13337, Aeronautical Research Committee, 'National Requirements for 
Aeronautical Research and Development', (The file contains A. R. C. Report 7500 of the same 
title, dated March 1944). The five mile runway would have been the longest in Europe. In the 
USA the almost limitless landing grounds provided by the dry salt pans of the Mojave desert 
(subsequently Edwards Air Force Base) did prove of great utility post-war for test-flying 
experimental high speed types. 
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George Bulman, unpublished autobiography, ms deposited with the library of the Royal 
Aeronautical Society, p. 506. "The scheme would demand the undivided attention of one 
individual to steer this great project through all the quicksands and shoals of Departmental 
policies, and especially through the Treasury which would undoubtedly seek to delay it and 
whittle down the expenditure". Bulman accepted the job of Director for Construction of 
Research Facilities (DCRF) and, although he suspected that the move had been partly prompted 
by the failure of the Napier Sabre engine programme, he accepted Cripps' assurances that this 
was not so "because he was one of the most honest men [he] had ever met". 
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contentious subject than national research and development efforts and one 
where many more special interests sought to be represented. Even the Treasury, 
which had balked at the costs of the College, gave authority in December 1944 
for planning for the new establishment to proceed. " 
Nevertheless, the actual location of the proposed 'National Establishment' still 
required extensive inter-departmental negotiation. Farnborough would be the 
most economical centre on which to base the new investment. However, the 
War Office resolutely opposed expansion of the existing aeronautical 
establishment, maintaining that the proposed new runway would bisect the 
Aldershot army training area. ' 
Considerations of flying weather and local topography then identified four 
possible areas, based around Reading/Oxford, Luton/Bedford, 
Coventry/Leicester and Hitchin/Cambridge but the Board of Trade and the 
Ministry of Labour, with responsibilities for the location of industry and for the 
minimisation of post-war unemployment, insistently pushed to have the 
Establishment located in one of the "difficult areas", strongly urging the 
selection of South Wales. It is a measure of the pervasiveness of the war-time 
'command' mentality that the Ministry of Labour particularly commended the 
airfield at St Athan, on the South Wales coast, on the basis that "hostels were 
already established there". ' However WS Farren, from his experience as 
Director of the RAE, displayed a more humane and intelligent attitude to 
location declaring that "research is done by men and not by wind tunnels. It 
44 
PRO AVIA 15/2091. Major Bulman noted on 12 December 1944 "we have now received the 
authority of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to proceed with the planning and design of the new 
Establishment on the Bedford site". The initial approval in principle came from the Lord 
President's Committee in June 1944. 
45 
Ibid. In fact, much of this Army activity was transferred to Salisbury Plain in the post-war era. 
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PRO AVIA 15/2091, minute of 19 July 1944, minutes of Inter-Departmental Meeting, 25 July 
1944. The new Establishment was expected to employ some 2000 skilled industrial workers and 
1600 scientists. Douglas Jay, for the Board of Trade, strongly opposed the Oxford area on the 
grounds that labour resources were already insufficient for the Nuffield and Pressed Steel 
organisations; "it would be an embarrassment to the Board in resisting industrial approaches if a 
Government Department insinuated a fairly large labour demand into the area". 
138 
must be possible for the majority of the staff to live in a good town where there 
are the normal amenities people need for a reasonable life and good educational 
facilities for children. ... these rule out a site in the wilds". 
47 
The Air Ministry and MAP senior staff fought also to make the facility 
accessible by quick train service from London, and deployed arguments against 
locating experimental flying in northern areas of industrial haze and poor 
weather. 48 In addition, choice of site was constrained by the need to installing a 
connection to the National Grid with a high capacity electricity supply at a cost 
of Elm per mile. For all these reasons Bedford, where two existing airfields 
could be joined up, eventually was chosen49 A month later, in October 1944, he 
announced that "the question has been fully discussed with Ministries concerned. 
Having regard to their views and to such considerations as good flying weather, 
easy access to London, Oxford and Cambridge ... I have decided that the most 
suitable location ... 
is in the neighbourhood of Bedford". Cripps also displayed 
his wider vision by noting that "the opportunities of the site should provide for 
an architectural layout adequate to the needs of the Establishment" -a provision 
so that he also had demanded for the new College of Aeronautics. 
Plans for the new establishment were laid out on the site on the basis of the 
1944 ARC report although it was never fully completed to the almost grandiose 
47 
PRO AVIA 15/2091, WS Farren, paper on site for the National Aeronautical Establishment, 
July 1944. 
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Ibid. Bulman noted that "we are virtually left with the single obstacle of Mr Jay, and it has been 
separately hinted to me that his President may not support him at Ministerial level". Most of the 
proposed sites were also opposed by Miss Champ of the Department of Town and Country 
Planning on the grounds that they did not wish to see growth in existing towns or new 
communities, although Sir HEC Beaver, from the Ministry of Works pointed out pithily that 
the Government was committed to a large housing programme and that "new houses will be 
built somewhere". 
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Ibid. "I want the decision as to the siting of the new ARC establishment to be finalised by the 
end of this month please without fail". Minister to CRD, 8 September 1944. This note, like 
many of Cripps' most emphatic ones is in bold red ink. These directives were said by initiates 
in the MAP to be "written in blood". 
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Ibid. Minister's statement of 9 October 1944. 
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scale that had been envisaged. Only part of the planned complement of 'national 
wind tunnels' were built and the runway was completed at three, rather than 
five, miles. Although it opened under the title of the 'National Aeronautical 
Establishment' Bedford was, from the outset, administered under the Ministry of 
Supply as a branch of the RAE at Farnborough and by the autumn of 1945 it 
was becoming accepted that Farnborough would not be displaced as the main 
research centres' 
The downgrading of what had been an exceptionally ambitious programme, was 
caused, in part, by the natural reduction in defence expenditure as the war came 
to an end, and although Bedford had been promoted as a national facility for the 
whole aviation sector, and particularly for the civil aircraft projects, it was 
inevitably seen primarily as a defence facility for purposes of financial planning. 
As the screw began to tighten for government expenditure at the end of the war 
WS Farren advocated an initiative from the MAP "to persuade the Treasury to 
take a statesman-like view of our problems", but internally MAP officials 
conceded that the programme "comes at an awkward moment for us. ... From 
now onwards the Treasury will turn a more critical eye than before on any 
proposals for expansion. ... We must expect them to be running a full-blown 
economy campaign in about two years time". " 
By August 1945 the Treasury noted to the MAP, on the subject of the staffing 
and administration at Farnborough and Bedford, that "for some time past we 
have been growing increasingly alarmed at your constant demands for additional 
scientific staff'. The time had arrived when this "fairly free hand" allowed 
during the war was no longer possible. Approval had so far been given for 
acquisition of the Bedford site at a cost of £190,000, but came with a strong 
warning that the new establishment should be planned in relatively self-contained 
51 
PRO AVIA 15/3691, 'R. A. E. Reorganisation', minute by Air Marshal Coryton, CRD, MAP, 
16 October 1945. "The RAE [Farnborough] will certainly remain our principal aeronautical 
establishment for many years to come". 
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Ibid. Minute of PAS (E), 4 May 1945. 
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stages, so that "if the economy axe falls" while the project as a whole was 
incomplete, what has been built would still form a functional unit which would 
be "capable of standing on its own feet". " 
In fact the vote of credit for all aeronautical research and development in 1945 
totalled just over £4.5 million, a sum that was insufficient to also provide for 
the completion of Bedford to the scale as first conceived, although it did 
certainly become an important research facility with a suite of wind tunnels and 
other equipment. ' But although Bedford was opened under the title of the 
'National Aeronautical Establishment', it was effectively operated as a section of 
RAE, staffed and run from Farnborough, and never really developed a separate 
identity. " By 1947 it was accepted that the two sites would continue in existence 
and that Farnborough would remain the major national centre. 56 By 1955 the 
MoS came to the view that there was not "a homogeneous job" for Bedford that 
would justify separation and that "morale at Bedford would lose by separation 
from Farnborough ... being part of a large and successful organisation is 
beneficial. It was also accepted that the name should also be changed to R. A. E. 
(Bedford). " 
53 
Ibid. FC Newton, Treasury, to AL Cadman, MAP, 17 August 1945, , and minute by RE 
Bone, PSS, MAP, 5 September 1945; "the Treasury have been very disturbed by the continued 
growth in R&D staff". 
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These included a supersonic tunnel of eight foot working section and another of 3 foot section, 
both using drive motors and fans taken from the Herman Göring research institute at 
Volkenrode, although it appears that the aerodynamic design for the tunnels had been developed 
at Farnborough during the war. 
55 
Although RAE Bedford certainly pursued some research programmes of its own, a study of, for 
example, the Concorde programme implies that the origination of the aircraft concept, creative 
direction and initial wind tunnel testing took place at Farnborough. Bedford would then take 
over the proposed aircraft and wing shapes for high speed test in their powerful tunnels. 
56 
PRO AVIA 15/2091, Second Secretary MoS, minute of 30 July 1947. "The growth of G. P. 
[guided projectile] work has strengthened the case for saying that both Farnborough and Bedford 
are necessary if we are to cope with the liabilities ahead of us". 
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Aeronautical Research Council, T. 4963, copy of letter from ET Jones, P. D. S. R. (A), MoS to 
Secretary, A. R. C., 12 April 1955. 
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Although post-war economies did contribute to the curtailment of the bold initial 
plans the sense derived from the public records is that the real check to the 
major strategic plan for creating a major national aeronautical centre at Bedford 
was the departure of Stafford Cripps from the MAP. 58 His vision and ambition 
for the industry had launched the scheme and like the College of Aeronautics, it 
was pushed along by an energetic stream of his letters, minutes and exhortation. 
Following his departure the development of the facility was subsumed into the 
normal channels and agencies which administered the scientific civil service. As 
the previous chapter showed, a similar fate befell another of his initiatives, the 
formation of Power Jets (R&D) Ltd as a national jet engine research facility. 
The Exploitation of German Aeronautical Science 
The exploitation of Germany's scientific research and its scientists by the USA, 
particularly with regard to Werner von Braun and the other rocket experts from 
the V2 programme who were taken to the USA by the American Army in 1946, 
has received considerable attention, both at a scholarly and a popular level. 
There have also been broader studies of the American programmes which came 
under the project names 'Overcast' and 'Paperclip' which brought many German 
scientists to the USA. Of these studies the most comprehensive and analytical 
must be that by the American historian John Gimbel which puts 'Paperclip' into 
the context of the whole intelligence-gathering operation mounted in Germany at 
the end of the war and its translation into a kind of undeclared programme to 
59 extract "intellectual reparations". 
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Following the Labour election victory on 26 July 1945 Cripps became Chancellor of the Board 
of Trade. Colin Cooke, in The Life of Richard Stafford Cripps, (London, Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1957), covers his time at MAP rather briefly. He deals with Cripps' role in putting 
MAP programmes on a more realistic basis and his exhortatory visits to the factories but does 
not refer to Cripps' strategic initiatives for the post-war industry and his far-reaching influence 
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By contrast, the British effort after the war to utilise German science and 
technology has received surprisingly little study although Tom Bower 
characterises UK efforts as amateurish and piecemeal. 60 Even a recent (1996) 
work on technology transfer out of Germany after 1945 largely neglects 
Britain. " This is a considerable lacuna in the study of the post-war period in 
Europe and the section here will focus, in particular, the use made in Britain of 
German aerodynamics and aeronautical science. 62 
It is suggested here that the British initiatives for the utilisation of German 
science were carefully targeted, ambitious and probably at the limit of what was 
practical in the immediate post-war environment. The effect of influx of German 
technique certainly should certainly be analysed in the context of British post- 
war aviation since it appears to have had a significant influence on research in 
the Government establishments and on the complexion of the British industry. 63 
First Impressions 
As the Allied forces entered Germany, a variety of intelligence gathering 
operations and missions were put in hand to investigate German technique and 
60 
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Bower has contended that the UK failed to exploit the German lead in rocketry intelligently 
(The Paperclip Conspiracy, n. 59 above) but it is noteworthy that twelve scientists from the 
Trauern research centre were brought to the new Rocket Projectile Establishment at Westcolt in 
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the apparent lead in many areas of weaponry. The initial British attitude to 
much of the German research that was uncovered was equivocal. The 
proliferation of surprising secret weapons and new kinds of aircraft had done 
almost nothing to slow the Allied advance and Sir Roy Fedden, leading one 
mission, contrasted this profusion of projects with "the simple, but sound, 
British aeronautical programme ... pursued with very little interruption 
throughout the war, but accompanied all the time by intelligent improvisation 
until there was really very little in the way of development to come". ' But if 
the policy directing the German effort seemed diffuse, the actual technique of 
production was of excellent quality in most centres although not, in the opinion 
of the investigators, superior to British methods. " 
On 7 June 1945, a month after the German surrender, Air Marshal Sir Alec 
Coryton at MAP invited members of the aircraft, industry to survey a cross- 
section of the corresponding German Industries under the leadership of W. S. 
Farren, Director of the RAE. The Farren Mission included eight industry 
designers and managers, the Director of Technical Development (DTD) at MAP 
and AK Cairncross, representing the Director-General of Programmes, 
Planning and Statistics at MAP. It left on 9 July, returning just over two weeks 
later. The Mission observed that there had been no central direction of the 
industry in Germany and "no O. R. [operational research] as we know it". There 
was also no organised resident German air ministry representative at the firms - 
64 
Sir Roy Fedden, 'Final Report - The Fedden Mission to Germany', MAP, June 1945, (Science 
Museum archives). Fedden's principal brief was to select equipment to equip the new College of 
Aeronautics. At Magdeburg Fedden photographed a pile of newly-made Junkers jet engines 
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equivalent to the British post of Resident Technical Officer (RTO). It also noted 
that "the firms were forbidden to make contact with the Service [and] 
considered that the inability of the designers to obtain first-hand knowledge of 
... performance of aircraft under operational conditions was a serious hindrance. 
... This lack of direct contact with the Service may well have been one of the 
contributory causes of the violent changes in Air Staff requirements". ' 
Thus the Farren Mission was able to take comfort from failures which Britain 
had avoided, and claimed that "when U. K. personnel reached Germany after the 
war, the surveys supported a view that the MAP had been successful". 
What certainly was different, in the German case, was the sophisticated level of 
the aeronautical research effort and the quality of the associated equipment in 
the firms where, it was noted, research and development departments in the 
firms were well organised and staffed with "relatively young men of experience, 
energy, and enthusiasm". Farren observed that although "their methods did not 
differ greatly from [ours] ... their resources were greater". 
" 
It also began to be appreciated by British investigators that jet aircraft like the 
Messerschmitt Me 262 which were entering service by the end of the war would 
have proved a grave embarrassment if they had been made available only a little 
earlier and in sufficient numbers. 68 In addition there were other innovations such 
as rocket interceptor fighters, anti-aircraft rockets, the V1 and V2 missiles, and 
radio-controlled anti-shipping glider-bombs and although these could scarcely, in 
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PRO AVIA 10/411, 'Farren Mission to Germany'. 
67 
Ibid. Sir Alec Cairncross has also left his recollections of the mission recalling that "the Farren 
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supported research and development, employing in 1945 5000 workers [in a private firm] in five 
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government in financing research and development in aviation". AK Cairncross, Planning in 
Wartime, (Oxford 1991), pp. 137-140. 
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PRO AIR 8/784, minute of 24 January 1945. The threat of the new Messerschmitt jet fighters 
was serious enough for Lord Portal to predict that "if Germany has not been beaten before July 
1945 she will have dominance in the air over Germany and above the armies during good flying 
weather". 
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most cases, be regarded as mature and practical weapons systems they 
nevertheless pointed to a huge German lead in the technology of high-speed 
flight, propulsion, guidance and control as well as the research facilities for the 
mechanical and aerodynamic analysis of aero structures in a new high-speed 
aerodynamic regime. As the British missions moved through the parts of 
Germany to which they had access the scale and quality of the advanced 
research being done began to astonish them. 69 In a rider to his defence of the 
pragmatic British production programme, Sir Roy Fedden observed that the 
Allied victory had been won by "obsolete types, from which every ounce of 
development had been wrung". American commentators reached a similar 
conclusion, suggesting that the air war had been won with brawn, not brain: 
"we choked them with the weight of our planes". " 
Perhaps this should not have been so surprising for before the war Germany had 
hosted visits for British aeronautical engineers, including Roy Fedden, who 
visited frequently, Sir Harry Ricardo, and a delegation from Rolls-Royce which 
toured a range of companies and research establishments. These tours always 
impressed with the scale and quality of the facilities and no doubt were offered 
to persuade British opinion that to challenge Germany in the air would be 
fruitless. " Nevertheless, when re-visited in 1945, the scale on which Germany's 
69 
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70 
Gunston, 'By Jupiter', (n. 5 above)), p. 130 and Senator Albert D Thomas, quoted in Judt and 
Ciesla, (n. 62 above), p 101. 
71 
The subject of these various high level missions into Germany before the war and German 
intentions in facilitating them is a curious one which has not been explored. It is interesting to 
note that Tizard wrote to Lord Swinton, Secretary of State for Air , in 1936 about one such: "H 
R Ricardo, of whom I expect you have heard, has just returned from Germany where he has 
been shown German engine developments. I think that it would be helpful to you if you had a 
talk with him. His news is very reassuring in some ways". (PRO AIR 2/1866, 'Committee for 
the Scientific Survey of Air Offence'. The facilities given to the Rolls-Royce mission in 1937 
are particularly intriguing, since these were top-level engineers who could see the significance 
of what they were shown. The three Rolls-Royce men were AG Elliot, Chief Designer, HJ 
Swift, General Manager, Production, and J Ellor, the R-R supercharger expert. They saw, 
among other things, the Daimler-Benz, Junkers and BMW aero engine works and were provided 
with a Junkers Ju 52 aircraft. They were deeply impressed with the scale of organisation and the 
provision of enclosed 'silent' test beds with instrumentation grouped outside, noting that the 
facilities of plant, buildings, equipment and personnel for research and development was 
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government defence research establishments had moved ahead was startling. The 
first challenge to British investigators appeared to be the exploitation of the plant 
and physical resources found in the British area of control in Germany. 
The Hermann Goering Research Institute, Volkenrode 
Six important research facilities fell inside the British Zone of Occupation. They 
were: 
Luftfarhrt Forschungs Anstalt (LFA) Volkenrode 
Aerodynamische Versuchs Anstalt (AVA) Göttingen 
Kaiser Wilhem Institut (KWI) Göttingen 
Dispersal Wind Tunnels from AVA, Reyershausen 
Rocket Research Station and liquid oxygen plant, Trauen 
Focke-Wulf structural testing laboratory, Detmold. 
Many of these facilities, such as the AVA at Göttingen (equivalent in some 
senses to the RAE at Farnborough), were well known before the war. However, 
the greatest surprise, as well as the greatest prize, was found in the immense 
Hermann Goering Research Institute at Volkenrode, near Brunswick. ' The 
institute had been conceived on a vast scale by British standards and was 
equipped particularly to deal with the new problems of high-speed flight. It was 
hidden in a forest and extraordinary care had been taken to conceal it from 
Allied photo-reconnaissance flights. No large roads led there, the power lines 
had been buried underground, and the whole site was elaborately camouflaged. 73 
superior to anything we have seen in this country". They also-noted the open layout of factory 
sites with buildings widely spaced "evidently planned [to make] air attack extremely difficult". 
Report reproduced in The Archive, (journal of the Rolls-Royce Heritage Trust), Vol 2, Issue 2 
No. 6,1984 and subsequent issues. 
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PRO AVIA 9/88, 'Visits to Volkenrode'. Paper on file: 'MAP Interest in German Research 
Establishments', 3 January 1946. This notes "of these, by far the most important is 
Volkenrode". 
73 
Ibid. Sir Arthur Woodburn, as Parliamentary Secretary for the MAP, visited Volkenrode in 
January 1946 and recorded that "the Herman Goering wind tunnel was covered by a special 
cement platform covered with tons of earth in which shrubs, grass and even trees were planted. 
... the 
fact that all this ... was planned and prepared 
long before the war and so carefully 
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Ben Lockspeiser, as Director of Scientific Research in MAP (DSR), went to 
appraise the site in May 1945 when the British army advised that there were 
"some wind tunnels in a large forest" and was amazed to find "the finest 
aeronautical establishment he had ever seen". 74 His report to the Minister for 
Aircraft Production revealed the contemporary excitement at the discovery. 
It is concealed and dispersed in a large forest. ... Its aerodynamic, 
supersonic and high speed equipment is far ahead of anything in 
this country, and as far as my knowledge goes, ahead of American 
equipment also. ... in several directions the equipment is 
unsurpassed anywhere". " 
WS Farren, thinking clearly of his own facilities at Farnborough, observed 
independently that Volkenrode had "a magnificence ... that beggars the 
imagination of anyone who has seen similar institutions in the UK". 76 
Initially the site was under the control of Colonel Donald Putt of the US army 
which had discovered it shortly before but, as noted, it fell inside the British 
Zone and was shortly to be handed over to the British Army. Putt, in fact, was 
the officer in charge of the American intelligence operation 'Lusty' and was 
subsequently a major proponent of the American 'Paperclip' programme to 
hidden [is] itself a silent indictment of the Nazi preparations for war". 
74 
Ben Lockspeiser, introductory remarks as Chairman on 9 October 1946, to; R. Smelt, 'A 
Critical Review of German Research on High-Speed Air Flow', Journal of the Royal 
Aeronautical Society, 50, (1946), p 900. 
75 
PRO AVIA 15/2216. Ben Lockspeiser, DSR to Minister (through CRD and DTD), 11 May 
1945. Lockspeiser noted that the establishment "consisted of seven independent institutes, each 
under a professor and reporting directly to Berlin, which covered aerodynamics, gas dynamics 
(supersonics), strength of materials, engines, special engines (rockets and gas turbines), 
weapons and theoretical ballistics. The head of the aerodynamics institute acts as administrative 
head for the whole. The scientific staff number about 150 and the total number of people 
employed was about 1000. ... It had very 
large funds at its disposal from 71/2 to 8 million 
marks yearly, (and received, in addition, 1-11/2 million marks a year from industry for wind 
tunnel work)". 
76 
AVIA 10/113, quoted in Bower (n. 60 above). 
148 
bring German scientists to the USA. " Lockspeiser considered that Britain ought, 
without delay, put the site back into use or, in view of the possible political 
difficulties of allowing the installation to remain intact in Germany, transfer the 
most valuable equipment to the new National Aeronautical Establishment being 
established at Bedford. The scale and sophistication of the equipment made such 
an impression on Lockspeiser that he judged that exploiting the Volkenrode 
facility meant that: 
we should bridge over the gap of some five to ten years which I see 
no means of doing by any other method. ... The equipment ... is 
such that we cannot expect to be able to build its parallel within a 
number of years and the knowledge possessed by its scientists is such 
that it will fill in gaps which otherwise would take us similarly many 
years to fill in from our own resources and researches. It would, in 
our view, be difficult to exaggerate the importance to this country of 
exploiting these facilities to the full". '$ 
Lockspeiser's reports from Germany also reflected the difference in approach 
between the USA and Britain in acquiring this intellectual booty. The British 
model was that the material would be acquired by government agencies such as 
the RAE or other research establishments and then be put at the disposal of 
firms for assistance with specific research contracts under security conditions. 
The American approach, although more ambitious and far-reaching seemed 
looser and at odds with this British 'government-rationing' attitude. Lockspeiser 
observed that "a large part of the scientific service provided by America for this 
kind of investigation is in the hands of industrial representatives who have been 
placed in uniform and there is no doubt a great temptation in the way of 
77 
CG Lasby, Project Paperclip, (n. 60 above), p 28-29. According to Lasby, Putt was one of the 
most vocal and influential advocates for the transfer of German scientists to the USA. "Lusty" 
was just one of a large number of the intelligence missions intended to investigate and exploit 
German science after the surrender. These also included ALSOS (the mission to investigate the 
state of German atomic research), CIOS (Combined Allied Intelligence Sub-Committee) and 
BIOS (British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee). 
78 
PRO AVIA 15/2216. Herman Goering Research Institute at Volkenrode 
(Luftfahrtforschungsanstalt Herman Goring - LFA), Ben Lockspeiser, DSR to Minister (through 
CRD and DTD), 11 May 1945. 
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individuals to profit their employers". 79 
Lockspeiser was correct about the attitude of the Americans, although it is not 
clear whether the American 'industrial representatives' regarded this as a 
temptation or simply a normal duty. 8° In fact, he visited Volkenrode at the same 
time as the noted aerodynamicist Theodore von Karman, who had arrived from 
CalTech as part of the 'Lusty' operation. 81 George Schairer, the head of the 
Boeing aerodynamics department and a member of this group, wrote home from 
Volkenrode to his deputy at the Boeing company within a day of Lockspeiser's 
own note to the MAP, giving his colleagues important details of the German 
research into the use of swept back wings for high speed flight. 82 This 
information was incorporated into Boeing engineering policy so quickly that the 
XB-47 bomber project, then under development, was delayed while this new 
aerodynamic theory could be incorporated. As subsequent sections will show, 
Boeing's readiness to incorporate this new thinking led, within a few years, to a 
79 
Ibid. 
80 
Gimbel, 'Science, Technology and Reparations' (n. 59 above), p viii, quotes an interesting 
contemporary German opinion that this technological booty represented a subsidy from the 
foreign taxpayer to the capitalist in the guise of costs of the Occupation; "the foreign capitalist 
receives his German competitors' secrets and enriches himself by them, but he does not re- 
imburse his country ... with the result that the 
foreign taxpayer is the primary sufferer". 
81 
Clive Irving, Wide-Body, the Making of the 747, (London, 1993); 75-94. 
82 
Schairer wrote "the Germans have been doing extensive work on high speed aerodynamics. This 
has led to one very important discovery. Sweepback or sweepforward has a large effect on 
critical Mach No. " and he gave sample calculations to illustrate the theory. GS Schauer to 
Benedict Cohn, 10 May 1945, reproduced in facsimile in 50 Jahre Turbostrahlflug, DGLR- 
Symposium [Proceedings], Munich, 26 & 27 October 1989. The fact that Schairer wrote 
"Censored" on the cover of his letter and signed this statement himself could indicate a desire to 
avoid US government control although one account attributes his action to a desire to "avoid 
delay". 
Schairer and Cohn would have immediately realised that the swept back wing allows a subsonic 
aircraft to approach the speed of sound without suffering the effects of buffeting and trim 
change (pitching up or down) - the so-called compressibility phenomena which had been 
encountered by the increasingly powerful Allied service aircraft used in the war. Schairer's 
Boeing colleagues absorbed the importance of his note and immediately began wind-tunnel tests. 
By September the experimental XB-47 bomber project had been converted to use a 30 degree 
sweptback wing, although this meant delaying it behind their rivals. Boeing won the contract 
and the aircraft became the B-47 bomber. 
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generation of transport aircraft with a significant speed advantage over British 
(and other American) rivals. 83 
Lockspeiser also asked for a ruling to stop the records of scientific 
establishments being moved and for them to be microfilmed "for the benefit of 
all". In fact, some 3 million documents, many of them from Volkenrode, were 
taken by US agencies. ' Sir Roy Fedden told his biographer some years later 
that he had two loaded trucks with equipment collected for the new College of 
Aeronautics taken away from him by American forces at gun-point. He also 
alleged that American investigators with whom he had examined wind tunnel 
models of swept wing aircraft at Volkenrode went back secretly by night and 
took them away. 85 
The initial report from Volkenrode by Lockspeiser was among the first to air 
"the problem of the German scientists". He mused "what is to be done with 
them? They are, in my opinion, primarily scientists with an almost pathetic 
eagerness to continue as scientists working for us or anybody else. If they are 
deprived of their equipment they would inevitably drift to other countries. ... I 
suggest that those who are really first class ... should be 
brought over here to 
work under supervision". " 
83 
Clive Irving, 'Wide-Body', (n. 81 above). 
84 
Michael Gorn, The Universal Man, Theodore von Karman's Life in Aeronautics, Washington 
1992; 105-106. Much of this haul, weighing some 1500 tons, was air-freighted back to the 
USA, to form the nucleus of the Armed Services Technical Information Center. 
85 
Bill Gunston, personal communication, 1997 (also see n. 6 above). Gunston recalled Fedden 
saying "it was the law of the jungle out there". It is possible that Fedden had encountered in this 
case an American unit of the Allied army 'T-Forces' which had armoured infantry and anti-tank 
weaponry in order to gather material in target areas immediately resistance ceased. In general 
Anglo-American co-operation was good and apart from these intelligence related issues Fedden 
specifically noted the generosity and helpfulness to the Mission of the U. S. Army. ('Fadden 
Mission to Germany', (n. 64 above). 
86 
PRO AVIA 15/2216. Ben Lockspeiser to Minister, 11 May 1945. Colonel Putt, although 
concerned about the possibility of the German scientists becoming "allergic to further enquiry 
... 
by a succession of unrelated investigators", confirmed that when interviewed by visitors they 
were "quite anxious to be revealing ... and they get a square meal with the G. 
I. s". 
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In July 1945 Sir Frank Tribe at MAP proposed a scheme to dismantle and 
remove the plant and equipment to Britain, suggesting that "this would 
eventually constitute once-for-all delivery to us on reparation account". He also 
noted that the plan could have the incidental result of collecting together at 
Volkenrode a few of the best German aeronautical scientists and technicians, 
observing that "I believe the Americans have not yet taken them all! ". The most 
suitable could then, he suggested, be transferred to the RAE or UK aircraft 
design firms, "if and when Government policy here permits". 87 
This proposal had interesting links with earlier discussions in Britain as to how a 
resurgence of German air power might be prevented and Tribe observed that 
"our feeling is that the UK government will eventually be driven to the 
conclusion that no effective plan for preventing the export of German scientists 
to foreign countries, or, in the long run, controlling their activities in Germany 
beyond a certain point, will be successfully evolved, and that therefore it would 
be desirable to have the best of those who might be particularly dangerous from 
the point of view of war potential (e. g. aeronautical scientists) under American 
or British control while at the same time gaining substantial advantage to our 
own war potential". 88 
For a time the MAP considered an alternative strategy of operating and 
administrating the establishment on its existing site. RV Jones, then Deputy 
Controller of Research and Development (DCRD) at the MAP, listed 17 aircraft 
projects of interest, including rocket-powered and swept-wing types and 
suggested that the aircraft should be completed by their designers and staff "to 
the point at which the Germans fly them and prove them to be airworthy" 
87 
Ibid. It should be noted that the policy of "denial" of German scientists to other powers was 
initially pursued by both US and UK governments out of a genuine fear of a revival of German 
power through defence research conducted in other countries. It was not initially directed 
against the Soviet Union and it was only, from about 1947 that it took on this complexion. This 
shift coincided with a general perception in the US State Department that the current policies 
were by then "flogging a dead Nazi horse". Gimbel, 'Science, Technology and Reparations', (n 
59 above). 
88 
AVIA 15/2216. Tribe's paper also noted "I am sending a copy of this letter to Barlow at the 
Treasury because of the reparation issues involved". 
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before taking them to England for further study. 89 He also proposed that "the 
maximum concentration of MAP will be in Volkenrode and we hope that we 
shall be able to consider that station as our MAP headquarters in Germany". ' 
However, this course was rejected because it was considered both politically too 
sensitive to utilise the site and because this would also have had the effect of 
preserving an element of German war potential. The problems of managing 
work there must also have seemed insuperable. The decision was taken, 
therefore, to remove the research papers and records to Britain and to dismantle 
the research plant and equipment for use in Britain. 
Operation Surgeon 
The resources assembled to dismantle Volkenrode were impressive. At a 
meeting at the Air Ministry on 12 July 1945, Sir Charles Ellington, as Assistant 
Chief of Air Staff (ACAS) observed that under the government's policy for war 
reparations only six months were available "in which to satisfy our requirements 
from places of scientific value in Germany such as Volkenrode". The task was 
to be a special operation and would be run largely by the RAF as MAP did not 
have the administrative or command organisation to undertake the task. 91 
This operation, code-named 'Surgeon' was assigned a commanding officer from 
the British Air Forces of Occupation (BAFO) and senior MAP officials 
including Major George Bulman, DCRF (Director of Construction of Research 
Facilities, MAP), the aerodynamicist WJ Duncan, scientific and technical 
89 
RV Jones D/C RD, MAP statement on Volkenrode to ACAS, Air Ministry, 6 July 1945, 
AVIA 15/2216. Jones ascribed the highest priority to a supersonic swept-wing jet-powered 
project, the DFS (Deutsches Forschungsintitut fur Segelflug) 346. This was intended for 
reconnaissance and was intended to achieve the then startling performance of 1250 mph (Mach 
1.9) at 60,000 feet. 
90 
PRO AVIA 15/2216, RV Jones D/C RD, MAP statement on Volkenrode to ACAS, 6/7/47. 
91 
Ibid 
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officers from MAP, a librarian, representatives from the aircraft and engine 
companies. 
The operation consisted of two phases. Firstly, detailed information was to be 
collected from German scientists in the form of monographs on their research 
work, followed by the removal to UK of the equipment that would be of value. 
Initially, some 35 British scientists came out to Germany to clean up of the 
facility (it had become occupied by displaced persons and by troops), to run the 
wind tunnels and become familiar with the apparatus. This group also identified 
and located the former German scientific staff, where possible, and brought 
suitable individuals back to write technical monographs summarising the war- 
time research in their various fields. By October 1946,180 scientists and 
technicians from Volkenrode and the Göttingen institutes had been located and 
employed to write these reports. From the Volkenrode staff alone some 250 
monographs were commissioned, translated and reproduced by a printing 
department specially established there. ' 
The work was scheduled to begin on 15 January 1946 under the supervision of 
Major Bulman and, in the light of the section above on the establishment of the 
new National Aeronautical Establishment it is interesting to note the comment 
that "the Treasury have given approval to the special arrangements necessary for 
removing this valuable equipment, and they will look to the use of it to save 
some of the very large expenditure which is planned for Bedford". 93 
There was also a specialised dismantling team from the Ministry of Works - the 
agency which was responsible for the actual construction of government 
research facilities including the ambitious new aeronautical institute at Bedford. 
92 
PRO AVIA 12/82, 'Operation Surgeon - Memorandum No. 2', and Johanna Weber, interview 
with author, 1 June 1998. Dr Weber recalled that after the surrender "we were [working] in the 
fields with the farmers" until the British investigators came to find them. 
93 
PRO AVIA 9/88, 'MAP Interest in German Research Establishments'. It was noted to Sir Alec 
Coryton, Controller of Research and Development (CRD) that "Mr Gorrell Barnes of the 
Treasury is therefore accompanying you [to visit Volkenrode] to obtain a general picture of the 
equipment involved and the scale of the operation". 
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Two flights per week in each direction of transport aircraft were also scheduled 
to bring out documents and smaller equipment. ' 
The Ministry of Works engineers, who referred to themselves ironically as 
'Operation Spanner-hammer' constituted a subset of the 'Surgeon' team. The 
intention to re-use the material for new British aeronautical facilities was 
facilitated by the fact that these were, in most cases, the same individuals 
responsible for the erection of heavy capital plant for British government 
research facilities including the RAE, Farnborough, the National Physical 
Laboratory, and the new Bedford site. 95 The bulk of the structure of the large 
wind tunnels formed substantial civil engineering structures which were 
relatively 'low tech' and not worth transporting. However, the 6000 hp Siemens 
electric motors and their control gear were precious and a number were shipped 
to England with their associated mercury arc rectifiers and compressors and 
were used in the construction of the '8 foot' and the '3 foot' supersonic tunnels 
that were built at Bedford. However one complete smaller supersonic tunnel was 
disassembled and transported to be rebuilt for projectile studies at the Armament 
Research Department at Fort Halstead near Sevenoaks. Also invaluable in 
Britain was the advanced ancillary optical equipment used for flow visualisation 
in the tunnels. ' 
94 
PRO AVIA 15/2216. It was also noted that "at Göttingen there is ... equipment 
deposited by Sir 
Roy Fedden [for the College of Aeronautics]. This should be included in general plans". 
95 
Paul Fletcher, conversation with the author, March 1996. 'Superintending Engineer - Heavy 
Research Plant' for the Ministry of Works, Fletcher was concerned with the engineering of all 
the large government research installations in the UK and was in overall charge of the 
engineering side of the dismantling of Volkenrode and the transport of its equipment. He was 
also involved in the planning and layout of the Bedford site and the building of the wind 
tunnels, spinning tunnels and engine test facilities there so there was a close integration between 
these programmes. 
96 
For example, Schlieren interferometry equipment. The superb quality of the German optical and 
mechanical instrumentation can be seen in the case of kinetheodolites - calibrated camera 
devices used on ranges for tracking the trajectory, height and speed of projectiles and aircraft. 
In 1965 the RAE were still using and maintaining what effectively were German Askania 
instruments of pre-war manufacture. (Kinetheodolite planned maintenance manual, Workshops 
Department in conjunction with Instrumentation and Ranges Department, July 1966, Science 
Museum Technical File for Inv. 1993 -2547). 
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Much of the lighter and more delicate freight was flown back to Farnborough 
and a Douglas DC 3 and a Junkers Ju 52 aircraft were dedicated to this. In 
addition three or four Hudson aircraft brought a stream of personnel back and 
forth from England for study. These included both government and industry 
scientists, a considerable number RAF and service personnel and politicians 
such as Arthur Woodburn (Parliamentary Secretary for the MAP) who went to 
see the progress of 'Operation Surgeon in January 1946.97 
John Wilmot, as Minister for the new Ministry of Supply also planned a visit. 
The plans for this are noteworthy in connection with the surmise in earlier 
sections of this study that the highly directed strategy of the MAP in the latter 
stages of the war towards the aircraft industry was weakened in an important 
degree by the departure of Stafford Cripps. It is certainly difficult, for instance, 
to imagine Cripps writing about the proposed visit to Volkenrode in the diffident 
terms in which Wilmot did to his colleague Herbert Morrison (as Lord President 
of Council), on 31 August 1945. 
I have been told that it is most important for any Ministers who have 
a responsibility for the future of research and development for the 
Armed Forces ... themselves to visit ... the enormous Hermann 
Goering Research Establishment. ... Do you think that you and I ... 
could make a trip over there? ... If you 
did not feel able to go I 
would not go myself. 98 
However, the momentum for the operation had been established and it ran to 
completion until almost everything useful and transportable had been taken 
although some equipment did still remain in situ at the end of the agreed period 
and was destroyed punitively. " 
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PRO AVIA 9/99. "Our purpose was to check up on the progress of the M. A. P. scheme for the 
exploitation of aeronautical scientific a material in the British Zone in Germany, described as 
Operation Surgeon". 
98 
PRO AVIA 9/88, Visits to Volkenrode, Notes by Parliamentary Secretary on visit to Germany, 
9-14 January 1946. 
99 
Paul Fletcher, (n. 95 above). 
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Some idea of the scale of the operation can be gained from the provision of six 
road tractor units and low-loader trailers of 100 tons capacity which were used 
to take loads up to Hamburg for shipping. The total quantity of material 
identified for removal to the UK amounted to some 14,000 tons. 1°° On some of 
the outbound flights the 'Surgeon' aircraft brought back to Germany half ton 
loads of Birmingham nails to build packing crates from trees felled in the 
surrounding forest and sawn in a sawmill set up by the Ministry of Works 
team. '°' The curious emotions that must have existed in the German civilians at 
the time can be judged by the fact that the British team had the willing 
assistance of the Siemens company's chief export packer and his assistance for 
the electrical equipment. 102 This equipment was delivered to several hangars at 
Great Storton airfield which marked one end of the proposed five mile runway 
at Bedford and from there delivered to the various research establishments 
controlled by the Ministry of Supply. 'o3 
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PRO AVIA 12/82, 'Operation Surgeon, Memorandum No. 2'. The scale of this removal is all 
the more remarkable when it is recalled that this 'take' consisted of 'high tech' research 
equipment rather than general industrial plant. By 1 October 1946 approximately half the 
identified material had been shipped (7620 tons by sea and 144 tons of more delicate equipment 
by air) and it was reported that shipments were going out at a rate of 1800 tons a month. For 
the new College of Aeronautics at Cranfield alone, which was the junior partner in allocations, 
400 tons of research equipment and machine tools were packed in Germany during October 
1945 by Wing Commander Hereford. (John Harrington, Librarian, Cranfield University, 
personal communication, 1996). 
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Paul Fletcher (n. 95 above). Nails were unobtainable in Germany and were so sought after for 
construction that the MoW supply bought another advantage. The German vehicle drivers were 
given 281b bags of nails for each trip to the docks at Hamburg as 'currency' to distribute. This 
largesse ensured there was no pilfering of equipment. 
102 
Ibid. Fletcher recalls the attitude among the Siemens men as "We have a good name and we 
want to see that it comes out tidily". 
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PRO AVIA 9/88, M. A. P. Interest in German Research Establishments, Note for CRD by EC 
Ashworth, PS 15,3 January 1946 and paper 'Organisation of Operation SURGEON'. The 
Ministry of Aircraft Production was amalgamated with the Ministry of Supply during the course 
of this programme. "MAP have appointed a British scientific staff at Volkenrode and at other 
... research stations. ... they are at the moment preparing 
inventories of all German equipment 
found in the Establishment for use by the Allocations Committee in London. This Committee 
under the Chairmanship of DCRD allocates the German research equipment concerned to 
Government Establishments, Aeronautical Establishments etc. in U. K. and the Dominions". 
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Emigration from Bizonia - The Employment of German Scientists 
In July 1946 the decision was made by the British and American governments to 
fuse their respective zones of occupation in Germany into a single administrative 
area termed the "Bizone". (British officials, more playfully, tended to refer to 
the area as "Bizonia"). This fusion implied, or perhaps made more overt, a 
direct competition between the Anglo-American allies and the Soviet Union for 
the scientific and economic spoils of Germany and there was substantial, and 
exclusive, Anglo-American co-operation. 104 
However, there was inevitably still rivalry between the Britain and the USA, 
although this should not be overstated compared to that which existed in relation 
to the USSR and also France. Thus it is interesting to recall the claim by 
Bower, alluded to above, that British efforts were poorly focused and 
inconclusive since the study by Lasby, written from American sources, shows 
that American officials considered British plans to be very effective. " Colonel 
Putt wrote in November 1946 that "the Board of Trade handles all scientists 
coming here and has little interference from anyone. Once it is decided they 
want a man he is brought over and put to work. ... Whether he is lily-white 
[does] not worry them too much. If any man can be of assistance in realigning a 
segment of their economy which is out of adjustment, they try to get him". 106 
Putt had a strong personal commitment to the utilisation of German scientists for 
the United States and perhaps over-emphasised British efforts. In fact, British 
policy, like that in America, was initially ambivalent over the employment of 
104 
PRO BT 211/46, 'Employment of German Technicians and German Reparation Labour 
Generally', March 1946. The secret and contentious nature of these arrangements is illustrated 
by the instruction on a telegram in the file from the British administration in Vienna to the 
Board of Trade: "This message will not be distributed outside British or US government 
departments or HQs or re-transmitted, even in code, without being paraphrased". 
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Bower, (n. 59 above) and Lasby, (n. 60 above). 
106 
Note from Colonel Putt to 'Hap' Arnold, Commanding General, AAF (Army Air Force), 4 
November 1946, quoted in Lasby, (n. 60, above), p. 170. 
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"ex-enemy aliens". There was less concern about the acceptability of this where 
pure defence research was involved and scientists could be brought to 
establishments like the RAE, but the question of using a wider range of 
personnel to assist industry at large in Britain was the subject of some debate. 
However, Board of Trade officials were generally keen to utilise German 
developments as were British defence personnel actually serving in Germany. 
Similarly American military personnel in Germany were initially more 
enthusiastic than State Department officials at home. Indeed, it was the value 
put on German science by the military of both allies that led to mutual suspicion 
and competition between British and American officials actually on the ground 
in Germany, as glimpsed from Putt's remarks above. Both groups were excited 
by the new technologies they had found and both considered their own 
governments to be irresolute in forming plans to utilise German personnel. Both 
groups reported to their home administrations that the other ally was being less 
scrupulous than themselves about former Nazi affiliations among the candidates 
in order to urge greater urgency. '07 
In Britain the arguments for an expedient approach came quite quickly to 
dominate policy while some moral doubt still was felt in American government 
circles over the question and it was said that German scientists often migrated 
back to the British zone after tiring of waiting for US employment. 10' 
Thus a cipher telegram from the Cabinet Offices to the British Embassy in 
Washington 14 February 1946 observed that: 
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PRO BT 211/46, GE Preston, minute of 27 September 1945. "Brigadier Spedding told me that 
the Americans are already busily removing technicians from Germany and offering, as an 
inducement in some cases, naturalisation". 
108 
There was some fragmentation of policy on both sides over the question. Although in February 
1946 the American State Department were opposing immigration there were already 130 
German scientists in the USA by the end of January 1945. With the onset of the Cold War the 
American position soon reversed; by 1948 the opposition within the State Department had been 
countered and the US then avidly sought specialists. See Lasby (n. 60 above). 
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750 Germans evacuated from the Russian zone and frozen in the 
American zone may be released to Russian zone if not designated..., 
We have deferred from submitting a list of Germans solely because 
American policy is not yet determined. It would therefore be 
manifestly inequitable if our scrupulous regard for the proprieties 
should prejudice our chance of exploiting the Germans now detained. 
109 
A further telegram advised the embassy that the British list would be ready for 
exchange by the first of February and that "we consider it not unreasonable to 
request crystallisation of American policy". It suggested that if this were not 
forthcoming in a month "we shall consider ourselves free to go ahead on a 
unilateral basis". "o 
There was now growing pressure from many areas of government and 
particularly the Board of Trade and the firms themselves to extend the 
exploitation of German technique beyond the purely military sphere. 1' This was 
a contentious issue and conflicted with what has been called "rigidly moral 
approach" of the post-war Labour government and the feeling that private 
industry and individual firms should not profit from the war-time sacrifice of 
Allied lives by gaining special access to the German work. Therefore, it was 
proposed, scientists and technicians brought to the UK would normally work for 
Trade Associations or research establishments since the work done there might 
be expected to augment the capability of a whole industrial sector, rather than 
enriching particular companies or groups of individuals. 
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PRO AVIA 15/3846, 'Panel to Consider Employment of German Scientists, Specialists and 
Technicians for Civil Industry in the United Kingdom'. 
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PRO AVIA 15/3846, telegram of 19 January 1946 to British Embassy, Washington. In fact 
MAP had noted that in early January 1946 "Air Vice Marshall Jones paid a special visit a few 
weeks ago to Volkenrode and Göttingen to disclose the broad policy in connection with the 
German scientists in the UK ... at Headquarters 
in London arrangements are now in hand for 
the preparation of the contracts and for the accommodation, programmes of work etc. for those 
Germans who elect to come to this country". (Note from PS15, PRO AVIA 9/88). 
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Sir William Palmer attempted to convert some political objections by arguing that "no matter 
how objectionable and undesirable ... Germans could 
help over the long term. ... The 
Americans were recruiting vigorously ... and we should be missing a valuable opportunity if we 
did not follow their example", minute of 28.9.45, PRO BT 211/46, Quoted in Bower, (n. 59 
above). 
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Thus Stafford Cripps, for example, is said, initially to have suggested that 
employment for the Germans in non-military industries in the UK was only 
tolerable if they were "sucked dry of their knowledge in a short time". 12 
However, Arthur Woodburn argued that "there is no possibility of getting these 
men to put all they have into our research if the arrangement is merely to suck 
them dry and throw them back into Germany". "' The relaxation of this attitude 
resulted in the suggestion, which appears to have emanated from Cripps, that 
German technique could be disseminated through trade associations to prevent 
individual companies obtaining an advantage. 
However Board of Trade officials were unhappy with such a policy. "This 
seems to me quite wrong", minuted George Preston at the Board of Trade. "It is 
the individual firms who design and make the goods, not the trade associations, 
and if we are to get any benefit from these German technicians, we must surely 
obtain them for particular firms. I recognise that this may cause some jealousy 
... [but] it seems to me that if it is properly handled we have a chance of 
helping our export trade materially if we can pick up a relatively small number 
of the right people. ... The papers passed through the President. [Cripps] when I 
was up in the Private Office last week. He ... was not happy at the suggestion 
that these technicians should be attached to particular firms". Preston went on to 
comment that there seemed little point in getting civil technicians over to work 
for trade associations or the government. "If we tried this on, the good ones ... 
would, I fear, either be persuaded to go to the United States or elsewhere or to 
remain at home". "4 
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PRO AVIA 9/88. Arthur Woodburn, 15 January 1946, suggested that "there is no question that 
the ability and accumulated scientific knowledge of some of these scientists is so great that it is 
essential both for the demobilization of the German war potential and for the economic and 
speedy progress of our own work in jet turbines, etc. and that arrangements should be facilitated 
for the bringing of the required personnel to this country permanently. ... I understand so far 
there are objections to their families coming here but I fear objections of this kind will prove 
short-sighted in the ultimate interest of our research in vital fields. 
114 
Minute of LB Hughes to George Preston, 22 September 1945 and Preston's reply, BT 211/46. 
Board of Trade view, as understood by Preston, was that "it is our present policy to exploit 
German industry to the full, and in many cases the most effective way will be to get the 
161 
These doubts were intended to be reconciled by a scheme for civil industry 
administered by a panel chaired by Sir Horace Darwin, Director of the National 
Physical Laboratory. This was announced by Stafford Cripps in Parliament in 
December 1945, when he declared that "it is the Government's policy to secure 
from Germany a knowledge of scientific and technical developments that will be 
of benefit to this country". He remarked, perhaps disingenuously, that "although 
we were generally ahead there are certain fields in which the Germans held a 
temporary lead". Sir Charles Darwin was to examine the requirements of British 
industry and to scrutinise the credentials of those whose names were put 
forward. Another role of the Darwin panel was "to see fair play between the 
firms". "' 
Alongside the announcement of the scheme measures were devised to pre-empt 
objections from labour organisations. A brief drafted by the Board of Trade for 
issue by the Ministry of Labour offered arguments for employers to deploy. It 
suggested that "it is evident that there must be some industrial technique in 
which ... Germany has surpassed us. It is intended to bring certain German 
scientists, specialists and technicians ... into civil industry ... in order to gain 
the most up-to-date knowledge and perhaps save ourselves many years of 
research. The Americans and the Russians are exploiting the Germans in the 
same way". It also stressed that the inventions and discoveries would be 
available to industry as a whole and that "they will have no authority over 
British workpeople". 1'6 
German specialists over here to teach us their skill". BT 64/2879, minute of 10.9.45, quoted in 
Bower, (n. 59 above).. 
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PRO AVIA 15/3846. 'Panel to Consider Employment of German Scientists, Specialists and 
Technicians for Civil Industry in the United Kingdom'. The Darwin Panel nominees handled by 
the "German Division" at the Board of Trade was an extremely diverse list including specialists 
in cameras, lenses and optics, photographic film, fuel injection, but also oddities like the chief 
engineer for a fully-fashioned hosiery machine company and a designer of sugar and chocolate 
machinery. 
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PRO BT 211/47. The press release on the Darwin scheme, released in December 1945 also 
made these points and added that "during their stay the Germans will not be in any position of 
authority, and will, in no case, serve in any vacancy which could be filled by a British 
employee". 
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An elaborate system set up to prepare the ground in the firms and local areas, 
with the Board of Trade acting as go-between for the employers and the TUC. "7 
In addition, Sir Walter Citrine, as General Secretary of the Trades Union 
Council (TUC), was extensively briefed by the Board of Trade which stated that 
"Germans would normally work in Government Establishments and Research 
Associations". Although "exceptionally they might find their way into individual 
firms Germans are, however, under a contract with H. M. G. ". It added that: 
"the number of Germans who will serve in this country will not 
exceed one or two hundred ... no known pro-Nazis will be admitted 
.. * only those Germans who have a real contribution to the national interest ... the results of their discoveries and inventions will be 
available to industry as a whole". "' 
Inevitably there was some negative publicity and officials noted that "the 
Beaverbrook press were running the story in a big way" with "uninformed press 
criticism" and that a story in the Daily Mail for 5 January 1946 reported that "a 
rumour-monger [sic] is sweeping Barrow .. the shipyard workers resent the 
arrival of former Nazis who are still pro-Nazi". "9 
However the British public displayed a remarkably sanguine view about the 
utilisation of German science and the superiority in many areas which this 
implied over UK technique. In December 1945 Stafford Cripps opened an 
exhibition of German industrial products at Millbank which showed something 
of Germany's war-time advances in science and industrial technique. It also 
sought to promote the BIOS reports (British Intelligence Objectives Sub- 
Committee) on German developments for British industrial use. These amounted 
to 1400 reports on a great range of industries and techniques compiled by some 
10,000 investigators. Cripps urged British industry "to make the fullest and 
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The Germans referred to at Barrow-in-Furness were Helmuth Walter and his team which had 
produced a hydrogen peroxide submarine power plant to allow sustained high speed underwater 
running. The Admiralty had managed to install the Walter team at Vickers in advance of any 
general resolution of the policy doubts over placing the Germans in specific companies. 
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speediest use of the knowledge gathered ... there was no time to waste". Among 
the wonders promised were "powdered white of egg which whips better than the 
real thing, a bath enamel you can hit with a hammer without chipping, the 
perfect baby food ... and, for women of all ages 'lizard' shoes and handbags, 
flexible, durable, dyed in rich shades and made out of haddock skin". '20 
The Daily Graphic reported that "we so often have occasion to criticise the 
obstructiveness of the Board of Trade that it is a considerable satisfaction to be 
able to compliment its President, Sir Stafford Cripps, on the apparent 
thoroughness of his investigations into German trade methods". The exhibition 
was intended to tour Cardiff, Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Nottingham, 
Newcastle, Glasgow, Belfast and Bristol. "' 
German High-Speed Aerodynamics and British Defence Science 
However, the greatest concentration of British effort was in aeronautics. In 
November 1946 Arthur Woodburn for the Ministry of Supply (MoS) had 
announced that German scientists were to be employed at the RAE and at the 
recently created Guided Projectiles Establishment at Westcott. The press 
statement was careful to emphasise that the pay "will be comparable to that of 
British technicians ... but at a slightly lower figure". Any suggestion of feather- 
bedding former enemies was countered by the announcement that "the men will 
120 
'To Brighten your Life', Sunday Pictorial, 24 November 1946. It is interesting to note, in the 
era before the Cold War, how openly this German technology was displayed in Britain. In 
October and November 1945 the Royal Aircraft Establishment put on a display of captured 
German aircraft and equipment which included not only service types like the piston-engined 
Focke-Wulf 190 and Messerschmitt 109, but also the Messerschmitt 262 jet fighter and secret 
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be accommodated in Army huts". 122 
This 'Defence Scheme' eventually identified 124 individuals included guided 
missile experts, rocket engineers, aerodynamicists, flutter analysts, 
instrumentation engineers, an archivist, experts in servo mechanisms, control 
guidance, gas turbines, and, most curiously, two naval historians) Of these 
scientists some had already been brought initially to Britain for interrogation, in 
effect as VIP prisoners of war. The aeronautical scientists were taken to the 
Beltane School at Wimbledon which had been requisitioned for the purpose as 
part of a separate operation known as 'Inkpot'. By late 1945 about 250 of the 
best German scientists and engineers had been brought there for interrogation. '14 
and were subsequently offered employment on a special pay scale within Civil 
Service terms, graded as 'German Scientist Ito V'. For example, Adolf 
Busemann, one of the foremost experts in the world on swept wings and 
supersonic flow was retained in Britain and worked at Farnborough and at the 
National Physical Laboratory but soon left to work in the USA. 'u 
However, others such as the eminent Göttingen aerodynamicist Dietrich 
Kuchemann were offered employment freely while they still in Germany. 
Initially these contracts were for six months, and Kuchemann's associate, Dr 
Johanna Weber, who took up a similar offer to follow some months later, 
recalled that the short period of these initial contracts was a major factor in 
inducing German scientists to accept. '26 
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Apart from the lucky find of Volkenrode the British search had not been hit or 
miss - CIOS targets even specified minor Messerschmitt dispersal factories. 
There was also a specific search for personnel with particular skills such as 
those involved in work on flight control and stability on the new high speed 
aircraft. This brought Morien Morgan of the RAE to Germany to seek out Dr 
Karl Doetsch who had been working on the directional instability of the 
Messerschmitt Me 262 since the Gloster Meteor was similarly afflicted with this 
'snaking' problem. 127 
The two schemes were the official channels for the employment of German 
specialists and they show that 124 German scientists and technicians were 
formally brought into the UK under the Defence Scheme while another 257 
Darwin Panel nominees were listed in 1946, although it is not clear how many 
of this latter group came. 128 
It also appears that other Germans did come under less formal conditions. One 
example, which may not have been exceptional, is that of the engineer August 
Stepan who had worked on the Doblhoff tip jet driven helicopter system in 
Austria. In 1947 he was given a contract by the Ministry of Supply and worked 
at the Fairey company on the Rotodyne passenger helicopter project until 1962. 
However he does not appear on the lists of Darwin Panel scientists so far found 
by this author or in the separate DCOS scheme for defence scientists and his 
case raises the question of how many others there may have been like him. 129 
127. 
Doetsch was one of the German scientists offered employment at Farnborough and he and 
Dietrich Kuchemann were the only ones offered "German Scientist I" grade salary. Karl 
Doetsch, (n 125 above). 
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Although the intention to recruit under this scheme was announced early in 1946 and many 
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German High Speed Aerodynamics at RAE, Farnborough 
As already noted, the British pattern for the utilisation of German science was to 
concentrate this material in the Government research establishments. The reports 
and personnel and equipment thus were located principally at RAE, 
Farnborough while the actual hardware initially went to the new Bedford 
research centre which, as we have seen, stayed under Farnborough control. 
The presence of German personnel at Farnborough, in addition to the captured 
documents and reports, ensured that British transonic research made striking 
speed in the immediate post-war period. 
It is also interesting to note that this absorbtion took place partly with the 
assistance of intermediaries who were at home in the German language, such as 
the aerodynamicist TRF Nonweiler. Nonweiler was the son of German-Jewish 
immigrants and acted as a security vetting officer for some of the German 
aerodynamics reports. 13' As many British aerodynamicists were competent in 
scientific German it would be tempting to cast the analysis of these events in 
terms of technology transfer, as it is generally understood, but more 
particularly, in terms of the transfer of "tacit knowledge", as analysed by 
Collins. "' The essential elements in such a case, it might be argued, include a 
body of advanced technical and theoretical knowledge, complemented by subtle 
practical and experimental 'know-how' (in this case wind tunnel and modelling 
technique) mediated by key personnel. 
However, an analysis along these lines would undervalue the state of British 
aerodynamics at the end of the Second World War and could also imply that it 
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had developed in isolation from Continental work. In fact, aerodynamic research 
in Britain had been well integrated into developments in Germany and elsewhere 
during the 1920s and early 1930s. Senior RAE aerodynamicists were well 
informed about German research and a knowledge of technical German was 
considered almost essential in the field. In particular, Hermann Glauert, the 
outstanding theoretician at the RAE in the inter-war period, was at the forefront 
in spreading an appreciation of the work of Ludvig Prandtl and the 'Göttingen 
school' of aerodynamics in Britain. "' 
These contacts disappeared as German aerodynamics became incorporated into 
German war planning. Probably the last open international exchange took place 
in Italy at the Volta High Speed Conference in 1935, and there British, 
American, French Italian and German aerodynamicists gave papers on current 
thinking about future high-speed developments. 133 One commentator has 
concluded, from a study of the papers given at the conference and the citations 
in them, that Germany was pre-eminent in theoretical aerodynamics in 1935, 
with Britain only slightly behind. By contrast, the USA (excepting the special 
case of Theodore von Karman who, from 1930, in essence imported German 
aerodynamics to Cal Tech) was rather backward in theoretical high-speed 
aerodynamics although the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics 
(NACA) was "widely recognised for the excellence of its empirical data and for 
little else". " 
At this conference the aerodynamicist Adolf Busemann presented a paper on 
supersonic flight which mentioned the possibility of using swept wings in the 
132 
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transonic region. "5 This was almost the last opportunity for international 
exchange and following the Volta conference the German work became 
increasingly secret, while in Britain, the expansion of the Royal Air Force and 
the introduction of new types of aircraft absorbed a great proportion of the time 
and energy of government scientists at the RAE. 
During the war the RAE did nevertheless manage to do some advanced work in 
high speed flight and in a notable investigation, began flight trials with a Spitfire 
which was dived at an angle of 45 degrees from a height of 40,000 feet, 
increasing the speed attempted in each flight until over Mach 0.9 was attained. 
At the same time a scale wind tunnel model was tested in parallel in the new 
high speed Farnborough tunnel. In this way an unusually good understanding 
for the time was developed into the interaction between the effects of 
compressible air flow at speeds approaching that of sound and the effects on the 
control and stability of the aircraft. "' 
There was also some advanced theoretical work undertaken at the RAE during 
the war including a study on a hypothetical supersonic biplane. This derived 
from an ingenious proposal also aired by Busemann at the 1935 Volta 
conference and relied on the interference between the shock waves reflected 
between the superimposed wings to cancel each other out and thus avoid the 
high drag (and power requirement) associated with supersonic flight. 137 
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Thus although Busemann's swept wing proposals were not explored in Britain 
during the war and the extent to which German research on swept wings in the 
transonic regime had progressed came as a surprise in 1945, these studies were 
not received by a naive or theoretically unsophisticated audience. British 
aerodynamicists realised the point of this work virtually as soon as they saw the 
reports and analyses and they had the theoretical and mathematical equipment to 
be able to extend it and, as we have seen, began rapidly to incorporate the 
thinking into proposals for operational aircraft. 
The case of the reception of German high speed aerodynamics in Britain does 
not therefore fall into the categories for technology transfer or for the 
communication of tacit knowledge that have been discussed by historians of 
technology. Rather, it represents a re-integration of a particular branch of 
theoretical aerodynamics which had been undergoing separate evolution since 
German science had "gone off the air" as it were, in the late 1930s. 
Conclusions: the Utility of German Science 
In numerical terms the number of specialists brought to Britain does not support 
the assertion, referred to above, that Britain was backward in exploiting German 
work in comparison to the USA and the official British total so far discovered of 
381 German scientists should be compared with the declared total of 210 who 
emigrated to America under the auspices of Project Paperclip. 138 A more 
reasonable judgement is that the number of German scientists actually brought to 
Britain was probably in line with what the government and industrial research 
establishments could absorb. 139 The quality and the experience of the individuals 
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recruited also shows that Britain sought out individuals in the top rank of 
German aerodynamics and aeronautical science and, as we noted with the case 
of Karl Doetsch, the intelligence evaluation and preparation was already in place 
to enable British investigators to locate them. 
However, it is unlikely that a final judgement can ever be reached on the 
contribution to the British aeronautical industry of the various programmes to 
exploit German science. The value of the physical equipment as well as the 
intellectual contribution made by the personnel and the research documents 
brought to the UK is literally incalculable for various reasons. Thus one could, 
for example, put a notional value on the R&D work from which the 
Winter/Multhopp transonic aircraft design (discussed in the next chapter) sprang 
but this might not represent the cost which the RAE would have had to expend 
to get to the same point without them. In such cases it may be sufficient for 
other workers to know of a new possibility in broad detail in order to jump to it 
quite rapidly by their own efforts. 
It should be noted that there were efforts made in the immediate aftermath of 
the Allied exploitation programmes to assess the value of what had been taken, 
both from the German side and on behalf of the British and American 
governments of occupation. Perhaps the major motivation behind this for 
German trade associations, but also Allied occupation bodies such as the Bizonal 
Economics Administration, was to establish the value of intellectual and other 
properties removes from Germany in order to establish a credit figure towards 
the reparations account. Establishing the value of this material proved 
extraordinarily difficult and the final assessment reached by the commission the 
established by the administration for this purpose came up with an estimate of 
ranging between $4.8 billion and $12 billion. 140 
Estimating the share of this which fell to Britain would be extraordinarily 
problematical and, moreover, would not represent its utility. Firstly, there is the 
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possibility, quite strong in many cases, that British manufacturers would have 
adopted types of plant, processes and designs that were in use in Germany 
anyway in time, and that there was a process of modernisation which had been 
deferred by the war. Another reason to suggest that the value to the recipient is 
lower than the value estimated by the loser is suggested by a 'housebreaker' 
analogy where the burglar never obtains the full cost of items taken away. In the 
case of German science the utility that patents, processes, scientific knowledge 
and so on would have had when stripped out of the milieu in which they 
developed must have been vastly reduced. Perhaps the only environments 
where this special knowledge could have been absorbed and transferred without 
high dilution could have been in defence establishments such as the RAE. 
In some areas of British aviation technology, post-war development was 
practically untouched by a knowledge of German work. This was certainly true 
of the gas turbine development carried on at Rolls-Royce, De Havilland, Bristol 
and Armstrong-Siddeley which built exclusively on what had been done during 
the war in the firms. The German jet engines were analysed at Farnborough, by 
RAE scientists and by Power Jets (R&D) at Farnborough who concluded that 
there was little learn from them. 14' It is also noteworthy that only two German 
turbojet engineers were brought to Britain in the DCOS scheme and one of 
them, Dr Max Bentele,. with high level experience of turbine blade design at 
Heinkel-Hirth was not used in the British jet aero engine programme but was 
despatched to a fairly low priority project for a gas turbine tank engine at CA 
141 
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Parsons, in Newcastle-on-Tyne. 142 This sparing use of German turbojet 
personnel argues again for a purposeful and highly selective British approach to 
German engineering and scientific personnel. 
By contrast, the British jet engine teams were quick to appreciate the superior 
quality of German test facilities and instrumentation and the De Havilland team 
spent several weeks at the BMW high altitude test cell in Munich, completing 
over 70 hours of testing on the Goblin engine which provided information which 
could not then have been obtained anywhere else. The cell could be de- 
pressurised to simulate altitudes of up to 50,000 feet, while the inlet air speed 
could be regulated up to 550 mph and refrigerated to - 70 degrees C. 143 The 
team noted that the speed at which results were obtained was much better than if 
flight tests only were used and the information far more complete. The BMW 
test facility was removed to the USA but the practical experience of the utility 
of the installation certainly helped establish the need for test cells working on 
the same principle at NGTE. 
Germany was, of course, closely identified with advances in rocketry and 
British liquid fuel rocket motors certainly owed much to the V2 engine concept. 
Much work was done on these, for rocket assisted take-off applications, for the 
abortive rocket fighter programmes and particularly for the Blue Steel and 
cancelled Blue Streak nuclear weapons. 
By contrast, the solid fuel rocket technology which was used in many anti- 
aircraft and air-to-air weapons was a largely home-grown and successful British 
technology. Thus the Bristol Bloodhound missile, which emerged as an excellent 
ground to air defence system against high altitude hostile bombers relied largely 
on British technology for its solid fuel core motor and radar guidance, and not, 
for example on the German Wassserfall liquid fuel anti-aircraft missile which 
142 
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had been studied with such interest by Allied investigators. 144 In cases such as 
these the fact that Germany had done a thing, or had begun a project, was 
perhaps sufficient stimulus for British research engineers to accept that it could 
be done and to successfully attempt it, but in their own way. 
Nevertheless, it must be accepted that German aerodynamic work was important 
in Britain. "As far as the aerodynamics of swept wings were concerned there 
was no background in English at all" one RAE aerodynamicist recalled. In the 
1950s British workers therefore referred to the specially written reports from 
Volkenrode and Göttingen and to the RAE series "Reports and Translations" 
(R&T's) which were translations of papers from various captured German 
archives. las 
Perhaps most significant, in the long term, for British aeronautics was the 
employment at Farnborough of the Göttingen aerodynamicist Dietrich 
Küchemann and his collaborator Johanna Weber. Küchemann took British 
nationality in 1952, becoming head of the Supersonics Division of the 
Aerodynamics Department in 1957 and overall head of RAE aerodynamics in 
1966. ' Both Weber and Küchemann had a major impact on the Concorde 
programme but if any single person can be considered as the 'father' of the 
aerodynamic design of Concorde it is, in the opinion of this writer, Küchemann. 
In this context Concorde is certainly an interesting case since it represented such 
an enormous technological and scientific effort. It might therefore be tempting 
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to regard the heritage of German scientific influence in both America and 
Britain as a kind of technological supremacism for in some respects Concorde 
can be regarded as the British equivalent of the American Apollo space 
programme. 
However, this seems too simple a view for there is also the point that the 
Second World War marked a step change in the application of science to 
weapons systems. 147 While Britain had made notable use of scientific research in 
many areas, the new technologies and weapons systems demanded quite a new 
scale of expenditure and effort. Germany had been among the first to realise the 
returns that might be available from this intense application of science and 
research. Thus the effect on the Allies of their analysis of German science was 
as much moral as direct. Although in many cases the post-war programmes of 
the former allies did not build directly on the weapons and solutions that had 
been attempted in Germany, the scale and extent of research and the degree to 
which engineering science was applied to German war projects was eloquent. 
147 
Although Apollo and Concorde were not weapons systems they can certainly be regarded as 
first cousins to them and could not have been remotely possible, at the time they were created, 
without defence expenditure. 
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Chapter 5: The Royal Aircraft Establishment in the post-war period 
Introduction 
In recent years the growing academic study of aeronautical history has tended to 
emphasise the role of political and social factors on developments in the 
industry, in contrast to an earlier (though still active) genre deriving from the 
industry itself and from 'amateurs' of aviation, in which the principle and most 
interesting agents are seen as the designers, the pilots, and the firms. Both 
schools would benefit by being informed by the other. However, in the post-war 
era, there is a powerful third element contributing to the development of aircraft 
programmes which must be considered in order to reach an integrated 
understanding. This is the contribution of the research done by scientists and 
research engineers within government establishments which attained a special 
importance in the post-war decades. 
The influence of the government's centralised direction of aeronautics has been 
touched on with respect to the development of new facilities and establishments 
in the latter part of the war, and in the pattern of utilisation of captured German 
personnel and results. However, it was the pre-existing and powerful Royal 
Aircraft Establishment (RAE) at Farnborough, which became the locus for this 
enhanced effort in the post-war period. These constituent parts of the British 
aviation ensemble made up, therefore, a kind of triad, with policy and projects 
being developed in a sometimes rather elusive way through long-range studies at 
Farnborough, preliminary project work in the firms, and contacts which were 
exchanged reciprocally between these centres with policy-makers, defence 
planners and RAF personnel. It is the aim of this chapter to tease out something 
of these relationships and to throw light on the extraordinary influence of the 
RAE in the period. 
As the Cold War took on the character of a competitive contest of research and 
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development during the 1950s, the influence of the RAE grew enormously, in 
part because the new fields of jet propulsion, supersonic aerodynamics, guidance 
technology and electronics offered a series of step changes in weapons 
capability, each step both alluring and enormously expensive, and RAE advice 
became vital in guiding policy makers as to whether to pursue such leads. 
Another factor contributing to this influence was that intelligence about the 
Soviet Union's capability was so scanty that the best insight into the weapons 
that the Soviet Union might deploy derived from analyses of what systems the 
aeronautical scientists, particularly within the RAE, considered that it might just 
be possible to create. ' (It is interesting to note that this pattern of is largely at 
the heart of weapons escalation since evaluators necessarily must 'aim off' and 
assume a precaution that an enemy might have more success than themselves in 
any particular line of development). 
However, to return to the immediate post-war years, the RAE can be best 
regarded at that time as an institution that had, as its central role, the task of 
"technologising" the British aircraft industry and, in this period there is no 
doubt that the advanced projects were critically reliant on the RAE. In fact, it 
would have been impossible for the firms to have completed the design, testing 
and evaluation of the new post-war generation of high-speed jet aircraft without 
the RAE since they lacked the research equipment and wind tunnels required. In 
1951, for example, the English Electric company was one of the first firms to 
build a trans-sonic wind tunnel as the design for its P. 1 supersonic fighter 
started to advance. The firms also lacked specialist staff; "they always had their 
chief aerodynamicist, " one RAE scientist recalled, "but to be honest, he was the 
1 
"Direct penetration of the Russian research and development programme was impossible. We 
had never seen a single Russian equipment [sic] until it was in operational service or 
deliberately shown". Intelligence official's statement in minutes of Defence Research Policy 
Committee, 24 May 1955, PRO DEFE 10/40, quoted in Jon Agar and Brian Balmer, 'British 
Scientists and the Cold War: The Defence Research Policy Committee and information 
networks', 1947-1963, Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 28: 2,1998, p 
209. 
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one aerodynamicist". 2 Another RAE member was more severe, recalling in the 
mid-1950s "some twenty design departments, all more or less inadequate". 3 
From the time of the war-time coalition government it had been accepted that 
these deficiencies would have to be addressed by government action, largely 
through the research establishments, and the early post-war years saw what was 
almost an inversion of the capitalist ethos with government scientists and civil 
servants often adopting a more "progressive" and explicitly technocratic posture 
than the firms were prepared to do. However, it was also a period in which the 
war-time consensus still prevailed and in which collaboration between the 
Services, the firms and the government research establishments in pursuit of 
common national purpose was the norm. 
By 1962 the RAE employed 8500 people (of whom 1500 were "qualified 
scientists and engineers") at Farnborough and its other sites, making it the 
largest research establishment in Europe. Its facilities, too, were world class. 
For example, to model the flight of experimental anti-aircraft missiles RAE 
installed TRIDAC, possibly then the most powerful computer in the country. 
This analogue machine could simulate all phases of missile interception in its 
full six degrees of freedom in 15 seconds (the actual flight time), using 8000 
thermionic valves and consuming as much electricity as a small town. ' In the 
same period the RAE upgraded its pre-war high-speed wind tunnel, increasing 
2 
CHE Warren, interview with the author, 1 June 1998. As an influential member of the Aero 
Department "Chew" Warren was involved in many of the advanced RAE aircraft proposals in 
the period covered. From 1960 he headed the Noise, Flutter and Vibration section in the 
Structures Department where he made a special study of the effects of the sonic boom over 
land, as part of the Concorde programme. 
3 
John Bagley, conversations with the author, 1997. John Bagley was a member of the Aero 
Department and worked for a long period with Dietrich Kuchemann. He came to the Science 
Museum in 1979 and preceded the author as Curator of Aeronautics. 
4 
Sir George Gardner, Director of Guided Weapons Research and Development, Lecture to 
Bedford Technical Society, 2 October 1957, Science Museum archives. At this time a digital 
machine would have needed about 7 minutes for a problem of this complexity. 
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the 8000 horsepower drive motors to 20,000 horsepower enabling it to run 
supersonically at a continuous airflow speed of 1000 mph. This was a piece of 
highly sophisticated scientific apparatus - in effect a laboratory instrument 
capable of fine measurement, but with the strength, mass and complexity of a 
substantial industrial plant. The facility was opened by Reginald Maudling in 
1954 and thereafter was devoted largely to projects such as the development of 
the supersonic fighter to intercept Soviet atomic bombers and to the development 
Britain's own deterrent V-bomber force. 
The organisation covered the complete spectrum of aeronautical technology 
including guided weapons research, armament, radio, instrumentation and 
navigation as well as maintaining its own chemistry, physics and materials 
section and all this expertise contributed to the emerging post-war generation of 
British jet aircraft. It was, wrote MJ Lighthill as the then Director of the RAE, 
"a central reservoir of scientific and technical knowledge ... on which all British 
producers and users of aircraft are able to call". 5 
The account here cannot cover all the areas in which the RAE was active and 
therefore deals mainly with the aerodynamic and "project work" that contributed 
to specific aircraft or aircraft proposals . However, the main focus of this 
chapter is on the role of the RAE in the two decades from the end of the Second 
World War - the period of this study - during which, it is argued, its influence 
on national defence was at its peak. Certainly by 1970 the firms had become 
more independent and were forced into competing groups. They were, 
moreover, beginning to be required to pay for Government facilities and the 
establishments were themselves being encouraged to become more accountable 
and "the freedom was going out of research". 6 The industrial situation also 
5 
MJ Lighthill (subsequently Sir James Lighthill), 'The Royal Aircraft Establishment' in Sir John 
Cockroft The Organisation of Research Establishments, (Cambridge, 1965), pp 28-54. 
6 
Mike Dobson, former superintendent, RAE Bedford, personal communication, 28 March 1998. 
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changed radically during the post-war years and during the 1960s the aircraft 
firms were becoming transformed, bringing in more analytical talent and 
investing in research facilities. 
The work of the RAE in this period underlines the thesis that the Cold War 
was, in a sense, a war - one of competitive innovation in weapons utilising the 
most advanced technology that the country could deploy and some of its best 
scientific and engineering personnel. ' This was clearly a hugely expensive 
undertaking and has been analyzed from one perspective as a waste of human 
assets and national resources as well as a dangerous game of escalation which 
carried the risk of triggering conflict, particularly at crucial periods when new 
systems were about to be deployed. However, an alternative strategic and 
utilitarian view, which has been defended in the USA rather more robustly than 
in Britain, is that the effort was worthwhile because the threats were met. 
According to this view a third world war was averted not only by balance of 
terror but in the early period, when atomic war fighting was considered a 
possibility, by a balance of capability. The technical success of Western defence 
science in countering and meeting Soviet threats could be seen, therefore, on 
this view, be seen as a contribution to stability. 
Perhaps the surprising feature of the work at the RAE in this period is that, in 
spite of all the pressing needs and perceived dangers implicit in this world 
order, the direction of the research performed there by its highly intelligent and 
motivated scientists was done with a remarkably light touch on the part of their 
superiors. Indeed, much influential work was done because RAE scientists 
themselves felt that it would be strategically significant or that it would be 
scientifically interesting. 
7 
Thus Sir John Carroll, at the Defence Research Policy Committee in 1955 suggested that "the 
present armament race ... [is] a research and 
development race and not one for the provision of 
equipment". Quoted in Agar and Balmer, (n. 1 above). This point is also well made by Peter 
Nailor, 'The Ministry of Defence 1959-1970' in Government and the Armed Forces in Britain 
1856-1990, Ed. Paul Smith, (Hambledon Press, London, 1996), pp 235-248. 
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There were various reasons for this comparative freedom. One was the 
prevailing sense throughout universities and research institutes, that lasted until 
the Thatcher era, that advanced research should not be shackled to closely too 
specific ends. Useful results would certainly accrue but, the argument went, 
who could say where? No one had foreseen, it used to be said, that Fleming's 
stray mould would lead to penicillin, and this perspective was underpinned by 
the administration of the Establishment since the Director was generally a 
government aeronautical scientist who had grown up in this system with its 
tradition of intellectual independence. Another reason for this comparative 
independence of the RAE scientists was that aircraft were entering a new 
aerodynamic realm as they approached the speed of sound. Up to 1945 the Air 
Staff had expected, for example, incremental progress in engine performance 
leading to improvements to the speed and height ceiling of aircraft; the main 
question was how rapidly these would come along in comparison to the progress 
of the enemy. With the approach to the speed of sound there was a genuine 
discontinuity of knowledge and the solutions were in the hands of the scientists 
while the experience within the aircraft companies did not extend to trans-sonic 
and supersonic flow or to the associated problems of stability, control, structural 
integrity and the prediction of performance in this regime. 
Thus post-war British aeronautical work can be seen as being led as much by 
scientific research as by military requirements and by military assessments of 
threat. Furthermore, because of the centrality of new science to aviation the 
perception of threat would be very likely to derive from the aeronautical 
scientists' own appreciation of what the potential enemy might be able to 
achieve. However, it is important to note that in this new, uncertain, post-war 
era (uncertain both politically and aerodynamically) the development of military 
aircraft specifications was a much more fluid process than during the Second 
World War. Then, the mission could be defined reasonably closely on the basis 
of actual experience with losses, evaluation of success, and continual knowledge 
of enemy capabilities. In the Cold War era the nature of the threat was 
speculative as were the potential capabilities of the defensive and offensive 
181 
aircraft which might be produced to operate in the new trans-sonic and 
supersonic regimes. 
The complement of aerodynamic staff at the RAE was drawn from the rather 
few universities which had aerodynamics courses (that run by Sir Brian Melvill 
Jones at Cambridge was one) as well as academically trained engineers and a 
considerable number of mathematicians of exceptionally high attainment who 
frequently came directly on completion of their undergraduate degrees. Thus, to 
a considerable degree the RAE developed its own cadre of aerodynamicists and 
its own style of research. ' However, the work of the theoreticians, it must be 
noted, was supported by a large number of talented practical engineers and 
technicians and by well-equipped workshops in which prototypes, wind tunnel 
models and instrumentation of the highest quality were made. To support this 
the RAE ran its own craft apprentice scheme, although exceptional individuals 
recruited in this way could move into more directing positions in research 
programmes. Thus the early work on jet lift and the control of vertical take-off 
craft was done by a former craft apprentice, Dennis Higton, and his moving 
platform rig was the conceptual predecessor to the Rolls-Royce Flying Bedstead 
and, eventually leading to the reaction control system of the Harrier. 
At the theoretical centre of the innovative work of the RAE was the 
Aerodynamics or "Aero" Department, whose members, according to one 
recollection, led "a god-like separate existence". and it was in the Aero 
Department that new concepts for aircraft and new directions for theoretical 
8 
On completion of his degree during the Second World War, Sir John Charnley recalls being 
interviewed by CP Snow who was involved in the allocation of scientific manpower for the war 
effort and sent to Farnborough because of his interest in hydraulics and structures. Sir John 
Chamley, interview with the author, 28 May 1998. Sir John Charnley was, among other posts, 
Superintendent of the RAE Blind Landing Experimental Unit, Head of the Weapons 
Department, RAE and Chief Scientist to the RAF. CHE Warren recalls being allocated to the 
RAE on completion of his mathematics study at Cambridge with the winning proposition that 
"in the last war you'd have been sent to the trenches but we've been thrown out of France now. 
Have you heard of a place called Farnborough? ". (n. 2 above). 
182 
research tended to arise. 9 Within this group there was a strong team spirit, 
perhaps engendered by the largely secret nature of the establishment's work and 
the consequent lack of opportunity to publish work competitively. 10 In this 
atmosphere scientists within the group were, to very high degree, self-directing 
and, in the Cold War climate there was a good chance that many of the ideas 
and suggestions emanating from this group could be tested in wind tunnel work 
and with research aircraft. Thus aerodynamicists have recalled being "in the 
fortunate position of never having to think about money for the things we were 
doing" and that "we never thought about cost - we never asked". It must 
certainly have been an almost idyllic time for aeronautical scientists with high 
theoretical capabilities and self-motivation. The perception of some of those who 
worked at the RAE in this period was that "it was absolutely marvellous" and 
that "we thought of the topics ourselves and found the answers; we had the 
perfect jobs". The RAE was also a highly integrated community in which the 
various groups knew what lines each was working on and collaborated. "We 
really were a team here. People had ideas, but passed them into the team; 
everyone was very co-operative". " 
The Aerodynamics Department also contained an inner circle of perhaps six 
people, the Projects Division, (also referred to as Aero Projects) which played a 
leading part in devising proposals and considering what new types of aircraft 
could result from the latest aerodynamic research. Tom Sommerville, who was 
head of the group for a period, considered that the job was "to look one step 
9 
Brian Kervell, former member of Structures Department, RAE, personal communication, 3 
February 1997. 
10 
An ingenious mechanism did exist for peer review of secret work through the Aeronautical 
Research Council which had a fluid dynamics committee composed of security cleared 
aerodynamicists from the universities and other establishments at which, CHE Warren 
considered, the ARC would put forward ideas and comments on the work at RAE "but in a 
generous way" (n. 2 above). 
11 
Johanna Weber and CHE Warren, interview with the author, 1 June 1998. 
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ahead", because "aerodynamics always played a leading part" in advanced 
projects and that "we were able to integrate the thinking of all the [other] 
departments". " Within the Aero Department internal contact was ensured by bi- 
monthly meetings where the theoreticians and perhaps flight test practitioners 
would stimulate each other with problems, queries and proposals, often in the 
absence of any top-down directive or requirement. On these days the internal 
morning discussion was followed by an afternoon meeting with senior 
government and RAF personnel and, for example, the Vice Chief of Air Staff 
(VCAS) of the RAF would come to survey both the progress of practical short 
term experimental work on service types but also to meet the Director and 
senior staff and to learn what advanced ideas were in the air. 
In this period the Air Staff targets for future aircraft were frequently "not in 
black and white" and were evolved and modified in discussion with Aero 
Projects or with specially formed multi-disciplinary teams such as the 
"Advanced Bomber Project Group". In addition, the Director of the RAE 
always took a close interest in the work of these groups and was able to 
represent it at higher policy levels both informally and through bodies such as 
the Air Warfare Committee at the Air Ministry. Senior RAE people also 
maintained a range of contacts in the services and in government, with a number 
of them, including Morien Morgan, Handel Davies, Sir James Lighthill and Sir 
John Charnley moving from the RAE into wider government roles. 13 
In the context of so much open-ended and self-directed research it is often hard 
to disentangle where aircraft developments actually originated and it is important 
12 
Tom Sommerville, interview with the author, 16 October 1997. The group also acted as arbiters 
when several competing designs were produced by the industry. 
13 
For an understanding of British defence policy it seems important to give attention to role of 
informal and social contacts between the protagonists. I have attempted to show how essential 
these contacts were in a slightly earlier period to the establishment of the WW II radar chain 
and the concurrent development of high power interceptor engines in 'Two-stroke or Turbine: 
the Aeronautical Research Committee and British Aero Engine Developments in World War II', 
Technology and Culture, April 1997, pp 312-354. 
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to see Farnborough as part of a wider aeronautical community involving the 
RAF, the Air Staff, and civil servants in which ideas and possibilities could 
circulate and resonate. In this milieu aircraft requirements and projects 
developed in a "social" and even an informal way so that "Operational 
Requirements" (ORs) which were issued to the industry to invite design 
submissions for future aircraft had been refined by an interchange, which helped 
to define what might be attainable, between RAE experts, Ministry of Supply 
officials and RAF officers. 
Of course the Air Staff could originate operational requirements for aircraft on 
the basis of strategic and combat needs in advance of the firms' ability to meet 
them and even in advance of the power of the RAE to predict whether the 
performance was attainable. This was certainly the case with the "medium 
bomber" requirement which was to result in the V-force, issued in 1946. 
However, in other cases, such as that of the supersonic fighter and also, later, 
with Concorde it seems clear that the impulse to initiate the projects came from 
Farnborough. 
It is also noteworthy that RAE staff in this period recall considerable contact 
with RAF personnel at a practical and an experimental level, with, on occasion, 
uniformed RAF officers going into the wind tunnels to collaborate on 
programmes. There was also a very high degree of collaboration with the firms 
at all levels, from the Director and Deputy Director at the RAE to the research 
scientists on the particular projects who all liaised in a personal way with the 
appropriate contacts in the aircraft firms. Through this, the research flying and 
wind tunnel programmes at the RAE were completely integrated into the 
development programmes for the forthcoming service aircraft. Indeed, this had 
to be so for, as the case studies here will show, the companies in this period 
were simply not equipped to do the fundamental research to support the 
advanced programmes. 
This disparity between the capability of the RAE in advanced areas and that of 
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the industry led, in 1947, to a proposal from the Ministry of Supply (MoS) that 
the RAE might be made responsible for the direct design and manufacture of 
military aircraft "with the object of producing better types" and "for the benefits 
of research to be passed on to operational aircraft as early as possible". 14 The 
main objective (which is significant in the light of the discussion below on the 
supersonic fighter and the atomic threat) appears to have been to obtain an 
advanced interceptor. The RAE discussed the idea internally and though 
reflecting on "the problems of getting the firms to do advanced work" - 
particularly the problem of aero-elastic distortion on highly swept-back wings - 
cautioned strongly against the proposal. Its view was that the existing co- 
operation between RAE specialists and the firms' designers had only been 
achieved "after years of striving to gain the industry's confidence". If the RAE 
were to become a competitor the effective partnership with the firms would be 
dissolved and "the whole structure of the aircraft industry would then lose its 
main scientific support -a disaster for which a single national factory, however 
efficient, would be poor recompense". " 
In pursuit of its aim to nurture the capability of the industry, the RAE mounted 
numerous conferences and meetings in this period to pass on to the implications 
of its long-range research to the designers and the aerodynamicists from the 
aircraft firms. These would take the form of presentations, followed by 
discussion, from a range of RAE personnel including aerodynamicists, control 
and stability experts, structural and 'flutter' analysts and so on, to acquaint the 
firms of "what it would be like to design a supersonic aeroplane". Flutter was a 
particular province of the RAE, since the mathematics of the interaction 
14 
PRO AVIA 13/666, 'Proposals for the RAE to take direct responsibility for the design and 
production of aircraft', March 1947. This idea recalls the role of Farnborough in the First 
World War, when as the Royal Aircraft Factory, it had a contentious, and eventually untenable, 
role as both a government manufacturer and as a design and research authority. 
is 
Ibid. These opinions were expressed by Morten Morgan, then Head of Aero Flight and PB 
Walker, Head of Structures, who became well known for his investigation of the Comet 
crashes. 
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between aerodynamic flow and the elastic or vibratory movements of the aircraft 
structure is particularly demanding. It was an area in which, during the 1950s, 
the firms appeared unable to cope, often leaving the final validation of a design, 
or the cure of a fault, to the RAE. Moreover, the theoretical solutions that came 
to be adopted by the industry for such analysis was established at Farnborough. 
The theoretical excellence of the RAE at this time was accompanied by a 
laconic, almost self-deprecating style and one mathematician, describing his 
presentation on the expected solutions for supersonic wing design to the 
industrial audience, recalled mildly that "I'd just done some sums really ... and 
drawn some graphs". " 
RAE Contributions to the post-war British Aircraft Programme 
The intention in this chapter is to study the exceptional degree of integration and 
exchange between government science and the aircraft firms in the period under 
review. This intimate relationship reflected, initially, the political philosophy of 
the post-war Labour government, although it continued substantially in the same 
path when the Conservative administration was returned to power under 
Churchill in 1951. The association certainly reflected the pattern of collaboration 
established by weapons development during the Second World War, but was 
also a response to the very high scientific and technical demands of the new 
post-war aircraft and systems which were evolving rapidly and competitively at 
a time of enormous changes in performance and capability. However, the role 
that RAE performed was not identical in each case, in some instances acting as 
initiator and champion for an idea, and at others acting more conventionally to 
provide the research underpinnings for a Service requirement. A study of some 
of the major projects which relied on substantial RAE involvement in this period 
16 
CHE Warren, (n. 2 above). The major theoretical insights on flutter analysis at Farnborough 
were ascribed to EG (Ted) Broadbent, subsequently Visiting Professor in Mathematics at 
Imperial College. 
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gives an insight into the influence of the establishment and the way it affected 
British aviation in this period. 
The P. 1 Lightning Supersonic Fighter 
In 1945 a study of the 'interception problem', prepared by Don Hallowes, an 
Aero Department mathematician, analyzed a new type of threat - the high 
altitude high-speed bomber made possible by the new and rapidly developing jet 
engine. Hallowes assessed the chances of intercepting hostile incoming bombers 
at a range of speeds from 300 mph up to 500 mph and various heights up to 
50,000 feet. He hypothesised as the defence "a good conventional jet-propelled 
fighter such as might be flying in a few years' time" powered by the Rolls- 
Royce Nene which was then, at 5000 lbs thrust, the most powerful jet engine in 
the world, providing a top speed of 595 mph. Hallowes treated the problem as a 
series of exercises in three-dimensional geometry calculating the results of a 
large range of different defence conditions, such as radar range and fighter 
readiness, and their interaction with bombers at varying speeds and heights. 
From this he arrived at what he called "a pseudo-statistical approach" to answer 
the question "how fast and high must a bomber fly to avoid interception? " and 
reached the important conclusion that "in a large number of cases (70 to 90%) a 
bomber flying at 500 m. p. h. at 50,000 ft. would be free from the possibility of 
interception" ." 
This study is interesting because the performance parameters of such a bomber 
mirror almost exactly those selected by the Air Staff in the following year for 
the high altitude high speed "medium bomber" force called for in its Operational 
17 
DM Hallowes, 'An Examination of the Interception Problem', RAE Report No. Aero 2035, 
April 1945. As well as enemy height and speed the analysis studied the interaction between a 
range of possible values for radar detection range, the distance between defending airfields, and 
the 'lost time' - the period elapsing between the first detection of the bomber and fighter take- 
off. 
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Requirement (OR) 229 issued in November 1946 that led to the Vulcan, Victor 
and Valiant W -force' aircraft. " However, the RAE, as we have seen, nurtured 
a culture in which the various groups knew what lines the others were working 
on and where ideas were shared. The RAE was essential to the development of 
the nuclear V-force bombers but, as Sir John Charnley recalled, "at the same 
time that you'd be thinking about that, you'd be thinking about how to beat it". 19 
To combat the high altitude, high subsonic speed bomber and make interception 
possible it was essential to restore the speed advantage of the fighter over the 
bomber, but this would require "a step into the unknown" - the design and 
production of a supersonic fighter. 
Speeds approaching that of sound had been encountered in dives by late Second 
World War combat aircraft, often with disconcerting loss of control, buffeting 
and even structural failure. To analyze these problems, which came to be known 
as 'compressibility effects', the RAE pioneered high Mach number trials in 
Britain during the war by diving a Spitfire at increasing speeds up to Mach 0.9 
while simultaneously conducting wind tunnel model experiments in parallel with 
these flights to help predict the control effects that would be encountered and to 
analyse the pilots' experiences. 20 
Bullets and artillery shells could be supersonic and stable in flight and the 
mathematics of fully supersonic flight was fairly simple and reasonably well 
18 
Tracing the influence of work such as this is always difficult. However the circulation of the 
paper is recorded and included a large part of the scientific direction in the Ministry of Supply 
including the Controller of Research and Development (CRD) and the Director of Scientific 
Research (DSR). The operational research sections at the Air Ministry and in Fighter Command 
are also included. On the basis of the performance targets for the V-bomber force and the 
British supersonic interceptor it appears that Hallowes' study was highly influential. 
19 
Sir John Charnley, (n. 8 above). 
20 
WA Mair (ed. ) 'Research on High Speed Aerodynamics at the Royal Aircraft Establishment 
from 1942 to 1945', R&M No 2222, ARC Monograph, 1946. 
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known. The greatest uncertainty was in the trans-sonic region where the aircraft 
had not quite reached the speed of sound (a Mach number of one), but where 
the local flow over convex shapes on the aircraft accelerated the flow to become 
supersonic in parts. This mixed flow was extremely complex aerodynamically 
and mathematically, and while some aircraft, such as the Spitfire, had 
approached the speed of sound with reasonably progressive control changes 
which a prepared pilot could cope with, other types had shown severe problems. 
No body of theory existed to explain this. 
In the latter stages of the war some thought had been given to developing an 
experimental supersonic aircraft - the Miles M52, using a development of the 
Whittle W2/700 engine. This programme was cancelled, partly through doubts 
about the ability of the small Miles company to sustain an advanced programme, 
but mainly on advice from the RAE that the M52 wing was not thin enough to 
allow supersonic flight. Furthermore, the Allied discovery of the extensive work 
in Germany on swept wings in the trans-sonic regime suggested that the straight 
wing approach adopted for the M52 was mistaken. 21 In 1948, Hans Multhopp, 
one of the German aerodynamicists who came to Farnborough (formerly an 
aerodynamicist with Kurt Tank in the Focke-Wulf design office), proposed with 
M Winter, another German colleague, an experimental swept wing trans-sonic 
research aircraft. They calculated that the new Rolls-Royce Avon engine was 
just sufficient to give the aircraft a supersonic performance of Mach 1.24 at 
36,000 feet "if equipment and instrumentation are restricted to only the most 
essential items". The other restriction was to keep the diameter of fuselage to 
the absolute minimum dictated by the Avon engine and to this end the pilot was 
to be located in a prone position in a compartment located, in effect, within the 
21 
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inlet duct. The wing was to be swept back at an angle of 55 degrees to delay 
compressibility effects while the tailplane ("a scheme which was developed 
some years ago for the Focke Wulf 183 fighter") was to be mounted high on the 
fin to keep it clear of the wing wake and to avoid the loss or alteration of pitch 
control which had been encountered in transonic flight. " 
This aircraft, which the authors suggested could be regarded as "an 
experimental reduced scale model ... of an aircraft having possible practical 
applications" (i. e. a fighter) was not built but later, in 1948, another RAE paper 
by Owen, Nonweiler and Warren proposed a larger supersonic fighter which 
derived from it. ' In general layout and wing plan form the proposed fighter 
followed closely the Winter/Multhopp design, including a version with a prone 
pilot position, although an alternative layout was sketched with a conventional 
pilot position above the intake and a radar scanner dish faired into the centre of 
the intake duct. However the Winter/Multhopp aircraft was only supersonic by 
dint of scrupulous streamlining and avoidance of all unnecessary structure. A 
practical fighter would need much more power to attain this performance and 
the new feature of this June 1948 proposal was the use of multiple engines 
staggered so that the thickest part of one lay over the thinner part of the other - 
the so-called 'hip and waist' arrangement. The earlier conclusions of Hallowes 
are implicit in the paper which noted that the success of bomber interception 
depended largely on the margin of speed of the fighter over the bomber and 
that, as bomber speeds increased, this margin was becoming progressively 
harder to maintain. The authors noted that instability in the transonic regime 
was expected from work up to date, including disturbance in pitch and a severe 
loss, or even reversal, of aileron effectiveness (control in roll). However, these 
22 
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problems, which might be tolerated in a research aircraft and mitigated by 
accelerating rapidly through the 'sound barrier' (not the RAE term), had to be 
solved for a practical fighter to give progressive control at all speeds. 
By November 1948 the Advanced Fighter Project Group, which had been set up 
at the RAE, reported on work to date stressing the difficulty in predicting the 
nature of the threat (in terms of speed and altitude) for which "the fighter which 
must stop the bomber" should be designed. The task, they proposed 
was that of defending "this island against the attacks of enemy bombers similar 
to the long-range high altitude bombers we ourselves are developing" - aircraft 
capable of delivering bombs at 500 knots and from 50,000 feet. ' Although the 
study noted that this was a "restrictive and possible unrealistic assumption" these 
were also the performance characteristics of the hypothetical intruder aircraft for 
the earlier RAE interception analysis. 
The group considered that, although the state of knowledge on aerodynamics, 
stability and control was still developing, the main uncertainty centred around 
the structure. The operational supersonic fighter was required to be a large and 
complex aircraft weighing perhaps 30,000 lbs (at a time when the relatively 
simple 'first generation' jet fighters such as the De Havilland Vampire and 
Supermarine Swift weighed only 8000 to 10,000 lbs). The gamble of estimating 
strength and weights closely in the absence of "real guiding experience" or 
established design principles is shown by the structural challenge of providing 
enough stiffness to wings and tail surfaces to prevent flutter and aileron control 
reversal. u The catch here was that the forces would be higher than those met 
24 
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hitherto although the surfaces were required to be much thinner and, for 
geometric reasons, the high degree of sweepback also would tend to compound 
the problems of twist and aero-elastic distortion. However, the price of a 
slightly 'safer' and more conservative design, increasing the structure weight by 
a factor of only 3% would reduce flight endurance from 55 minutes to 29 
minutes - scarcely a useful fighter. 26 
The RAE admitted that the new fighter would be "unlike anything designed or 
built in this country before" and that there would be many entirely new design 
problems to solve, but it argued that "the requisite information, experience and 
design skill can only come from a direct attack on the problem". Indeed, in the 
light of these technical reservations the RAE took a bold and even propagandist 
role in weapons development policy, arguing that "a fully operational supersonic 
fighter would be an immeasurably valuable asset to the defences of this country" 
and actively promoting work on it in spite of the many uncertainties. It noted: 
The unknown factors are many and frightening but the prize may be 
immense. ... If we had unlimited time ... the obvious way to achieve this 
prize would be to tackle the problem slowly. ... It would, however, be a lengthy process. In view of this we would like to suggest, in all 
seriousness, that we take a short cut by proceeding forthwith with the 
design of a fully operational supersonic fighter on the lines sketched 
[out]. ... This would admittedly be an appalling gamble. 
' 
The RAE suggested that "a first class design team from the Industry" be asked 
to proceed with the design of an operational supersonic fighter. In August 1948 
the Ministry of Supply (MoS) issued Operational Requirement (OR) F. 23/49 
26 
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based on this RAE thinking which asked for "a minimum top speed of Mach = 
1.2 or higher" and a fantastic climb performance allowing six minutes from the 
moment the pilot presses "the first button" to reaching 50,000 feet. The MoS 
then began to pursue discussions with English Electric as the most likely 
company to build the aircraft and, by March 1949, confirmed to the company 
that it was to develop the concept as the English Electric P. 1 - the prototype that 
was to lead to the Lightning fighter. 28 Thus the project, it should be noted, was 
set in train at virtually the same time as the trans-sonic Hawker Hunter (and 
long before the Hunter flew), with the intention of leap-frogging a generation of 
fighters. 
It is important in studies of Cold War work to bear in mind that nuclear 
strategic thinking evolved continuously during the period and the P. 1 interceptor 
programme must be understood in the context of its times. At the outset of the 
programme the atomic bomb constituted a new and terrifying weapon but, in the 
minds of defence planners, there was still some hope for defence. It appeared 
that technical constraints meant that the actual rate of production of bombs was 
quite low and the relative scarcity of atomic weapons suggested that an attack 
could be defeated by a really exceptional technological effort. 29 A glimpse of 
this thinking can be gathered from a paper on 'The Air Defence Problem' given 
to aircraft industry designers and RAE representatives in December 1953 which 
hypothesised what soon came to be seen as an unrealistically limited and 
strategic attack on Britain, suggesting that "the elimination of the United 
28 
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Kingdom capital, ports and bomber bases would be a strong factor towards the 
success of Russian aims in Europe in the next war". " The initial development of 
the Lightning therefore took place in the context of a range of suggestions for 
fast-climbing manned rocket or hybrid rocket and gas turbine-powered fighters. 
Sir Charles Gardner (as Director of Guided Weapons Development, DGWD) 
also gave a glimpse of a certain optimism for defence when he noted that "the 
Million-fold increase in striking power of a single aircraft has transformed the 
defence problem from one in which an attrition of 5 or 10 percent could be 
worthwhile ... to one 
in which it is necessary to achieve an annihilation defence 
in which virtually every aircraft must be destroyed". 31 
One of the challenges for this study is to elucidate the contribution of 
government scientists at the establishments to the aircraft and equipment that 
was actually supplied. This has traditionally been hard because of the 
mythologising tendency in British historical accounts which conventionally 
emphasise individual contributions and efforts. This has been seen, for example, 
in the story of the Whittle jet, where the contribution of government scientists 
from the Engine Department of the RAE has been 
largely ignored. 
Furthermore, it has been noted that much aviation history has been written by 
enthusiasts with a particular regard for the firms. Thus, in the case of the 
English Electric P. 1 Lightning, Bill Gunston, one of the best-known British 
aviation historians, opined that the English Electric designer Teddy Petter and 
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his team "needed all their skill to create a supersonic aircraft which ... could 
form the basis for an operational fighter, in an environment devoid of practically 
any supersonic experience and with the most meagre facilities". Their success, 
he suggests, "was to some extent despite the advice of officials who caused 
endless trouble trying to make English Electric adopt a T-tail". 32 These 
'officials' were actually the most talented and experienced aerodynamicists in 
the country, feeling their way, like those in the companies, into the new trans- 
sonic and supersonic regimes and it is clear that, rather than keeping them at 
arms' length, the companies were most eager to have RAE advice on their 
designs. Of course both government and company scientists made both good 
choices and bad. The initial English Electric 1948 project drawings mirrored 
closely the planform of the RAE study, including the ingenious 'hip and waist' 
engine arrangement (fig ?- line drawing). This became a distinctive and 
successful feature of the production aircraft although in the case of the T-tail 
English Electric became convinced that RAE advice was wrong. In this they 
proved to be correct and the low tail position eventually adopted proved far 
more effective in the nose high landing attitude. 
This study demonstrates that the aerodynamic and structural facilities open to the 
industry were far from meagre; they were, in fact, enormous, and although 
largely concentrated at the Farnborough and Bedford sites of the RAE, any 
account of this period must stress the tremendous integration between the 
companies and the government establishments. Mike Dobson (subsequently 
Superintendent of RAE Bedford), who joined in 1954 as an aerodynamicist and 
worked initially on the P. 1A, recalled a colleague who worked "for months and 
months in the 'three foot' wind tunnel. It was a long time before I realised that 
he was English Electric and not RAE. The attitude was ... RAE was part of UK 
32 
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Limited". 33 In this period there was a huge amount of work in the RAE tunnels 
on stability and control for the supersonic fighter and also on the aerodynamics 
of the engine intake. There was also deep involvement of the RAE in the flight 
test program and the Short S. B. 5, built as a smaller model of the P. 1 to 
evaluate its low speed handling, was flown extensively from 1954 to 1960 by 
Aero Flight, at RAE Bedford, in the service of the development of the 
interceptor. 
The RAE also served as the point at which the contributions of the other 
government research establishments, and RAF fighter development experience, 
were integrated into the aircraft. This included, for example, tactical ideas as 
well as radar and infra-red research. The effect of these important elements of 
the interceptor can be seen in the arguments which began to surface from about 
1953 for a collision course interception, rather than the usual turn by the fighter 
onto the tail of the bomber, as a way of getting the interception point back from 
the coast of Britain -1 
Thus at the Sixth Fighter Tactical Convention in 1952, described as "a family 
gathering of the Fighter World, for the free exchange of views on current and 
future problems of common interest" the view was advanced that "from the 
Communist point of view Korea can be classed as a second Spain ... a testing 
and proving ground for their equipment and crews against Western powers", 
and it was suggested that, in a wider conflict, the "immediate threat was ... of 
atomic attack on the UK by bombers at the beginning of a war".. " This marked 
33 
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an early interest in collision course attack and, a little later, Dr FE Jones of the 
R, ýE noted explicitly that "if the over-riding requirement was for interception at 
the earliest possible moment, and certainly before the coast, we may be forced 
to collision course intercept using guided weapons". 36 
This represented a change in the way in which the supersonic fighter would be 
used, but the RAE studies in terminal dynamics showed that the advantage of 
collision course interception was strikingly great. The need to destroy a bomber 
carrying an atomic weapon as far out from the coast is clear, but there were 
also aerodynamic and operational considerations. Firstly, the timing and 
positioning of the approaching fighter for the turn onto the tail of the bomber 
for a pursuit course attack was extremely critical. Furthermore, making this turn 
at a high rate caused the drag to build up and the fighter speed to decay. It was 
also a manoeuvre which, at supersonic speed, used a very large proportion of 
the fighter's fuel load and limited the number of targets which could be 
engaged. 
The requirements of fighter interception also acted as a driver for all the 
establishments contributing to airborne interception (AI) radar as well as to 
guided missile development and the electronic guidance components for them. 
The Lightning, when it entered service in 1960, certainly vindicated the early 
RAE advocacy of the supersonic interceptor but although, like so many British 
aircraft, it arrived awfully late, the performance substantially exceeded the 
initial RAE predictions. It was, however, an aircraft that was predicated on the 
special air defence and quick reaction needs of Britain. In this role it was 
probably the most potent interceptor at the time in the world, but this specificity 
of role denied it really substantial export sales, although forty were sold to 
Saudi Arabia and a further fourteen to Kuwait. 
36 
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The performance of the Lightning perhaps also says something about the 
complexion of British technology in this period. Lightning pilots recall a real 
thoroughbred with astonishing rate of climb (two and a half minutes to reach 
40,000 feet), a speed, in later versions, of more than Mach 2, and flying 
qualities that were "beautiful" and "perfect". However, the promised integration 
of the computation aids and electronics - the aircraft radar, navigation system 
and attack sight - never reached the level of contemporary American semi- 
automatic systems. Interception was, a pilot recalled, "ä real one-armed paper- 
hanging operation" imposing an extremely high work-load. 37 This deficiency was 
spotted early on by the RAE and it is noteworthy that, during the programme, 
the instrument experts at Farnborough reflected that the electronics industry was 
overloaded and that "the effects of lagging equipment development are becoming 
very apparent in current fighter development". 38 In terms of maintenance too the 
aircraft reflected, throughout its operational life, the initial RAE view of it as an 
experimental aircraft which could be converted to an "operational prototype", if 
flight development was a success, and it demanded a huge and continuous effort 
on the part of the RAF engineering ground services. 
In strategic terms the fairly simple scenario for the overall air defence of Great 
Britain which had spawned the supersonic fighter also changed. The planning 
for the interception of a rather limited atomic attack proved unrealistic in the 
thermonuclear age and it became tacitly accepted that the UK would not be able 
to build and man enough supersonic fighters to defend the country against the 
likely scale of a Soviet bomber attack. In the light of this perception Duncan 
Sandys' 1957 Defence White Paper, surprisingly, served to preserve the 
Lightning programme for though Sandys is mainly remembered for prematurely 
anticipating the age of the missile and the end of manned military flying this 
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view overlooks the main objective behind his strategic thinking. Sandys, with a 
rather remorseless pragmatism, held the position that Britain could not withstand 
a nuclear attack and that both conventional and nuclear war-fighting strategies 
were unrealistic. The overwhelming need therefore was to secure the credibility 
of the British deterrent and he saw that this would necessitate the move away 
from the manned nuclear V-force to intercontinental missiles. " In-the interim, 
while the V-force continued to pose a viable threat, the Lightning force that was 
coming into service was to be devoted largely to bolstering this credibility and 
to "the defence of the deterrent" against a Soviet counter-force strike against V- 
bombers at their bases. 40 
The Lightning was certainly the most complex and potent fighter ever built by 
Britain alone and, from the perspective of Cold War history, it was a response, 
at the limits of what was technologically achievable, to the nuclear threat faced 
by specifically by Britain, which, for geographical reasons was different, and 
probably much more difficult technically, than either the Soviet or the American 
air defence problems. The programme was extraordinarily ambitious for a 
country the size of Britain and it could be argued that the influence of the RAE 
was to nudge defence policy towards an excessively technological aircraft, 
rather than to the more flexible fighters exemplified by, say, the French Mirage 
series with its great possibilities for extended and incremental development. 
Backing the Lightning to leapfrog a whole generation of fighters perhaps also 
caused Britain to forgo interim supersonic aircraft like the American F-100 
Super Sabre or the F-104 Starfighter and also to forgo sales of fighter aircraft 
which fell to the Americans both in Europe and in Britain's 'natural' markets in 
39 
TCG James, Defence Policy and the Royal Air Force 1956-1963, Ministry of Defence, 1987, 
Air Historical Branch archives. One senior civil servant likened Sandys, in pursuit of these 
policies, to "a programmed tank". 
40 
In fact the 1956 Defence White Paper (Command 969) had initiated the policy that close 
defence of vulnerable areas was outmoded and that the aim was to concentrate on defending the 
V-bomber bases using a guided weapon (the Bloodhound) to break up enemy formations before 
engagement by UK fighters. Discussed in Jack Gough, Watching the Skies, (London 1993), p 
178. 
200 
the Commonwealth. "' 
Nevertheless, in the long term, the Lightning was the learning project which 
really established the English Electric team at Warton as the leading military 
aircraft group in Britain. Indeed, it is clear that the development of 
technological and analytical power in the British aircraft industry, looked for in 
the post-war years by defence planners and civil servants, did in fact occur. 
When CHE Warren returned from the USA in 1960 to head the Flutter, 
Vibration and Noise unit in the Structures Department at the RAE he found the 
firms much more capable. "In the old days the RAE had done the sums which 
worked out whether the aircraft would flutter - now the firms were doing the 
work and we were just monitoring it". 42 
The technical expertise of the group has been maintained during the mergers 
which established the British Aircraft Corporation and then British Aerospace 
and through the collaborative Jaguar, Tornado, and Eurofighter projects. Today, 
as the Military Aircraft and Structures Division of British Aerospace, the group 
which grew out of English Electric has become established as one of the largest 
and most capable military aircraft organisations in Europe. 
The V-force Bombers 
Advice from the RAE was also crucial in the development of the British post- 
war bomber V-bomber force, which formed the initial delivery system for 
41 
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British nuclear weapons and which remained in service until 1970. However, its 
role in this programme was rather different to that in the case of the supersonic 
fighter discussed above. With the fighter, the RAE took a proactive and 
propagandist role and could even be said to have originated the concept, 
whereas the requirement for a long-range, high-speed bomber derived from 
strategic thinking within the Royal Air Force. 
The experience of the Second World War had shown that massed formations of 
bombers, even with substantial capability for defensive fire, were highly 
vulnerable to fighter attack. By contrast, the survivability of unarmed, high- 
speed high altitude aircraft, such as photo-reconnaissance Spitfires and the 
unarmed Mosquito bombers had proved good. This practical experience 
complemented the mathematical analysis of interception at RAE, discussed 
above, and the provisional 1946 'medium bomber' Operational Requirement, as 
we have seen, asked for an aircraft with speeds in excess of 500 mph at 50,000 
feet. It asked, moreover, for a radius of action of 2000 nautical miles, clearly 
indicating that a threat to Moscow and important cities in the Soviet Union was 
in mind. 
The major factor driving the creation of a new type of aircraft at the limits of 
aeronautical science was knowledge of the atomic bomb and it is interesting to 
note that the Air Staff "jumped the gun" by issuing a specification for aircraft 
capable of delivering the bomb before the British government had not made a 
commitment to the production of atomic weapons. However, the GEN 75 
committee of Ministers, convened to consider atomic matters, had already 
received unequivocal advice that "the United Kingdom should undertake the 
production of atomic bombs as soon as possible" while the Chiefs of Staff 
(Lords Alanbrooke, Cunningham and Portal) minuted the Prime Minister 
directly on 1 January 1946 that "we are convinced that the best method of 
defence against the atomic bomb is likely to be the deterrent effect" and that 
202 
"we must have a considerable number of bombs at our disposal". 43 
The Attlee government formally decided to proceed with the development of the 
atomic bomb in late July 1946. Thereafter the principle of deterrence for the 
United Kingdom by atomic bomb-carrying high-speed high altitude aircraft was 
firmly established by Lord Tedder, who followed Lord Portal as Chief of Air 
Staff in 1946 and was continued by his successor, Sir John Slessor (1950-1954). 
The initial aircraft requirement, though making no reference to an atomic 
weapon, was clearly drafted with one in mind for it called for an aircraft 
capable of carrying a single 10,000 lb bomb, some sixty inches in diameter and 
twenty four feet long. ' These dimensions were effectively those of the Los 
Alamos plutonium (Nagasaki) weapon, with a ballistic casing, that William 
Penney's team was to replicate in Britain. " 
The process of procuring these high-performance aircraft was inevitably 
complex. A. V. Roe (Avro) and Handley Page, having built large numbers of 
heavy bombers during the war, were clearly front-runners, Shorts (which, as 
noted, had been nationalised during the war) and Vickers all became involved in 
production. Handley Page, in fact, anticipated the RAF need for a high speed jet 
bomber and had started an ambitious project with slender swept wings almost a 
year earlier, partly using German design experience which had been acquired by 
Handley Page designer Godfrey Lee during his membership of an Allied 
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technical intelligence mission to Germany. 
The Avro team also understood that sweepback was needed for the high trans- 
sonic speeds required but did not consider it was possible to provide adequate 
strength for a wing of the span required without excessive structural weight. 
The Avro solution was to maintain the sweepback and reduce the span, but to 
restore the wing area by filling in the space between the swept-back wing and 
the fuselage, thus independently devising the delta wing. In this period, 
incidentally, the aerodynamic orientation of Avro was strengthened by the 
arrival of WS Farren who resigned his post as Director of the RAE to become 
chief designer at Avro. 
Both these proposals Handley Page and Avro proposals were highly ambitious, 
unlike any preceding aircraft, and carried major risks. The RAE, functioning as 
independent design advisers for the Air Staff formed the 'Advanced Bomber 
Project Group' from the Aero and Structures Departments and noted that the 
very long range required and "operation at a Mach number of 0.87 and at a 
height of 50,000 ft means that designers are being asked to go right outside the 
realm of past experience into a region bristling with aerodynamic and structural 
unknowns". The group reflected that the drag coefficient of an aerofoil did not 
vary appreciably until a critical Mach number was reached (and thereafter rose 
steeply), but considered that experimental information on whether this critical 
Mach number could be deferred to a value of at least 0.87 was "as yet scanty 
and conflicting". Unless this could be achieved the requirement for range could 
not be met and the group noted that "present knowledge is ... grossly 
inadequate 
for the safe design of an advanced bomber". " 
The RAE suggested that "we cannot put all our eggs in one basket" and advised 
pursuing several designs in order to spread the risk. Out of the large number of 
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notional designs for tailed and tail-less bombers of varying sweepback 
considered, it suggested work on a tail-less delta and a tailed aircraft of about 
45 degrees sweep. These were theoretical or 'paper' aircraft but they 
corresponded broadly to the Avro Vulcan and Handley Page Victor proposals. 
The RAE also proposed an intermediate design with less sweepback which 
presumably gave comfort to the Air Staff who were clearly nervous about the 
progress of procurement and, in fact, had sponsored the order from the MoS of 
a more conventional intermediate or 'insurance' type - the Short Sperrin, in case 
the firms were not able to solve the aerodynamic problems of the advanced 
types. However, the Air Staff considered this aircraft to be "unimaginative" and 
took a gloomy view of its likely performance "from our knowledge of the work 
of the firm". 
This hiatus was exploited by George Edwards, chief designer of Vickers, who 
lobbied officials to assert that a bomber that almost approached the original 
performance requirements could be built to a faster time-scale and the Vickers 
proposal (subsequently named the Valiant) ousted the lacklustre Sperrin as the 
insurance aircraft. The relaxed specification called for a speed of 465 knots at 
45,000 feet but, even so, the production of this aircraft was an industrial 'tour 
de force' and the first example arrived for squadron service in February 1955, 
whereas the Vulcan and Victor, which started almost a year earlier, did not 
reach operational squadrons until May 1957 and April 1958 respectively. Thus 
the development of the V-force operational procedures and the airborne 
dropping trials of inert versions of the first British atomic weapon (Blue 
Danube) took place with Valiants in 1955. The first live drops of British nuclear 
weapons were also performed by a Valiants, with a fission bomb being dropped 
in the 1956 'Buffalo' trial followed by a thermonuclear device in 1957 (the 
'Grapple' trials). These aircraft were subsequently converted to air-to-air 
refuelling tankers as the better types arrived and were finally grounded as their 
fatigue life was approached in 1964. 
The decision to order RAF nuclear bombers in triplicate was one of the most 
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notorious cases of the multiplication of British aviation projects which imposed a 
heavy financial burden on Britain in the Cold War years. It also represented a 
profligate use of British aircraft design skills, squeezing out, among other 
possibilities, better British civil airliners. The puzzle is that for the 'medium 
bomber' programme the RAE had encouraged both insurance aircraft as well as 
alternative designs for the eventual high performance front-line types. However, 
with regard to the supersonic interceptor it was remarkably single-minded, 
(asking for only one basic layout and one manufacturer), although this may have 
been because of a consciousness that it was proposing a large, risky and 
expensive step which was perhaps not so dear to the hearts of the Air Staff as 
the bomber. There was also some small latitude in the intercepter performance; 
it was a 'hot-rod' whose mission was short. By contrast, the bomber, to 
constitute a viable deterrent with a reasonable chance of survival, could not 
compromise on range, speed, or height over the target. 
This habit of multiple procurement was also due in part to Second World War 
experience where it had proved impossible to predict which designs would be 
superior until they reached service (the superiority of the Avro Lancaster over 
the Handley Page Halifax and Short Stirling was often advanced as proof of 
this) creating a doctrine which was held dearly by the RAF. The RAF, 
furthermore, had ended the war with immense prestige and was used to getting 
what it wanted. It was not, of course, the role of the RAE to comment on 
procurement policy, but in the light of genuine uncertainty about the right 
structural and aerodynamic solutions for new aircraft the RAE were perhaps too 
ready to see a large number of alternative aircraft projects materialise as useful 
full-sized experiments. Handel Davies, referring to the trans-sonic fighter and 
bomber programmes suggested that "many of us thought at the time that it 
would be better to do a bit more experimental work on prototypes than to go 
ahead with three of each. ... I think we 
dithered a great deal on the merits of 
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delta or sweepback and shared the blame for the multiplication of projects". 47 
Throughout the development programme of the three V bombers there was 
again a major contribution of RAE aerodynamic work, and this also extended to 
the aerodynamics of the carriage of nuclear weapons and their release. 48 The 
RAE also contributed to the further development of the Vulcans and Victors to 
carry the Blue Steel powered "stand-off" missile and the finding that the 
partially recessed missile "has little effect on the drag coefficient of the aircraft" 
was important to establishing the viability of the development of this next phase 
of the British deterrent. " 
RAE expertise of a different kind was needed in the service of the V-force when 
a Handley Page Victor on trials from Boscombe Down in August 1959 crashed 
unaccountably into the sea off the Pembrokeshire coast. More than 600,000 
pieces of debris were recovered by trawling the sea bed (sixteen trawlers were 
involved) and the investigation was conducted by the Structures Department at 
Farnborough where the fragments were reassembled on a wooden framework. 
The investigation concluded that the loss of a pitot head through vibration had 
given a false indication of low airspeed causing the automatic system which 
protected against stall to push the aircraft nose down into a catastrophic 
supersonic dive. 
47 
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The Comet Investigation 
The Handley Page Victor investigation, conducted under the direction of PB 
Walker, Head of the Structures Department, recalled the earlier notable 
investigation at Farnborough into the unexplained crashes of two de Havilland 
Comet airliners over the Mediterranean in 1954. As the first jet airliner in the 
world to enter service, the Comet losses were seen as entailing a grave loss of 
national prestige. However, the extraordinary efforts made to elucidate the cause 
of the failures should not, however, be seen merely as industrial support for a 
flagship civil aircraft. Defence officials saw the Comet disasters as directly 
affecting international perceptions of the technical quality of British aircraft 
generally and thus also impacting on defence and deterrence. Writing in April 
1954 Air Chief Marshall Sir John Baker, (as Controller of Aircraft, MoS) 
registered "the most urgent need ... to resolve and rectify the technical cause of 
the accidents ... [in the] 
interests of the integrity of the aircraft industry from 
both the national and strategic viewpoints". " 
Therefore the unusual step was taken of asking the RAE to take charge of the 
investigation, (rather than the Accidents Investigation Branch of the Ministry of 
Civil Aviation, which had formal responsibility for enquiries of this type) This 
underlined the unitary nature, at the time, of both the British military and civil 
aviation programmes and also suggests how advanced, and perhaps even 
premature, the Comet was in terms of the deployment of the jet engine to a 
British airliner. However, the episode also points up the unique strength of the 
RAE, for only Farnborough, at the time, had the resources and expertise to 
construct a rig to repeatedly pressurise an entire Comet fuselage to simulate the 
cycle of take-off, climb and descent, while hydraulic jacks replicated the flight 
loads on the wings. After some 3000 "flights" a fatigue crack, originating at the 
corner of a window pushed out a section of the fuselage. This pattern of failure 
50 
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was confirmed by debris from the second crashed aircraft (BOAC Comet G- 
ALYP) then being recovered from sea bed off Elba. 
The result of this investigation was the grounding of the Comet fleet pending 
structural modifications to the aircraft and to those of the next series, the Comet 
2. Many of these were subsequently taken into RAF Transport Command, 
largely to protect de Havillands from financial failure under "a unique 
arrangement to which Treasury have agreed as a special measure". " 
The Mach 2 Fighter 
The supersonic interceptor and the V-bomber force represent two models for the 
way in which the RAE contributed to operational aircraft. However, this 
reasonably smooth progression from a project study, whether initiated by the 
firms or by the RAE, did not always occur. For example, following the 
initiation of the supersonic interceptor as a counter to bombers with high 
subsonic speed, the RAE then looked ahead to the possibility of the Soviet 
Union developing bombers with low supersonic performance (Mach 1.3), and 
proposed, as a countermeasure, a new design of fighter based on an RAE 
project for an aircraft capable of Mach 2.52 
The RAE conducted an analysis of the utility of such a defensive fighter 
together with the Radar Research Establishment (RRE). 53 Their report suggested 
that the weapon was worth developing, in conjunction with more advanced 
51 
PRO AVIA 65/59, 'Comet Aircraft Production Policy', memorandum of 16 March 1955. 
52 
CHE Warren, J Poole and DC Appleyard, 'An Investigation into an Aircraft to fly at a Mach 
Number of 2', RAE Report No. Aero 2462, June 1952. 
53 
'Defence against High Altitude Bombers by Mach 2 Fighters -a Joint R. A. E. /R. R. E. Study', 
RAE Reports Aero 2513 and 2513A, June 1954. 
209 
airborne radar systems, and that such an aircraft "can achieve a kill line 30 
miles out to sea" against a Mach 1.3 target. The system, it noted, could also 
cope with a Mach 2 target but "the kill line would shrink in very close to our 
coast line". ' 
However, the main argument for a Mach 2 fighter - that the Soviet Union might 
supplement their high subsonic speed bombers with some Mach 1.3 aircraft 
seemed rather implausible, even to its proponents, since it began to appear that 
designing a long-range Mach 1.3 bomber was no easier than designing a Mach 2 
bomber. As the missile age dawned the perceived threat of such high altitude 
supersonic manned bombers receded while the Lightning proved capable of 
development to Mach 2 performance and some elements of the AI and ground 
control electronics permeated into the Lightning programme. The RAE Mach 2 
fighter proposal proved to be a dead end with only two prototypes of the Bristol 
188 built to test the wing layout. 
However, the work was influential at least in that the Bristol 188 was built in 
stainless steel to cope with the expected kinetic heating. The expense and 
difficulty of this construction was to play an important part later in the decision 
at RAE to restrict the design speed of Concorde to about Mach 2 (where 
aluminium alloy structure would just suffice) and not to aim for a speed of 
Mach 3 or more, as was being contemplated in the USA. 
The project also throws further light on the role of the RAE both as a kind of 
"advanced projects office" for the industry, and as a "booster" in policy-making 
circles for advanced aviation projects. Thus the same RAE Mach 2 thinking also 
gave rise to a research contract to the Avro company to develop a supersonic 
high altitude reconnaissance and bomber aircraft and the RAE helped to mediate 
between the company and the Ministry of Supply in the development of the new 
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type. 
Indeed, protagonists at the RAE for advanced aircraft like Morien Morgan co- 
operated (one could almost say colluded) with the companies to promote 
advances in aviation technology and when Avro sought government funding for 
the design and construction of a small-scale flight research variant of the 
supersonic bomber Morgan, (as Deputy Director) wrote to Avro that the RAE 
was preparing an appreciation of the Avro design "for official consumption, 
which I hope will help". He wrote also to the Ministry of Supply that "we are 
in full agreement with the reasons the firm give ... and consider that they 
have 
made an excellent case for this development". 55 A supersonic airliner version of 
the Avro bomber was also proposed but made little progress, due to its marginal 
payload, although Morien Morgan's real powers of advocacy were shortly to 
bear fruit with another supersonic airliner proposal - the narrow delta layout that 
led to Concorde. 
Inventing Concorde 
The RAE contribution to V-bomber development corresponded to the 
conventional role of a government research establishment in supporting a 
military programme. However, in initiating and promoting the supersonic 
airliner proposal which led to Concorde, the RAE followed a more inspirational 
and propagandist pattern. In some respects this activity, linking the latest 
theoretical aerodynamics to a possible future aircraft, recalled the role that the 
RAE had adopted for the supersonic fighter when it urged a development that 
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was well in advance of what the aircraft industry, and even perhaps the Air 
Staff, were contemplating. 
In the case of Concorde, RAE influence spread even more widely than this and 
into the political domain, largely through the efforts of Morien Morgan and his 
efforts in the creation of the Supersonic Transport Aircraft Committee. The 
establishment of a sense of the desirability of a supersonic airliner programme in 
British political and industrial consciousness thus illustrates the technocratic 
nature of decision-making in British aviation and the prestige of aeronautical 
scientists at the RAE, where supersonic passenger flight had been considered 
from the mid-1950, initially linked, as we have seen, to the Avro 730 
supersonic bomber project. From 1955, the highly persuasive Morgan "did the 
missionary work to get the companies to take an interest in it" and persuaded all 
the chief designers who were prepared to co-operate to join the Supersonic 
56 Transport Aircraft Committee (STAC) which first met in November 1956. 
As interest in the supersonic airliner began to build, RAE aerodynamics 
research began to suggest a completely different supersonic configuration for the 
aircraft - the narrow delta. The understanding of the narrow delta is associated 
particularly with the RAE aerodynamicist Dietrich Küchemann who, as 
discussed in chapter four, was one of the German scientists offered employment 
in England by British investigators in Germany at the close of the war. He came 
to Farnborough in 1946 and his long-term professional associate, the 
mathematician and aerodynamicist Johanna Weber came, at his instigation, some 
months later in 1947. 
Johanna Weber initiated the first interest in the aerodynamics of the narrow 
delta at the RAE with a survey paper in 1955 on all the available information on 
this type of wing and the configuration was first considered for its low 'wave 
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drag' in supersonic flights' Indeed, it appeared to be the only shape that would 
allow carriage of a reasonable civil payload. The solution to the supersonic end 
of the speed range thus began to become emerge, but it was still unclear 
whether it would it be possible for this supersonic, low-drag shape to queue and 
land at normal airliner speeds, using available runways. "The problems were the 
low speed problems of the high speed aeroplane - it seemed hopeless" CHE 
Warren recalled. " 
The aerodynamicists considered by then that "we'd solved the classical 
aeroplane", but the narrow delta entailed a new type of flow and though, with 
its echoes of the schoolboy paper dart the configuration seems, with hindsight, 
an almost unsurprising choice for a high speed aircraft, the way in which it 
works amounted to a real paradigm shift in aerodynamic thinking. 59 In essence, 
at high angles of incidence, the airflow over each wing rolls up into two huge 
stable vortices. This contrasts with classical aerodynamics of straight wings, 
where orderly flow front to back was the desired state and wandering, unstable 
vortices over the upper surface of the wing were associated with stalling and 
loss of lift. 
Soon it began to emerge from this research that the vortex flow of the narrow 
delta could offer the combination of both very high speeds and the possibility of 
flying slowly (and landing) in a 'nose high' flight attitude. Thus speed could be 
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reduced but lift could be maintained, it seemed, without the complicated flaps 
and leading edge devices, on which conventional airliners depended, by 
progressively raising the nose and increasing the angle of incidence of the wing. 
This discovery of the greatly extended range of 'non-linear lift' was at the core 
of the RAE advocacy of the narrow delta. 
Once it was shown theoretically that this slender supersonic shape should also be 
able to fly slowly doubts still existed. Though low speed lift was assured by the 
pair of large stable vortices rotating over the upper wing, how stable where they 
in the ultra-slow landing regime? In a side gust, might they not be liable to slide 
off one wing or the other and take some seconds to regenerate? American wind 
tunnel studies had predicted that this form of aircraft might be prey to 'Dutch 
roll' -a spiral instability with the aircraft rolling and swinging in a corkscrew 
motion about the direction of flight. 
But as the theoretical solution of the narrow delta began to emerge for the civil 
supersonic mission it was adopted with tremendous enthusiasm by the 
community of Farnborough aerodynamicists. One, in particular, WE Gray, 
believed that Farnborough and Britain had a mission to develop the supersonic 
aircraft and he also considered that the Dutch roll danger was exaggerated. Gray 
was an extraordinary character whose research effort was entirely "self 
propelled". He had been a pilot, awarded the DFC in the First World War, and 
was often seen cycling round Farnborough in his old leather flying cap. He had 
a talent for cheap, pragmatic experiments and made it his mission to investigate 
this roll phenomenon experimentally. Gray's private programmes often cut 
across the intentions and plans of other departments and sometimes section 
heads and senior officers would refuse to see him to avoid being badgered for 
research facilities, flight time or resources. Gray, who was an expert rose 
grower, usually managed to detain his quarry by finding a moment to present a 
bunch of his own blooms. 
Gray initiated one of his typically ingenious and cheap research programmes to 
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test the claimed instability of narrow deltas, building and launching simple balsa 
models with a variety of shapes across the 24 foot wind tunnel. The models 
began their glide in still air and, as they crossed the tunnel nozzle, encountered 
the tunnel flow from the side, simulating the kind of side gust the airliner might 
encounter on a landing approach. The aim was to see whether the disturbance 
damped itself out or was self-sustaining. The mathematician Jean Ross, who had 
just joined the RAE, was assigned to help with these trials and recalled "I was 
his ball girl", retrieving the models from across the wind tunnel. 60 
However, Gray went almost too far with his next sally. He argued that "the 
national good [and] the RAE's good name" turned on flying a narrow delta 
supersonic shape without delay and advocated building a range of cheap wooden 
manned gliders which he volunteered to fly "and so permit the Captains of 
Industry to keep their white robes unblemished". " His criticism of RAE 
direction and "the massive slow-motion approach" of the Ministry of Supply got 
him into trouble but the view that Jean Ross held of his particular style was that 
"you could be amused or you could be cross, or you could respect him. I think 
most people respected him". Indeed, the conjunction of Germanic theoretical 
and mathematical training, as exemplified by Kuchemann and Weber, with 
Gray's pragmatic English empiricism, which bordered on the eccentric, is one 
of the most fascinating conjunctions in the generation of the Concorde project. 
As confidence in the solution built within the RAE on the high speed and low 
speed behaviour the Establishment again mounted, from the late 1950s, a series 
of conferences and "selling" visits to the firms explaining the thinking behind 
the narrow delta, its aerodynamic, performance and control characteristics. Thus 
the initial "project design" for the SST can certainly be attributed to the RAE 
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and not to any particular firm. This parentage is revealed by the remarkable 
similarity of the shapes proposed independently for the aircraft by separate 
design teams at Bristol, Handley Page and English Electric, all of which showed 
a similar planform and the distinctive ogee (wine glass) shape that came to 
typify Concorde. 
Conclusion 
A central point about the RAE which needs to be touched on again concerns its 
crucial role in the integration of defence science and technology, for it was 
largely through the work at Farnborough and Bedford that all the then new and 
developing technologies for trans-sonic and supersonic flight came to be 
integrated into military aircraft. For example, work on pilot physiology, done 
by the RAF Institute of Aviation Medicine, would drive pressure flying suit 
design, but the suit itself had to interface with the aircraft systems and thus 
Mechanical Engineering Division of the RAE assessed techniques for providing 
the suit with the compressed air it needed from the compressor stage of the jet 
engine. " To take another example, the work on weapons, missiles, and 
guidance done at RAE and elsewhere also had to be integrated into the aircraft. 
This included the aerodynamic effects on performance and handling of the 
aircraft while the ordnance was attached and establishing safe separation on 
firing. Guidance and the integration of missile and aircraft electronics also fell 
to the RAE in this period, while 'terminal dynamics' - the complex three- 
dimensional theoretical treatment of interception, pitting the fighter/missile 
ensemble against the hypothetical enemy bomber was very much an RAE 
speciality. 
The strength of the RAE was that "presented with any aircraft-like problem, the 
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RAE could pull together a high quality group over a range of subjects". 63 Even 
as late as 1963 the RAE was itself pioneering a new integrated navigation and 
attack (nav-attack) system for the TSR2 tactical strike aircraft without any lead 
contractor from industry -a phenomenon which reflected both on the strength of 
the RAE and the thinness of the UK defence electronics sector. M 
The work reviewed here is necessarily only a sample of the huge output of 
research work carried out by the RAE in the period under review but hopefully, 
it is enough to show its far-reaching influence on British aircraft and on the 
character of the post-war aviation enterprise. Even an RAE programme with the 
apparently innocuous purpose of developing a blind landing system for poor 
visibility was tied in to the British posture on nuclear deterrence since "the point 
about the blind landing was to get the V force from their base airfields to their 
dispersal airfields where their weapons were stored". 65 This dispersal capability 
was needed to establish a credible deterrent capability for the V-force in the 
event of an imminent Soviet attack and it is an intriguing thought that part of the 
effect of the experimental transmissions from the RAE Blind Landing Unit at 
Martlesham in Suffolk was to acquaint Soviet signals analysts with the capability 
of the force for all-weather operation. 
The competitive development of aircraft and aircraft systems at the frontiers of 
knowledge illustrates the special Cold War phenomenon of science at war 
which, it is argued, put a special stamp on the post-war British aircraft effort. 
However, this chapter is not a critique of this orientation, or of the procurement 
policy of the UK for aircraft, but an attempt to show how the science and the 
operational analysis of the RAE contributed to policy and was part of a larger 
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political and decision-making milieu. In addition, the concentration on the 
preliminary, aerodynamic design of new aircraft should not be taken to imply 
that the firms did not contribute a huge amount to the designs, as they began to 
take shape. The RAE aerodynamicists would themselves be at pains to point this 
out, being essentially modest, cautioning that "a lot of things go into an 
aeroplane" and stressing the contribution to the actual aircraft of "the immensely 
practical people from industry". ' 
Finally, we should perhaps remember the large national and international role 
that the RAE played in aeronautics. The work done there circulated within the 
aeronautical community of the NATO countries but the RAE also fuelled the 
post-war British university expansion in aerodynamics with high-level teaching 
staff for aerodynamics and aviation subjects. ' Internationally it also contributed, 
for example, chief scientists to Lockheed and Martin-Marietta. It is also 
interesting to note that from 1971 Dietrich Kuchemann, then head of the Aero 
Department, promoted the initiative to set up powerful new transonic wind 
tunnels with NATO partners through his promotion of the European Large Wind 
Tunnels Group. Thus through the Cold War the RAE served as the main and 
enduring core of European aerodynamic knowledge and was instrumental in 
returning some of this expertise to Germany, as part of the larger Europe. 
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Chapter 6 
Planning in Detail - Post-war Projects: the Vickers V1000, Aero Engine 
Development, the V-force Programme 
Introduction 
The contention that British aircraft production suffered from a multiplicity of 
projects, and from the maintenance of too many separate companies during the 
twenty years following the Second World War, has become accepted as 
something of a truism among commentators on the industry. This account 
certainly endorses that view, but here the intention is to use case studies of 
individual programmes to examine this phenomenon and to investigate the 
character of the post-war direction of aeronautical research, development, and 
procurement. The chapter therefore looks quite deeply into a number of specific 
projects, both to examine the process by which these projects became 
established and sustained, and to gain some insight into the nature of the 
relationship between the administration and the industry. 
Perhaps cavalierly, to some, this account does not dwell on distinctions in 
attitudes towards the aviation industry between the various post-war Labour and 
Conservative administrations. Certainly several historians have sought to analyse 
what was distinctive about the post-war Attlee administration and the explicitly 
technocratic 1964 Wilson government, with respect to their attitudes to advanced 
industry, contrasting both with earlier socialist attitudes to industry and with a 
certain implied Conservative laissez-faire posture. ' 
Rather less appears to have been written about evolving Conservative policies 
with respect to technology. However, the term 'laissez-faire' hardly applies to 
multi-million pound programmes closely administered by government 
1 
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departments and it appears, from the perspective of this study, that pro-aviation 
Conservatives such as Peter Thorneycroft, Aubrey Jones and Julian Amery were 
just as technocratic (and, in principle, as dirigiste) as their Labour counterparts 
while Conservative and Labour aviation sceptics were equally sceptical. 
Governments of both parties, it could be said, were content with a kind of 
aeronautical 'Butskellism', a fairly pragmatic and consensual form of tinkering, 
although both were capable, now and again, of more resolute action, as with the 
determination of the Conservative administration to use the TSR 2 strike bomber 
contract, awarded in January 1959, to force the long overdue consolidation of 
aircraft companies, and the Labour government's later cancellation of that 
project in 1965 (actually a move that was also expected by many close to the 
programme in the event of a Conservative victory). 
However, the direction of the industry, for the first part of the period at least, 
was carried forward by officials, acting rather in the 'Crippsian' spirit of 
encouragement to the industry and with an intention to achieve integration 
between civil and military projects in the interests of the national economy. The 
studies here will throw light on the extent to which the structure inherited and 
adapted from war-time systems and institutions could achieve this. 
As argued in the preceding chapter, the aircraft sector, for some twenty years 
after the war, can be regarded as an ensemble which comprised a highly 
centralised government research capability, a large number of aircraft and 
engine firms, a government procurement agency in the Ministry of Supply 
which implemented the requirements formulated for the RAF by the Air Staff 
and, in principle, the civil air lines. There was, in addition, an extended and a 
rather diffuse defence community, also touched on in the previous chapter. This 
included bodies like the Air Warfare Committee, the Defence Research Policy 
Committee, supplemented by lines of communication between all the groups 
mentioned above, and often relying on personal links formed during the Second 
World War. 
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This system was placed under enormous pressure to produce aircraft and 
weapons of the highest achievable technical quality in response to the emergence 
of the Cold War, in the light of a growing realisation of the offensive threat 
posed by Soviet nuclear capability, and in response to the continuing conviction 
that Britain should retain 'Great Power' status with a global reach. These 
"requirements, it is argued, stretched the capability of this system to the utmost, 
and the final project case study in this chapter looks at the major load (or major 
distortion) imposed on the industry by the V-bomber project. Amongst various 
effects, this defence effort determined both the character of the firms and the 
way they interacted with government. The scale of the defence effort also 
severely prejudiced the attention that could be devoted to civil aircraft 
development. It is appropriate therefore, in this section, to both to review the 
technological challenges of weapons development to British aviation in this 
period, the way they were met, and the effects that they had on the industry. 
Case studies in Procurement 
The Vickers V1000 
When the Vickers V1000 long-range transport was cancelled in 1955 it marked, 
for the aircraft industry's supporters, a pivotal moment in the development of 
British civil aviation. George Edwards, the Vickers chief designer declared in 
The Times that "Britain had abandoned the struggle to get into the front position 
on long-range aircraft. ... large turbojet aircraft were going to dominate first 
class travel on the North Atlantic. ... it is a national decision that we shall 
regret for many years". 2 A few years later, the Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Ministry of Aviation was quoted as describing the cancellation as "a terrible 
2 
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tragedy". ' 
From the point of view of this study the episode can be regarded as a test of the 
whole post-war strategic approach to civil aircraft development. The Ministry of 
Supply had the responsibility to nurture saleable designs and it had as allies, the 
RAF and the airline corporations who were, at least in principle, pulling in the 
same direction in order to get the maximum value for Britain from the money 
spent on development. 
For that reason the V1000 appeared, at the outset, a highly attractive project. 
The RAF wanted a high-speed jet transport to replace the piston-engined 
Hastings and in 1951 issued a specification for an aircraft, to be ready in 1956, 
for the movement of troops or light equipment and, in particular, to be used for 
overseas deployment of a V-bomber squadron, carrying equipment and support 
personnel. The point was explicitly made that in order to produce the aircraft in 
time and to economise on development "the Air Staff has decided that it is to be 
based on an existing design. It will also be an advantage if it can be drawn up 
as a common operational requirement with the Minister of Civil Aviation". 4 
The main elements of this specification included a range of 3000 miles and 
cabin pressurisation - qualities that would also suit it for the developing long 
distance civil routes. All the current large British types were considered, 
including an adaptation of the next version of the Comet airliner - the Comet 
III. This was thought to represent the least departure from an already known 
type. and considerable airline experience would have been accumulated with it 
by the time the RAF took their versions. 
A point raised against the Comet by the RAF was that it was considered too 
3 
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small to airfreight aero engines. BOAC, who were also involved in the 
discussions thought that the Comet would not be capable of further development 
and so also supported a project that would bring forward a successor to it for 
international routes -a larger, faster jet aircraft. 
Also considered were transport adaptations of all three British V-bombers. The 
first choice was the Handley Page design (the Victor) which was currently being 
built. This had an extremely sophisticated aerodynamic design, promising very 
high speeds, but the prototype had not yet flown. By contrast, the technically 
less ambitious Vickers Valiant bomber was already flying and this seemed, 
therefore, to be the best basis for the relatively speedy production of the future 
RAF transport and civil airliner. The choice of a transport version of the Victor 
or Avro Vulcan was also opposed on the grounds that it would "eat into bomber 
production". ' 
By May 1952 Sir Hew Kilner of Vickers was pressing for "an immediate order 
for a prototype of the Valiant transport" without which, he alleged, Vickers 
would have to discharge design staff (a canny threat in view of oft-stated MoS 
concerns to retain skilled industry groups) and MoS officials began to consider 
how to obtain Treasury finance for the Vickers transport in advance of a 
finalised Operational Requirement (OR). The Valiant conversion was promised 
as a 120 seat aircraft, against the 80 seats for the Comet III, and also offered 
higher speed. The Air Staff objective, it was noted, was to make Bomber 
Command mobile and to do this, "it must be possible to transport personnel and 
equipment as fast as the bombers operate". 6 No justification seems to have been 
developed for this tactically novel and quite surprising proposition except for 
the RAF's observation that, if slower aircraft were purchased supporting staff 
and ground crew "would either have to start earlier or arrive later" than the 
5 
Ibid. This was an ominous sign and we shall see below that problems with bomber production 
were in train. 
6 
Ibid. 
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bomber force when deployed overseas. This was a quite indulgent specification 
for a transport aircraft, but MoS officials accepted readily that "it is quite clear 
that the [RAF] must have a Valiant Transport with Conway engines". ' 
However, the Treasury, as we shall see again, was independently capable of 
asking perceptive technical and strategic questions, querying whether "it is 
really necessary that military transport should fly at over 500 mph" and 
suggesting that if the airline Corporations preferred the Comet the RAF should 
have the same types since "it is not at all certain that we can afford to develop 
and produce two types of high speed transport". $ 
By October 1953, the Treasury noted that the aircraft "is really an entirely new 
aircraft and departs considerably from the Valiant bomber" and, sidelining the 
MoS, queried directly with the Air Ministry the RAF insistence, "of which they 
would admit no relaxation", on a performance comparable to the V bombers. 
Why could the RAF not make use of an enlarged version of the Bristol Britannia 
aircraft -a turboprop aircraft, faster than the previous piston-engined generation 
but slower than a pure jet airliner, recently developed, also at Government 
expense, as a civil transport aircraft for the emerging airline market? 
As noted, the requirements of the RAF were also intended to assist development 
of another commercial jet airliner, in addition to the Comet, and the MoS 
observed that "if the country is to export aircraft in the way that is done with 
shipping it must obviously have to offer more than one prototype from one 
firm". The delicate path MoS officials trod in all these project negotiations was 
highlighted by the internal warning that, when deploying arguments to the 
Treasury to attack the suitability of the Comet III for the RAF ("only ... a very 
7 
Ibid. 'Notes on draft O. R. 14 June 1952. The emerging. draft operational requirement proposed 
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inadequate interim aircraft for military purposes"), it was important that "we 
must, of course, take care not to damage the case for the Comet III for 
BOAC". 9 
In August 1952 the Air Staff completed the Operational Requirement for the 
aircraft (O. R. 315) which set out the detailed performance targets. Meanwhile, 
BOAC had become more equivocal about purchasing a new jet aircraft but the 
MoS agreed to go ahead with the development, with the weak proviso that 
despite the uncertainty of the civil interest "it would also be advantageous if the 
aircraft were designed to be basically suitable for adaptation to civilian use". 10 
The lukewarm attitude of BOAC may have been a result of performance 
assessments for the emerging V1000, but may also have been a bargaining 
tactic, for the Corporation tended to lean on the difficulties and expense of 
operating British aircraft when negotiating prices and subsidies. This apart, the 
project seemed an ideal marriage of the two functions. In design terms the 
Vickers Valiant was not a large step into the unknown - indeed it had been 
commissioned as an "insurance" design in case the more advanced Avro Vulcan 
and Handley Page Victor met development problems and it did in fact reach 
service several years before them. The conversion of this reasonably 
conservative bomber did not appear to problematic and this was the basis on 
which Vickers had first bid for the job. 
It seems remarkable, in the light of the rhetoric of the war-time reconstruction 
arguments developed in the MAP, and the subsequent claims by MAP and MoS 
to be uniquely capable of the centralised strategic direction needed to make the 
best use of British aeronautical R&D, that this commitment to commonality 
between the civil airliner and RAF transport was put in such vague terms. 
Indeed, it was the Treasury, rather than the MoS, which continued to put most 
9 
Ibid 
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PRO AVIA 19/811, 'History of the Vickers 1000'. 
225 
stress on the need to integrate civil and military requirements. 
This period of collaboration with the firms to develop new products was 
distinguished by a quite open-handed financial attitude on the part of the MoS. 
The essential emotion seems to have been that MoS officials had the experience 
and technical knowledge to deal with the firms, and that this encouraging and 
accommodating approach was essential for extracting advanced technical 
performance from the industry. Much ingenuity was expended by MoS officials 
to defend programmes and overspends from Treasury attack. 
Thus, as the V1000 study gathered way at Vickers, the MoS obtained Treasury 
permission for a preliminary provision of £50,000 but an official noted that "I 
think that the firm should tell us immediately if they find that the £50,000 
ceiling is impeding progress". This must certainly have been viewed by Vickers 
as a hint that control would not be rigorous and the firm responded in 
appropriate vein that "too rigid a limitation on expenditure would involve delay 
in meeting the production order". It was hardly surprising that by January 1953, 
it was noted by JE Adamson that "Vickers have exhausted the £50,000 and are 
writing to request further financial cover. Is there any reason why we should not 
ask for Treasury authority to order the first prototype? ". In fact, in September 
the Treasury approved spending (up to £600,000) on a prototype although it 
detected that "the aircraft is really an entirely new aircraft". " Assembly then 
started in February 1953 though the Treasury quickly detected that the 
programme was sliding and that "no more than six aircraft would be available 
by March 1958". 12 
11 
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This inability of the industry to develop and build the new generation of 
sophisticated aircraft fast enough, both in terms the design and delivery of the 
prototypes, and subsequent series production programme will be discussed again 
with reference to the Vulcan and Victor V bombers. However, a major asset, 
for MoS officials, was that the aircraft was to have Rolls-Royce Conway 
engines (in the event to prove another source of delay) and therefore would be 
the product of the Ministry's two most trusted producers, although, by February 
1954 Vickers' estimated cost to completion had risen over a year from £1.925m 
to £2.913m leading even the normally supportive MoS officials to comment that 
"a jump of 50% is good going, even in these times", and that "the change is 
more surprising in that the firm has been one of our better estimators" noting 
that there had been no changes in the requirements for the aircraft. " 
The firm now surprised officials by asking for a new test rig to test the wing at 
a cost of £0.628M, confirming how far the design must have come from the 
cost effective conversion of an existing bomber and prompting, to this writer, 
the question as to why all these costs came as a continual stream of surprises, 
given the claimed proven expertise of the MoS in dealing with the firms. 
Certainly it had been accepted that the aircraft needed a new fuselage, since, in 
the original bomber, the spar system of the wing passed through the fuselage 
and cut into the internal volume. This was not a problem for the carriage of 
bombs but it did not provide the continuous tubular cabin space needed in an 
airliner. The new wing, though, with 30% more area, was required in order to 
achieve the take-off performance specified, and the whole ensemble now 
dictated a new undercarriage. Thus so much would be new that the whole basis 
of the original tender - the low-risk conversion of an existing type - was 
specious. One could even speculate that Vickers were attempting to get funding 
for a new civil airliner development piecemeal - tugging the leash as it were - 
for increasing funding when sufficient monies had already been committed to 
make it unattractive for the MoS to turn back. 
13 
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By 14 June 1952 RAF had revised their procurement and were asking for a total 
of only 28 aircraft of which twelve were to be Bristol Britannias and the 
remaining fourteen Vickers V 1000. These were desperately small orders, given 
the huge design and start-up costs for both, really providing no help to either 
type as economic production propositions and shows how, between them the 
MoS, the RAF and the industry effectively squandered the subsidies that were 
being paid for weapons R&D and aircraft start-up projects in the period. " 
Numerous delays occurred. According to the programme the prototype should 
have flown in December 1954, but in October 1955, when cancellation was 
discussed in the Cabinet, the project had over-run the budget four-fold and it 
was only three quarters finished. The weight had increased and it was now 
outgrowing the thrust of its Rolls-Royce Conway engines. It was unable to meet 
the take-off requirements written into the OR which called for an ability to clear 
50 feet from a 2000 yard take-off run in tropical conditions and would only be 
able to do so with the provision of various "hot-rod" modifications that the RAF 
considered undesirable, or possibly the provision of two extra engines, although 
internally NH Wilkinson in MoS quipped that "a V1000 with six Conways 
sounds elephantine - and white at that". " 
The Air Ministry had lost patience and proposed cancellation since "the aircraft 
is marginal as regards meeting the specification and it is late. ... This is the 
second time that Vickers have let us down within twelve months and the firm 
ought to be left in no doubt as to the Air Ministry's opinion". Although the Air 
Ministry view was that "those concerned in the Ministry of Supply ... might 
14 
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have been more cautious in accepting the firm's estimate" an attempt was made 
to rescue the project with the firm belatedly proposing last-ditch tactics to the 
MoS to save the aircraft by reviving the prospect that the transport should 
"definitely be coupled with the development of a civil aeroplane". Vickers 
claimed that it would be competitive with the emerging Boeing 707 and held out 
the prospect of it being certificated and released for airline use in mid 1960. 
But patience also was exhausted within MoS which seemed no longer prepared 
to act as a buffer between Vickers and the Treasury. Reginald Maudling, as 
Minister of Supply, said "he was very concerned about this project and doubted 
whether the UK could afford it. ... The cancellation of the V1000 will 
undoubtedly be resisted by Vickers, but the effect will probably be salutary". 16 
Maudling asked to be briefed on the extent to which the V 1000 failed to meet 
RAF needs with regard to the performance and delivery time. He also requested 
a note on the DC 8 and Boeing 707, particularly with regard to the extra 
flexibility of these aircraft, compared to the V. 1000, the dates by which they 
would be expected on the transatlantic run, and whether they would be true non- 
stop transatlantic aircraft. "The Minister wanted answers to the points George 
Edwards has been making in the press" and to be able to "hit back" should a 
debate occur in the House of Commons. " 
The brief showed that the considerable weight growth and failure to achieve 
take-off performance suggested that the V1000 "would be at the limit of 
development at the beginning of its life". 'g The parity with the Boeing 707 
publicly claimed by George Edwards was also, for aerodynamic reasons, 
unattainable, and it is inconceivable that Vickers could not have known this. The 
V1000 was going to be slower and the main reason was that as an 'insurance' 
16 
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bomber design, the Valiant had relatively less wing sweep - the critical feature 
in allowing aircraft to cruise at very high subsonic speeds. By contrast, Boeing 
had already tackled the tricky aeroelastic problems of high wing sweep. 
Furthermore, their 707 prototype had flown in the previous July while advance 
orders for the Boeing 707 and Douglas DC 8 were already valued at over 
£200m. The Vickers claim therefore, that they could beat Boeing into 
production with their as yet untried and uncompleted aircraft looked completely 
unconvincing, and, in view of the inferiority in flight speed, the only real selling 
point that Vickers might have offered would have been be an earlier 
introduction into service. 19 The numerous delays in the programme gave no 
confidence that this could be achieved. Certainly BOAC showed even less 
interest in the Vickers aircraft at this late stage. The Corporation declared that it 
could not afford it and that "even if they could find the money they would not 
want to buy an aircraft like the V1000". 20 
Raising the proposed cancellation with Cabinet colleagues in' October 1955 
Reginald Maudling, as Minister of Supply, reviewed the position on British 
airliner development succinctly. "According to present plans the V. 1000 would 
be inferior to what is expected of American machines although it might be ready 
a little earlier. We have considered whether, by any reasonable modification of 
the design, we could make the aircraft fully competitive but ... the chance of 
success would be small and the time needed would mean the loss of any 
advantage of early delivery". Noting that there was "a real danger of having a 
white elephant on our hands" Maüdling pointed out that in pulling out of a 
short-term attempt to meet the Boeing challenge with the V. 1000 in 1960 it 
might also have to be accepted that Britain would not be able to produce a 
19 
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competitive jet in 1965 that would be good enough to take on the American jet 
aircraft of the 1960 vintage. He looked forward to design studies that would 
indicate "whether we can produce a competitive jet in 1965 or whether we have 
got to surrender this particular field to the Americans until we can re-enter it 
with a true supersonic aeroplane, not before 1970". 21 
RA Butler, as Chancellor of the Exchequer wrote to Maudling on 21 October 
1955 "I am sure you have reached the right conclusion and that the V. 1000 
should be allowed to die. I note that nearly £2 1/2m has so far been spent and I 
hope it will be given the coup de grace as soon as possible". For the future, 
Butler agreed that the principal aircraft firms should prepare design studies for a 
transatlantic aeroplane to be available in about 1965. "In view of the enormous 
cost of these things, I hope that such an airframe would be capable of a military 
application". 22 
The conclusion drawn here from Maudling's summing up of the V. 1000 affair is 
that the long-range planning conducted by the Ministry of Supply for this new 
airliner had been inadequate for the scale and cost of the venture. An 'expert' 
Ministry, established in the mould conceived by Stafford Cripps, tasked with the 
long-range planning and wellbeing of a major strategic asset and export industry 
had demonstrated poor control - one might say gullibility - in the administration 
of the contract with Vickers. It seemed, rather, to have accepted, in its relations 
21 
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with industry, an increasingly vague promotional role. We can recall the 
arguments deployed by MoS officials in the immediate post-war era when it was 
claimed that 
the rapid pace of aeronautical progress makes it especially difficult to 
ensure that each new aircraft design derives full benefit from the latest 
advances. To achieve this calls for an up to date knowledge, an 
appreciation of future research trends and the power to deploy 
research and development. ... The MoS must remain 
fully in the 
picture". ' 
By contrast, this episode could be said to have marked the beginning of the end 
for the belief that MoS officials could continue as the supreme planning 
'intelligence' which could juggle the requirements of the RAF, of BOAC and 
other airlines, while considering also export potential, the strategic retention of 
design skills and some responsibility for regional employment policy. 
But beyond that, there was the failure to identify the major thrust in air 
transport - the long-haul jet - and to plan for it, in spite of the fact that the 
efforts of Boeing and Douglas in this field were not a surprise - they were, as 
one would expect, the subject of intense interest and comment in the global 
industry. The V. 1000 had certainly not represented a considered plan. The civil 
side of the project had come about accidentally as the result of the RAF 
transport requirement and when it failed there was nothing else in train. 
Vickers, for their part had squandered an opportunity to advance a marketable 
civil aircraft on the strength of the military development finance, even allowing 
the first year of the programme following the issue of the operational 
requirement to elapse without producing a design. To this author, the episode 
speaks of the lack of an entrepreneurial culture within an aviation industry that 
had been conditioned through its wartime years under the direction of the MAP 
23 
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and subsequently the MoS. However, Dennis Healey, the Minister of Defence 
responsible for cancelling the TSR 2 strike aircraft ten years later, took harsher 
view, suggesting that the manufacturers "tended to get the government on the 
hook by giving cost estimates and delivery dates which were far too optimistic 
and then were quite content when the aircraft was cancelled". 24 
The Napier Nomad and other engine developments 
It might perhaps be argued that the procurement pattern for the Vickers V1000 
was necessarily a special case. There was, after all, an initial strategic argument 
for the aircraft, while the business of procurement of civil airliners for the 
national carriers was a complex and highly charged affair. However, 
procurement of aircraft and equipment in almost all cases reflected a Byzantine 
interplay between government departments, the RAF, the national airlines and 
the firms. 
The case of Napier Nomad engine, and some other engines considered here, is 
instructive since it illustrates this well. In fact, the Nomad engine was 
strategically and commercially irrelevant, and yet it consumed a striking amount 
of administrative effort during its cancellation. The history of the project also 
demonstrates the power and the influence of the 'aviation lobby' at this time, 
and throws light on the way in which this influence was deployed. 
The project had its origins at the end of the Second World War with the 
proposal, emanating from the Ministry of Aircraft Production for an extreme 
long range patrol engine for Imperial maritime surveillance. It appears that the 
specification was tailored specifically to give the Napier company some R&D 
work for it had good experience in diesels but had not then taken up the gas 
turbine, due to the major problems it had experienced during the war in 
24 
P Pagnamenta and RJ Overy, All Our Working Lives, (London, 1984) p. 69. 
233 
bringing the Sabre engine into service. ' 
The project was also framed at a time when it seemed that the new jet engine 
was inherently extravagant in fuel and best suited to high power short endurance 
military roles. The Nomad, in contrast, was a 'turbo-compound'; a complicated 
and ingenious hybrid of two-stroke piston-engine diesel with gas turbine and 
compressor offering a 'compound' engine in which the piston engine element 
and the gas turbine (turbocharger) were geared together. This allowed the output 
to be optimised at any height or power requirement, offering extreme economy. 
(Shaft power could be drawn from both the piston engine component and the 
turbine, in differing proportions, depending on speed, load, height and so on). 
This engine was of great theoretical and engineering interest but after eight 
years of government funded research, it was clear that the engine was still far 
from reaching service reliability and in August 1953 Air Commodore 'Rod' 
Banks, Principal Director of Engine Research and Development at the Ministry 
of Supply minuted "I have come to the conclusion that the development of the 
Nomad engine must be discontinued and our support should cease". This was to 
take effect in two months and it was noted that the engine had already been 
placed on "special category" (effectively a stay of execution) a year before to 
avoid heavy redundancy charges from Napier. The Napier company "had taken 
an inordinately long time to bring the engine to its present state of 
development", time was running out and it "still requires very considerable 
effort over the next three years". " 
Rumours of cancellation soon reached the firm which quickly deployed the 
25 
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threat of "throwing the market away to the Americans" and an alliance of 
interests between Napiers and Blackburn aircraft company emerged to lobby for 
the merits of a Nomad-engined version of the Blackburn Beverley military 
transport aircraft. 
The firms' case was that civil aviation was a pyramid, with 'Blue Ribbon' 
airlines at the top and 'air tramping' at the bottom, for which the Nomad- 
Beverley would be ideal and giving up the Nomad would be "throwing the 
market away to the Americans". MoS officials almost as ready as the firms to 
raise the American spectre and one of them mused whether there was any 
chance of persuading the Treasury to "carry" Nomad development outside the 
Defence Budget if it were kept within a maximum of £500,000 per year. "I 
doubt it myself although we could possibly use the argument that if we drop ... 
[it] ... British ... freighter aircraft will be dependent on American engines or, 
worse still, we shall have to buy entire American aircraft". 2' 
The spectre of having to buy from America was routinely advanced at the onset 
of cancellation discussions although, in the civil field, the British airlines much 
preferred American equipment and frequently argued to be allowed to buy 
developed aircraft such as the Lockheed Constellation, rather than to act as 
virtual development engineering partners with British manufacturers to help 
them refine their products. 
Blackburns could deploy, as a director, Sir John Slessor, former Marshal of the 
Royal Air Force, who quickly made representations to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, the Minister of Defence and to the Minister of Supply. His 
shameless intervention expatiated on the technical success of British V-bombers, 
fighters, the Viscount, the Brittania and the Comet, (comparable to the "crack 
ocean greyhound" liners of an earlier age) but argued "My Dear Chancellor" ... 
that "we must not allow the virtues and glamour" of these great aircraft to blind 
27 
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us to the fact that our air power and export trade will rest on the merchantmen, 
the freighter and the tramp". What was needed were "big loads at low operating 
costs". The Duke of Edinburgh too was recruited on the side of this lobby by 
Sir George Nelson of English Electric (now the owners of Napier) and he 
passed on Nelson's memorandum to ministers. Meanwhile Sir Conrad Collier, 
also of English Electric came in person to the MoS to present the case that "any 
dropping of the Nomad ... would be a National calamity". 
" 
These events show the complex power relationship which surrounded British 
aeronautical development at the time and the almost fantastic amount of 
lobbying and political activity elicited by one of the least significant aero engine 
projects. Sir John Slessor, who marshalled these bamboozling arguments, 
certainly traded on his distinctiofl in the RAF. Ministry of Supply officials 
however noted that the Beverley aircraft was "extremely expensive" for air 
freighting (especially in a post-war world awash with ex-military DC-3 Dakotas) 
and, if fitted with Nomads, even more so. 
Banks, though styled 'Director' apparently could not command action in such 
cases and officials considered what was to be said to Napiers "if they get 
tough", showing some ingenuity by suggesting that "before we finally kill the 
Nomad" there would be a good deal of advantage in allowing Napiers to visit 
Canada and the USA "thereby testing Blackburn's assertion that operators 
overseas have already expressed keen interest in the Nomad version of our 
'Universal' [the Beverley freighter]" and allowing American business to convey 
the message they were reluctant to drive home themselves. 29 Meanwhile Slessor 
cast doubt on the competence of MoS officials by writing to Duncan Sandys, as 
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Minister of Supply, that "I hope you will ... support my suggestion for an 
impartial enquiry". " 
Within the MoS it was now agreed that the Nomad was "the least important and 
least promising of the runners" among engine projects and one for which there 
was no longer any military requirement. As a final stratagem Napier offered to 
keep the Nomad going at their own expense, if the MoS agreed to support the 
Eland and Oryx (two gas turbine projects) "at a greatly intensified rate of 
development". This was clearly a specious proposal and officials noted that for 
the sake of keeping the Nomad alive we would be diverting money away from 
"the four more efficient firms whose programmes are regarded as essential". " 
There was now enough resolve in the department to secure a final decision. 
Still, one is left wondering at the political and institutional dynamic which 
allowed these same officials who rationally analyzed the shortcomings of the 
Nomad programme to spend £3.58m on it out of a total aero engine R&D 
budget of £22.7 in the financial year 1952/53. In other words the Department 
acceded to the expenditure of 15% of its entire engine development budget on a 
device which they knew to be both devoid of a convincing defence function and 
which was performing poorly according to development criteria. (This was 
almost 3% of the entire R&D allocation of £121m to the MoS from the defence 
budget for developments of all kinds). Nevertheless, the MoS continued to 
support the Nomad in 1953/54 with a further £2.8m and it was only in July 
1954, virtually a full year after Banks had recommended that the project be 
cancelled, that Duncan Sandys confirmed this unequivocally. 
30 
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Banks, in spite of his excellent engineering judgement and his comparatively 
resolute judgement in this case, shared the luxurious approach to development 
and the reluctance to prioritise between projects which permeated MoS in the 
post-war era. A familiar pattern was that money was spread across a large 
number of projects (some of quite marginal importance, as we have seen), while 
front runners, from good producers and of importance to the RAF, during the 
course of a year, to be dangerously underfunded and were presented to the 
Treasury as specially deserving cases. Thus the Treasury proposed allocating 
£121m to R&D for the 1954/55 but added a proviso that the Rolls-Royce RB 
106 supersonic engine project "would not be used as a lever to obtain more 
money for R&D". But Banks "while recognising the overall need for economy" 
argued that "we cannot afford to rely upon one project alone to meet the thrust 
required for the supersonic fighter". Four large turbojet projects, which 
overlapped substantially in performance characteristics, all needed to be carried 
forward together. Of the de Havilland Gyron, Rolls-Royce RB 106, the Bristol 
Olympus, and the Rolls-Royce Conway, he asserted, "not one is more important 
than the other. They are all of vital importance to the consistent development of 
the aircraft concerned". 32 Thus, in the interests of 'insurance' the MoS was 
prepared to fund (actually five) high technology engine projects of roughly 
comparable power, from separate manufacturers and consume over several years 
about one quarter of its total allocation for aeronautical R&D. Much later, in 
retirement, Banks commented, with remarkable insouciance, that "the 
government" had been wrong to keep weaker companies going and "there were 
far too many airframe and engine firms. ... the government should have taken a 
stronger line". " 
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In the period the separate requirements of civil and military R&D were, as we 
have seen, frequently intermingled and the late-war policy justification for this 
seemed highly plausible. Britain could only afford so much high technology 
R&D. The most efficient course would be to re-purpose the cutting edge 
weapons research to create superior civil products. The real result of this was to 
allow a serious lack of clarity over the sums disbursed by the MoS for engine 
R&D. In some cases the firms sought to combine civil and military requirements 
in order, naturally enough, to perform civil R&D out of allocations defence 
work. However, MoS officials were also quite prepared, on occasion, to assist 
in this process, acting in effect, to protect the firms against a more rigorous 
view of accountability being imposed by the Treasury. 
An example of this method of administration can be seen with the Rolls-Royce 
Dart turboprop which powered the Vickers, Viscount airliner. The Ministry had 
sponsored the Dart to power the Vickers Viscount 700 series and the 
combination proved highly successful. Vickers subsequently began design work, 
at the company's own expense, to enlarge the aircraft to form the 800 series 
Viscount. However, the further development of the power of the Dart, to suit it 
for the new Viscount, continued to be paid for by the MoS. Some MoS officials 
began to consider this anomalous and advanced the idea that Rolls-Royce 
"should be conditioned to the idea" of MoS stopping the contract. ' 
The policy of sponsoring civil aircraft had crystallised so that now we 
expect industry to bear some part of the risks by sharing in the cost of 
development. The Viscount is now launched with 100% of its 
development finances paid for by MoS and further 'stretch' ... is being done PV. It is therefore to avoid the anomaly that Rolls-Royce 
are stretching the Dart entirely at the expense of [Ministry] R&D 
funds, without risk to themselves, to standards being set by Vickers. 
... This matter becomes one of principle" 
34 
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Although Banks took the firm's side and asked for finance to take the engine to 
flight test other MoS officials also could see that the broadcast industrial subsidy 
they were providing to the aircraft industry was a liability in its dealings with 
the Treasury and RHW Bullock advised, with reference to the Dart, that "the 
non-defence element in our estimate for 1954/55 is going to come under very 
heavy fire from the Treasury". However, his solution was scarcely resolute and 
he submitted that it would be of great assistance "if we can offer a slight sop to 
them in the shape of the approaching termination of support for one existing 
engine" to offset the new engine programmes, although Banks' replacement, R 
H Weir, reluctantly agreed support for long enough to allow Rolls-Royce to 
clear the new propeller reduction gear - "an Achilles heel of an otherwise 
successful engine". " 
The upshot was a compromise apparently satisfactory to officials and to the 
company that help for the Dart would continue and, in return, Rolls-Royce 
would themselves "carry" development of the Nene fighter engine. The lack of 
clarity in this bargain, whereby government continued support for a successful 
civil engine which had first run over seven years before and which was in 
operational service in many parts of the world, while the company purported to 
finance themselves a purely military fighter engine, is manifest and it is hard to 
perceive whose interests were really served by arrangements of this kind. 
However, such understandings were common in the period under review, 
perhaps allowing officials the flexibility to conceal some programmes or to get 
others started in an undeclared way. Similar lack of clarity was evident in V- 
bomber force engine policy, when in mid-1956 the suggestion was aired (against 
a background of increasing airframe and engine costs) that worthwhile 
economies of scale might be had if the second series of the Bristol Olympus- 
powered Vulcan bomber was redesigned to use the Rolls-Royce Conway, as 
developed for the Mark II Handley Page Victor. Bristol countered with the 
proposition that they would carry on development of the Olympus for the Mark 
36 
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II Vulcans on the basis that "the cost to the Ministry would be no greater than if 
the Conway had powered both Victor 2 and the Vulcan II". The Ministry then 
agreed to pay Bristol a price "which would have been paid for an equal number 
of comparable engines" and also advanced ; Elm to Bristol against tooling, as a 
special measure "because of Bristol's financial position at the time". 37 
In defence of the contemporary development and procurement pattern it could 
perhaps be argued that the aero engine makers were at the time making the 
transition from Whittle-type centrifugal flow engines to more efficient and 
powerful axial flow types and virtually every new design generation produced a 
striking increase in power. Aero engines, perhaps, constituted a field in which 
a certain amount of experimental duplication could be encouraged, especially in 
view of the still experimental nature of the gas turbine engine. However, in the 
direction of aircraft procurement the situation was little different and, during the 
1950s, the MoS administered an array of projects in almost every corner of 
aeronautics for a large variety of roles and missions while, as discussed earlier, 
officials tended to see themselves often as protagonists for the firms rather than 
judicious controllers of the procurement process, with the Treasury cast rather 
in the spoiling role. The attitudes of that time are well illustrated by the attempt 
to develop a fast-climbing rocket fighter to counter the Soviet bomber threat. In 
the event, the Lightning proved able to achieve this kind of rapid climb 
interception, but in the meantime the Air Staff, sponsored three competitive 
projects for this from Bristol, Avro and Saunders-Roe (although they conceded 
that they had preferred the Avro proposal from the outset). As financial controls 
began to bite the Assistant Chief of Air Staff (ACAS) commented ruefully that 
"it is clear that if we have a rocket interceptor at all, the Treasury will allow us 
to build only one design". " 
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Deterrence and the V-Force Programme 
Any study of the UK aircraft industry in this period must take account of the 
immense load imposed by the British resolve to develop an independent nuclear 
deterrent and the aircraft capable of delivering it. The performance targets for 
speed, height, load and range required the deployment of the most advanced 
aerodynamics and structural techniques which were at the limit of what was 
achievable. The programme has been discussed from this perspective in the 
preceding chapter on the RAE. It is examined here from the strategic aspect 
because these considerations underpinned the perceived necessity to build and 
deploy a nuclear deterrent force -a programme which imposed the greatest 
workload on the industry in the period. The progress of the programme also 
helps us to a view of the manner and effectiveness of MoS control over a 
programme which was a clear national priority. 
David Edgerton has described the post-war British aviation industry as, 
essentially, a defence industry. 39 However, the purpose of this brief study of the 
manned bomber deterrent is to show just how great a load this programme was - 
a programme which surpassed in complexity and expense all other British 
aviation activities in the period. The design and industrial production effort was 
equally demanding and for that reason is considered again here. With a total 
production of over 410 large, hugely expensive and technically sophisticated 
four-engined aircraft, this was, in terms of value and complexity, the single 
most important aircraft programme in Britain between 1945 and 1965 when the 
last Vulcan was delivered. 40 
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The early post-war decision to build a long-range jet bomber programme has 
also been touched on in chapter five. Defence planners do not seem to have 
considered, at the time, that the transition from the massed high-explosive and 
incendiary attacks of the Second World War, to atomic attack constituted a step- 
change in human affairs. In a crude sense, the atomic attacks on Japan were 
seen to have done, in an instant, what the massed Allied bomber forces had 
done to cities like Hamburg and Dresden over a rather longer period. " 
Furthermore, the actual radius of destruction of an atom bomb, against 
substantially built Western and Soviet cities, was reckoned in hundreds of yards 
rather than miles. "An A-bomb could wipe out a factory or a neighbourhood, 
but hardly an entire city. A target might escape altogether if the bomber missed 
by 
... 
half a mile". " 
Nevertheless it soon became apparent, from 1952 onward, that the hydrogen 
bomb changed this entirely and that a nuclear war would be far more terrible 
than any before, not survivable for a small country like Britain. However, 
Britain had, through incremental steps, set out on the path of becoming a 
thermonuclear power. Thus in 1954 the Defence Review expected the Russian 
strength, by 1958 or 1959, to be about 850 jet bombers and 40 airfields. 
We cannot be sure what priority the Americans will accord to these 
targets.... Since the very survival of Britain would depend on the 
promptness and thoroughness of the counter-attack it is essential that we 
should ourselves possess and control a bomber force capable of 
performing this vital task.... The Secretary of State for Air said that 
the threat of air attack had greatly increased with the hydrogen bomb 
turbojet bombers of about 216,000 lbs (98,00 kg) flying at about 600 mph. 
41 
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and could now be considered mortal. " 
The appraisal suggested that "it is essential that the Russian Air Staff should at 
no time believe that the threat ... is a manageable one" and anticipated that 
suggestion that the Soviet government would be willing to accept the loss of 
"some of their cities". According to the thinking at that time: 
for the deterrent to be effective they must be convinced that the 
United States and the United Kingdom would ... smash their offensive 
power.... The long-range bomber with nuclear weapons is 
incomparably the most important weapon in warfare today. On the 
basis merely of military effect for money expended it is far and away 
a better investment than other ... forces. The Chiefs of Staff have 
recommended that in the economic situation in which we find 
ourselves it is in certain conventional weapons that risks must be 
taken, not in nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. " 
On the basis of this thinking, Britain began committing, from the mid-1950s, 
about £125m a year to the deterrent. This amounted to about 10% of the overall 
defence budget and defence planners suggested this was "a not an unreasonable 
proportion of our defence effort to spend on the prevention of global war" and 
that "the salient fact about the V-bomber force is that, in relation to its power 
and to the defence budget as a whole, it costs so little". " From the perspective 
of this study, of course, the essential point about this cost is that the 
commitment of about 1% of GDP to this particular aeronautical project 
constituted an enormous load, and an enormous distortion for the industry. 
As the force came into being it became apparent that Britain's possession of a 
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smaller, but semi-independent, deterrent force put the nation in a unique 
position compared to the USA and the Soviet Union and some theory of 
deterrence began to emerge within British defence circles. However, this 
strategic thinking, it must be said, appears to have been of a remarkably 
pragmatic and quite simple kind. Thus it is surprising, in a period when 
theorists in the USA were developing elaborate protocols to try and predict the 
progress of nuclear exchanges, or the effect of weapons development and 
deployment on stability, to find a British official musing over the Delphic 
proposition that; "the nub of the question is the answer to the question what 
constitutes a viable deterrent? " and continuing with the "assumption" that "the 
Russians would regard a known UK ability to strike 75 targets successfully as 
an effective deterrent". 46 Relatively coarse calculations of 75% aircraft 
serviceable at any time and a 50% loss rate en route to the targets produced a 
size requirement for the force of some 200 front-line aircraft. The slightness of 
this crude and non-statistical calculation is certainly surprising, both in view of 
the sophisticated use of operational research by the RAF in the war, and the 
highly developed (some would say arcane) use of game theory in the USA in the 
period for the development of strategy for nuclear deterrence. 47 
However, Britain's situation was very different to the 'semi-symmetrical' 
nuclear postures of the USA and the Soviet Union and had to take account of its 
particular circumstances. In the pre-missile era, Britain considered the first 
Soviet attack might well fall in Europe and it was argued that "the first 
retaliatory strike ... must come from UK bases" which would be able to react 
46 
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six hours before the US mainland. 48 But alongside the Anglo-American and 
NATO commitment there was the conviction that "we must be prepared to 'go it 
alone' in defence of purely British interests". In May 1958 an Air Ministry 
paper noted: 
The (believed) rocket threat to London during Musketeer [the Suez 
operation] was countered by SACEUR's reply [Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe] that Russia would immediately be destroyed in 
retaliation by the American bomber forces. We cannot guarantee such 
support in future. We must have a large enough deterrent force to show 
our Allies that we can, if necessary, take a relatively independent line. 
Tellingly, it concluded "not only have we to convince Russia that we have a 
worthwhile deterrent force. We also have to convince our Allies". 49 However, a 
credible deterrent relied, as has been discussed in above, on a continuous 
maintenance of relative technical quality vis-a-vis the Soviet Union's own 
aeronautical developments. Thus, by 1957, it was clear that the Mark I Victor 
and Vulcan bombers would have poor survivability, from about 1963 onwards, 
in the light of a developing Soviet anti-aircraft missile capability and the 
improving ability of Soviet manned fighters to intercept them at their operational 
height. The effectiveness of the deterrent, it was judged, would therefore 
depend on a further technological and industrial effort - increasing the 
proportion of the improved Mark II Vulcans and Victors since these both flew 
higher and were constructed to carry the new air-launched 'Blue Steel' nuclear 
missile, designed to reduce the depth of the V-force incursion into Soviet air 
defence area and the time spent there. 
By mid-1957 the calculation was that these enhancements were necessary to 
allow the force to reach a sufficient number of "the total of 312 cities in the 
48 
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U. S. S. R. with a population of 100,000 and over". 50 This estimation led to the 
argument prepared by the Air Staff, and deployed by Duncan Sandys, as 
Minister of Defence, that "in order to exercise any serious deterrent influence 
upon the Kremlin" a large part of the current order for Mark I aircraft should 
be converted to Mark II types to provide a front-line force of 120 Mark Its (an 
extra 95 of these aircraft) although "there could be no arithmetical proof that 
this was the right figure" . 
51 The additional cost was to be £75m and Sanndys 
suggested that the expenditure was small in relation to the amount already spent 
on the bomber programme and, spread over five years, would cost on average 
£15 million a year "which is about one per cent of this year's defence budget". 52 
Blue Steel, the Mach 2 'stand-off' missile with a range of 100 miles, (referred 
to in contemporary discussions as the "powered bomb"), was an additional 
financial burden on the programme for the deterrent and, in itself, a major 
industrial and technical effort which used AV Roe for the missile, de Havilland 
and Armstrong Siddeley for the rocket engines and Elliott Brothers for the 
guidance system. There was also a major input from the RAE as design 
authority for crucial elements of the system and as technical adviser. Thus in 
1959, Blue Steel expenditure for the next financial year was budgeted at £23m, 
about 25% of the cost of providing the V-force aircraft, with this proportion 
expected to rise to 50% in 1964/65. s3 
There were also additional political and economic elements in the calculation of 
the size and composition of the V-force and Sandys noted that, since its nuclear 
50 
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deterrent was one of the main justifications advanced for the reduction in the 
contribution of conventional forces to NATO, Britain should not hesitate to 
order an increased proportion of the improved Mk II aircraft "which, at 
comparatively small cost, will so greatly increase our military power and 
influence". ' In fact, the actual size of the force posed a ticklish problem since 
NATO had been told that the British target was 240 front-line V-bombers, 
although this was looking increasingly unachievable for both production and 
financial reasons. It was admitted that West German politicians were expressing 
misgivings about British cuts in conventional weapons and that "our failure to be 
specific about the strength of our bomber force was causing increasing 
embarrassment in our relations with N. A. T. O". 55 
There appears, also, to have been some intentional ambiguity in British 
intentions for the use of strategic weapons, for though the V-bomber forces had 
not been assigned to NATO, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe 
(SACEUR) "had been assured" that its primary task was to support the Allied 
forces under his command and "retardation operations in support of 
SACEUR". 56 'Retardation' implied nuclear attacks on force concentrations and 
'choke points' in the event of a westward thrust by conventional Warsaw Pact 
forces and necessarily conflicted with the over-riding British purpose for the 
independent nuclear weapon (in the event of the failure of deterrence), affirmed 
by Harold Macmillan as Prime Minister in July 1958 as being "to make sure 
that, in a nuclear war, sufficient attention is given to certain Soviet targets 
54 
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which are of greater importance to us than to the United States". 57 This still 
implied pre-emptive counterforce or 'blunting' attacks on the UK-facing 
(western) Soviet bomber bases in the event of Soviet aggression on land, 
although the prospects of achieving success in this were receding. 58 More 
realistically, the UK force was intended: 
to enable us, by threatening to use our independent nuclear power, to 
secure United States co-operation in a situation in which their interests 
were less immediately threatened than our own [and] to retain ... our 
right to have a voice in the final issue of peace and war. 59 
However, by January 1957, when Harold Macmillan replaced Anthony Eden as 
Prime Minister there was a growing sense that UK defence expenditure was 
unsustainable. As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Peter Thorneycroft warned of 
an expected budget deficit of £500m while, at the same time the defence budget 
stood at £1550m. Macmillan believed that the manpower and skills locked up in 
the conscription army, and the defence budget consuming 10% of GNP, was 
preventing a resurgence of the economy. Furthermore "Suez showed that we 
had not the ability ... or the strength of will to carry through an operation of 
relatively minor scale, and that we were exceedingly vulnerable economically as 
57 
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pressure on the pound brought [Suez] to an abrupt conclusion". 60 
This was the background against which Sandys had been appointed Minister of 
Defence. "Something drastic had to be done" to release manpower and reduce 
the financial burden. 61 The review conducted by Sandys culminated in the 1957 
Defence White Paper. 62 The main targets were the conventional forces of all 
kinds - anything which did not lend credibility to the deterrent - although the 
review did also lead to pressure to reduce the V-force numbers. The defence 
programmes were "imposing a severe strain on the economy" and planning staff 
were asked to consider how far the V-bomber force could be reduced since "we 
should never, in practice ... challenge the Soviet Union alone". 
Against this, the 
Air Staff argued on the operational grounds that reductions in the number of 
aircraft in an attacking bomber force multiplied the effectiveness of the fighter 
defence and would lead to a disproportionate penalty in aircraft losses and the 
efficacy of the force. A force of 144 front-line aircraft was expected to succeed 
in attacking 40 targets in Russia while a force of 104 would, it was judged, 
reach only 23, causing the Assistant Chief of Air Staff (P) to brief the 
Secretary of State for Air and the Chief of Air Staff that "Further tampering and 
tinkering with the size ... of the 
force in the interests of economy dressed as 
strategy may well mean the reduction of the force to impotence and the waste of 
our investment". ' 
The force was then stabilised at 144 front-line aircraft (of which 104 were the 
Mark II Victors and Vulcans) and the development of the Blue Steel stand-off 
60 
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bomb continued. The revised calculation of UK potential for deterrence now 
considered that the force would be able to attack between 30 and 40 major cities 
with an estimated total of 8 million people killed in such an attack. The scale of 
material destruction, it was believed "would be comparable with the general 
devastation wrought by German forces ... in World War II". It was observed, 
though, that "there is no mathematical proof that this is the right number" for 
the composition of the force and that "the Russians did not surrender to 
Germany". " 
While these theoretical and strategic discussions about the amount to commit to 
deterrence continued there was a pressing practical problem with the actual 
production and deployment of the aircraft in sufficient numbers. Thus, in May 
1957, the Air Ministry repeated their persistent criticism that production was 
going far too slowly and that "the remarkable thing about the V-bomber force is 
that while it has nominally received top priority in the Government's defence 
policy for years ... it is still so very small". 
65 The point was made that in 1954 
the annual review to NATO "we declared that ... by December 1957, we would 
have a force of 208 V-bombers". In 1956 the expected achievable deployment 
was scaled back to 128, but by May 1957 the problem had to be faced that 
NATO were not aware that for production reasons the build-up had again 
slipped so that by December there would be no more than 80 aircraft in the 
front line. ' 
The slow build-up of the force was of concern throughout the life of the 
64 
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programme, with new targets continually being set when the previous ones were 
not met. In January 1958, MoS officials noted that although adequate jigs 
existed at Avro to build three Vulcan aircraft a month there was insufficient 
labour to build more than two and that since there had been no significant 
reduction of labour over the past years "one can only draw the conclusion that 
the firm has been consistently understaffed on labour" and that "it is now 
considered impossible to meet the Shackleton or Vulcan programmes for 
1956/57". 67 The final Handley Page Victor was handed over in 1963, and the 
last Vulcan in 1965, thus completing a smaller force than initially ordered some 
eight years after the date originally set for full deployment. 
Alongside the V 1000 affair this failure to keep the V-bomber production on 
track shows again the problems besetting a centralised 'expert Ministry' in 
peacetime procuring aircraft and engines across the civil and military spectrum. 
This was a programme that was at the core of Britain's defence strategy. It was 
the most expensive and the largest aircraft programme in existence in Britain at 
the time and it is unlikely that Ministry staff failed to detect the ongoing 
production problems at the firms. In addition to its central control the Ministry 
maintained a network of Resident Technical Officers (RTOs) - engineer civil 
servants located at the firms to monitor progress and to interface with the 
projects. There is also a suspicion of cynicism on the part of the firms with 
regard to the promised production schedules and delivery dates and that "the 
Ministry was paying and the firms weren't losing anything but reputation, 
perhaps. The firm knows that once the Ministry is committed (really committed) 
there is not much you can do except wait for them to deliver". 68 However, Sir 
Richard Powell, as Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Defence in this 
period took an alternative view about the problems of delivery. 
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Every project was grossly undermanned and took twice, three times, 
four times what ... the industrialists and the designers said they were 
going to take. All these projects were definitely undermanned. That's 
why everything took so much longer and cost so much more. It was 
not deliberate - it was just wildly optimistic and overambitious. 
Excessive optimism followed up by disappointment. ' 
The Rolls-Royce Conway - attempt at synergy 
A final engine case study of another episode, which comes out of the V-force 
programme, further illustrates the inherent tensions in the MoS mission. 
The RAF were keen, as we saw above, to maximise the height achievable by V- 
bomber aircraft to increase their survivability over the Soviet Union and a 
proposal to upgrade the Rolls-Royce Conway engines for the improved Mk II 
Handley Page Victor aircraft emerged in conversations between senior RAF 
personnel and Rolls-Royce engineers. Rolls-Royce held out the prospect that 
further development would yield an engine with superior thrust, range and 
height performance. The new 'Stage 4' Conways, uprated from about 17,250 to 
20,000 lbs thrust would also allow loaded Victors to take off in 2000 yards, 
rather than 3000, thus increasing the number of dispersal airfields they could 
use and the survivability of the force in the event of a Soviet 'counter force' 
attack. 
The Air Staff were keen to foster this, while the Ministry of Supply was 
sympathetic since the emerging civil Vickers VC 10 airliner was also to use the 
Conway and Aubrey Jones, as Minister, began to push for extra funds, outside 
the defence allocation, on the basis of this synergy. However, Jones' personal 
enthusiasm was not appreciated by the Air Ministry which viewed his initiative 
as premature, suggesting that; "it is particularly unfortunate that the Minister of 
Supply should have attempted to force our hand by disclosing these ideas to the 
Treasury.... I think you would agree that we should not be manoeuvred into a 
69 
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premature approach". 70 
To the Treasury it seemed evident that the provision of better engines "as a 
relatively straightforward way" to improve the efficacy of the V-force should be 
funded from the agreed total defence budget of £1620m. 7' Meanwhile Aubrey 
Jones' well-meaning and apparently logical 'Crippsian' initiative to link defence 
R&D with a marketable civil development also quickly ran into difficulties when 
the Treasury suggested BOAC should pay more towards development of the 
improved engine, noting "the striking contrast" between "the substantial all- 
round improvements" in VC10 performance and the limited value placed on it 
by BOAC, "judged by their readiness to pay a higher price for improved 
aircraft". 72 The Treasury considered BOAC's offer of £3500 per aircraft 
inadequate, suggesting that it equated to attracting just one extra tourist 
passenger per transatlantic flight for a year and "should the Corporation not be 
expected to pay a full economic price including a reasonable share of the 
development cost of the Stage 4? ". 73 
The MoS, attempting to hold the ring between these interests, and in receipt of 
strong objections from BOAC, replied that "the little calculation you suggest ... 
is, I am afraid, too great a simplification. It certainly cannot be assumed that 
BOAC would carry an extra passenger on every trip made by VC10 aircraft". 
More persuasively, MoS argued that asking BOAC to contribute to development 
was invidious because, after completion of the programme, Rolls-Royce would 
70 
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be able to sell improved engines to BOAC competitors without a development 
surcharge. 74 
The programme was expected to cost between £15m and £18m with £6.1m 
attributable to the civil side. Rolls-Royce, pleading declining profits, asked for 
government support for all this, while the Treasury reminded MoS that the 
Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation (Harold Watkinson) had made it clear 
in Parliament that there would be no Government money in the VC10. It noted 
that "while the statement was not without its ambiguities" they did not wish to 
give Rolls-Royce any reason to believe that government finance would be 
available towards the VC10 engines. Nevertheless, the appeal of an "integrated 
programme" gathered strength and Aubrey Jones, writing to Harold Watkinson, 
as Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation suggested that "if the military, 
requirement can be justified, that might pay for its development. This would be 
preferable to putting Government money into the civil development". 75 
Eventually, this integrated programme for Conway development was accepted, 
although without Jones' covert civil subsidy, and the programme costs were split 
between the Air vote (from the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation) the 
military R&D vote, and with Rolls-Royce making a contribution towards the 
specifically civil element in the programme. 
The final outcome was depressing and again suggests that the appealing post-war 
concept of using the MoS to harmonise the interests of the manufacturers, the 
Services and civil operators set what was a perhaps an impossible task. The cost 
estimates for the VC 10 grew, while BOAC cut back the numbers it was 
prepared to take. Vickers, now merging with Bristol, English Electric and 
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Hunting to form the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC), twice appealed to the 
government for launch aid which reached over £lOm. Production reached only 
54 aircraft and both Rolls-Royce and Vickers/BAC lost money on the aircraft 
(Vickers put their loss at some £20m). Functionally, the VC10 turned out to be 
an excellent aeroplane with high rates of utilisation and high load factors. 
Nevertheless only eight were sold to non-UK airlines and, in Vickers' view, the 
export prospects for the aircraft were fatally weakened by BOAC attacks on the 
aircraft and the corporation's approach to government for a £30m subsidy to 
cover expected operating losses. 76 
The tussle over the question of allocations between defence and civil budgets for 
the Conway are illuminating, for this area was viewed with particular unease by 
the Treasury on account of the lack of transparency in the transactions. Thus 
Denis Haviland, then Undersecretary (Air) in the MoS reported that a meeting 
at the Treasury with David Serpell during this period was: 
... enlivened periodically by a fairly severe attack on the way in 
which the Ministry [of Supply] handles its research programme and 
the way in which Mr Serpell had the transfer of certain items from 
the military to the civil budget 'put across' him at the time of the 
Estimates last year.... His conclusions were that the Treasury control 
over the research programme was quite inadequate; that the control 
exercised ... [by the MoS] was also inadequate. 
" 
The Treasury solution was for a financial ceiling covering all aeronautical 
research, and military and civil interests should be obliged to reach agreement 
within the allocation. However, MoS considered this amounted to a Treasury 
policy of "divide and conquer", anticipating "a scramble for marginal money at 
all times of financial pressure. It is out of this scramble that the Treasury would 
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hope to see 'unnecessary' projects brought to light for them to cancel". " 
Encounters such as this were not, in themselves definitive, and seem to have 
been taken in good part by the protagonists, but they are indicative of a growing 
perception, in government circles, that there were problems in the 'machinery of 
administration' arising from the various roles of the Ministry of Supply and its 
location between the aircraft industry supplier and the users. There may have 
been no general prescription for a new administrative structure but there was, 
by the late 1950s a sense that the MoS had become "the fifth wheel on the car 
which wasn't really necessary". 79 
Towards a new relationship: Sandys and Plowden 
In 1957, Reginald Maudling stood down as Minister of Supply and, apparently, 
recommended the abolition of the department to the Prime Minister, Harold 
Macmillan. 80 In this context it is interesting that a few months earlier, in relation 
to the projected overspend for the defence R&D vote, Maudling showed the 
untenable position of the Supply minister in a note to Macmillan, as then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
When it comes to cutting out projects I face the difficulty that the 
Minister of Supply cannot make excisions from his military R&D 
programme without the agreement of the Defence Departments. To 
this extent, while I am responsible for the size of the estimates, I do 
not have control over them. 81 
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Aubrey Jones then accepted the post of Minister of Supply (the last there was to 
be), though "little realising how ... I was to be dragged behind the grinding 
wheels of Mr Sandys' chariot". " The 1957 Defence White Paper, touched on 
above in connection with the V force, was devised by Duncan Sandys solely 
with the problems of deterrence and expense in mind. Nevertheless, there was 
an industrial consequence in the new arrangements since Sandys, as Minister of 
Defence, was now made the major determinant of the defence programme. This 
"first step on the road towards a unification of the defence structure" 93 was 
intended to lessen the competition between three powerful service and 
effectively heralded a more direct relationship between the service users and 
industry and a weakening of the importance of the MoS. 
Traditionally, the aircraft companies, and their historians, have dated the 
travails of the industry from the publication of Sandys' White Paper calling it 
"the biggest shock ever ... to be administered to the aircraft industry". 
M From 
the perspective of this study the White Paper was also the seismic triggering jolt 
which unlocked the tectonic strains that had been growing over years in the 
relationship between the government and the industry. Thus, even before the 
document was published, there are signs that a transition point had been . 
reached. Officials were, early in 1957, reflecting that "it is healthy, as well as 
inevitable, that the industry, swollen by rumours of wars, should now suffer 
some deflation" and were reviving earlier rationalisation initiatives that had 
stalled in 1953.85 
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This time, the analysis was more resolute. Stiffened, perhaps, by repeated 
disappointments, a new attitude - even a new emotion - developed among MoS 
officials who abandoned their former liberality and adopted a ruthless 
assessment of the fate of the firms in a resolve to implement an effective 
remodelling of the industry. Thus one asked, in terms unthinkable a decade 
earlier; 
Why are Bristols so important? I suggest their most notable 
achievement since the war is the amount of government R. &D. money 
they have absorbed to achieve so little. My guess is that the total now 
exceeds £150m. We shall only get value for money out of Bristols if 
they have to fight for existence in a competitive world". 86 
Now officials contemplated with equanimity the demise of firms that the 
department had earlier been anxious to protect. Thus Armstrong Siddeley "will 
now collapse at the end of the Sapphire and Mamba lines, ... de Havilland 
[engines] ... seems likely to decline to a minor status" while the 
disappearance 
of the relatively minor airframe firms "would not be disastrous". " 
The Sandys analysis that missiles would soon perform the task of nuclear 
delivery, and such air defence as was possible or necessary, turned out to be 
highly premature. Nevertheless, the policy served to secure the termination of 
many aircraft and engine contracts in the interests of a contraction that was 
already perceived to be required. Ironically, as Hayward points out, orderly 
'short step' developments, with excellent export potential such as a supersonic 
Hawker Hunter, with a reheated Rolls-Royce engine, was also cancelled. 88 What 
survived was the highly ambitious TSR 2 strike bomber project which was used 
by Aubrey Jones at the MoS to induce a measure of consolidation on the 
industry by bringing Vickers and English Electric together as the principal 
86 
PRO AVIA 65/736, Minute of 29 March 1957, US/LGW to Dep. Sec (C). 
87 
Ibid. 
88 
Keith Hayward, The British Aircraft Industry, (Manchester 1989), pp. 69-70. 
259 
partners in the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC). 
Whether this project was a suitable tool for these policy aims is an intriguing 
question. Over its life TSR2 displayed, in effect, the 'mission creep' problem - 
a growth in the specification and performance that was promised or specified, 
leading ultimately to an unaffordable product. The industry's apologists tended 
to blame the Air Staff and claimed that "the final TSR 2 requirement had 
everything built into it that military imagination could devise and quite a lot that 
was not strictly essential". " However, the industry, and the government 
research establishments, almost certainly were complicit in the upward creep of 
performance targets (as we saw with the Vulcan engine programme in the 
previous chapter) because this, in a sense, was their raison d'etre. 90 From the 
point of view of this study, the process of performance and cost escalation 
should be regarded as a socio-cultural one, in which defence priorities (or 
wishes) can be too easily communicated to the supplier firms and where the 
firms reciprocally aim to tempt their patrons with something much better, if 
more funding (usually modest compared to that already committed) can be 
found. The argument here is that the post-war MoS actually represented an 
inversion of the ethos of the war-time MAP which, for clarity and control, 
established a separation between the user/specifier and the production system. 
By contrast, the way in the MoS had operated its contracts had established a 
milieu in which this kind of contact and negotiation could occur. The progress 
of the TSR 2 development also suggests that a similar process of 'positive 
feedback'. in technological expectations continued under the Ministry of 
Aviation. 
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The responsibility of the MoS for aviation came to an end in 1959 with the 
formation of a new Ministry of Aviation with Duncan Sandys as Minister. 
Sandys was said to be a supporter of the supersonic transport (Concorde) project 
now being canvassed by RAE and industry91 and by an irony, his own defence 
policies appear to have pushed the RAE scientists (the early protagonists) to 
become committed propagandists for the supersonic transport since "the RAE 
swung behind the civil supersonic transport when most of the military projects 
disappeared". ' 
The enthusiasm for the supersonic transport was continued by Peter 
Thorneycroft, Sandys successor as Minister of Aviation, who seemed still, like 
all the Ministers responsible for the industry since Cripps, to be acting fully in 
the spirit of his late war agenda for reconstruction. To the Cabinet Thorneycroft 
noted in 1961 that: "I am deeply concerned as to the future of the aircraft 
industry, for which the Government have accepted a substantial measure of 
responsibility". Among other proposals for investment in the industry 
Thorneycroft anticipated "whether we like it or not" the almost certain 
introduction of supersonic air travel and noted that, although the USA had 
started investigating an all-steel Mach 3 aircraft, British design research was 
advanced on an aluminium alloy Mach 2 design. "My technical advisers firmly 
believe that Britain has an opportunity here of gaining the leadership we so 
narrowly missed with the Comet". 93 
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Hayward suggests of this time that "the strongest impression of the period is 
that, having engineered the regrouping, and having reintroduced launch aid, the 
government had no coherent idea of what to do with the industry". ' This is fair, 
but really had also been true throughout the entire post-war period. The Cold 
War defence programmes clearly had their own imperatives. For the rest, civil 
servants and Ministers had been required to simulate an entrepreneurial and 
commercial instinct. It is the contention here that this promotional role, 
combined with an explicitly protectionist agenda, served to delay the emergence 
of an entrepreneurial culture in the firms. 
The election of the Wilson government in October 1964 brought a new step in 
the adjustment of the government-industry relationship. Dennis Healey, as 
Minister of Defence, was perhaps constitutionally less indulgent to the aircraft 
industry. Healey claimed that "the previous government had cancelled thirty 
major aircraft projects in about ten years at a cost to the taxpayer of £250 
million without ever actually getting an aircraft off the ground" . 
9S The 
cancellation of TSR 2 followed in April 1965, while a committee of enquiry 
under Sir Edwin (subsequently Lord) Plowden was set up. 
Plowden was not particularly radical, the recommendations including a flexible 
form of nationalisation or government shareholding -a type of "mixture of 
public and private enterprise [that] has not been much tried in this country" but 
was deemed to work well in Italy, a substantial size reduction, a merger of the 
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two airframe groups and exploring partnerships with Europe. ' To American 
diplomatic observers the Plowden Report appeared to based: 
to great extent on untested assumptions, loose general analysis and 
inadequate statistical base. Report will lack rigorous analysis and 
economic-military back up data which should be essential in major 
report of this kind. 97 
However, Plowden could perhaps be viewed less as a searching enquiry than a 
process for formally legitimising the growing perceptions about the industry that 
had been germinating within civil service departments and government. The 
"melodramatic" reaction of the industry, calling the report "entirely negative and 
defeatist" has been described by Edgerton who, drawing on Tony Benn's 
diaries, finds evidence of Tory as well as industry hostility. " According to the 
reading here a readjustment was inevitable under governments of either party. 
Thus although Aubrey Jones issued a minority report within Plowden arguing, 
particularly, that a government shareholding would reduce the progress of the 
industry towards a more commercial outlook, his judgement on the industry was 
not that far removed from Healey's. Jones considered that "the aircraft industry 
had not presented a pretty picture - ignorance of markets, laxity of costs, and 
greed for public money"" while previously in 1957, as part of the impulse 
towards spending reduction that prompted the Sandys White Paper, the 
Macmillan cabinet called for an 'informal' enquiry to consider the future of the 
96 
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Aircraft Industry, Cmnd 2853, December 1965, pp 
82-97. 
97 
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the US Department of State, 
Central Files, 1964-66, AV 12-7 US. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to 
the Department of State, London, October 22,1965,1937Z. The Embassy also suggested that 
release of the American Department of Defense report into the US supersonic transport, though 
perhaps useful to British and French in terms Concorde project, might "dramatize what seem to 
be major deficiencies in Plowden Report". 
98 
David Edgerton, 'The White Heat Revisited; the British Government and Technology in the 
1960s, Twentieth Century British History, No 1,1986. 
99 
Aubrey Jones, 'Roots of Stagnation' (n. 80 above), p. 80. 
263 
aircraft industry, commissioning, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (then Peter 
Thorneycroft) to establish a working party. The report had noted that for civil 
work the industry; 
has grown up largely at government expense. Generous financial help 
was in fact given. ... This took the form of payment of all costs of development for a wide range of interim or conventional types of civil 
aircraft. ... Later, more advanced aircraft using gas turbine engines 
were developed largely at the Government's expense. 
Companies were now being induced to take over "much or all of the cost and 
risk of development". Newer, stronger units were needed and continuing 
government civil R&D support should be conditional on the industry 
progressively taking over this expenditure. 1°° 
Neither Padmore's earlier study nor Plowden seemed to recognise the 
contribution of the government's own structures to the outcomes of aircraft 
programmes. But though few striking changes emerged directly as a result of 
these studies under Conservative and Labour administrations, the Plowden 
report does mark the development of a new realism as evidenced, perhaps, by 
the establishment of the post of Chief Economist at the Ministry of Aviation in 
1965 to provide advice within the department and to keep in touch with 
economic organisations in other parts of government. This is not to imply that a 
clear path for the management of the aerospace sector by government had been 
discerned by the mid-1960s. The ensuing administrative changes, taking us 
beyond the period of this study, make that eminently clear. In 1959, as we have 
seen, responsibility for the supply of military aircraft had been switched to the 
Ministry of Aviation, then to the Ministry of Technology in 1967 and to the 
Ministry of Aviation Supply in 1970. Other punctuation marks include the 
bankruptcy and protective nationalisation of Rolls-Royce by the Conservative 
Heath government, the Concorde programme, the nationalisation of the British 
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Aircraft Corporation and Hawker-Siddeley Aviation to form British Aerospace 
by the Labour government under Harold Wilson in 1976, with both Rolls-Royce 
and British Aerospace being privatised under the Thatcher government in the 
1980s. 
With regard to military procurement, in 1971, following the report by Sir Derek 
Rayner, the supply of military aircraft was made the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Defence, with the creation of a dedicated Procurement Executive 
within the MoD. In a sense, the creation of this partly autonomous agency, with 
to an extent, a 'Chinese wall' between it and other defence policy functions, 
recalls the greater administrative focus that was achieved by the creation of the 
Ministry of Aircraft production in 1940. Responsibility for civil aircraft 
programmes and launch aid (renamed launch investment) now rested with the 
Department of Industry which established the definite aim of recovering its 
investment, and a share of profit, from sales. 
These do seem to be steps on a path to greater clarity of direction of aerospace 
projects. Certainly in recent years the international performance of Rolls-Royce 
and the British contribution to Airbus appear to have vindicated the evolving 
mechanism of administration, the increased realism of the industry, but perhaps 
most importantly, the growing maturity of the technology. However aerospace 
programmes can still continue to run into overspends and argument. This should 
be no surprise for as John Jewkes argued in 1978, one of the important 
meanings of the 'high' in 'high technology' is "exceptionally high-risk 
technology". 'o' 
101 
John Jewkes, A Return to Free Market Economics?, (London, 1978), p. 120. 
265 
Chapter 7: Conclusions 
Preamble 
The history of relations between government and the post-war aircraft industry 
can be seen in terms of a gradual movement from the system developed for the 
totally directed war economy, with the government as the sole customer, to a 
more autonomous industry competing in the global aerospace market. The 
administration of the industry over the period studied reflects this evolution and 
thus the post-war decades show a continuation, in a gradually attenuating form, 
of the pattern of administration and control developed during the war at MAP. 
However, by the end of the period covered by this study a transition is 
occurring in the structure of the industry and in the pattern of its administration 
by government. 
It has been noted, in preceding chapters, that the great achievement of MAP lay 
in guiding production during the war when it was largely following the precepts 
set down for it in 1940 for the separation of procurement and production from 
the Air Ministry. This clarity of purpose allowed the British aircraft industry to 
achieve remarkable feats of production and also to attain high technical quality. 
The success attained in this role, and the confidence this engendered, it is 
argued, underpinned the case that was made in the late-war era, for a pivotal 
post-war role for the combined MAP and MoS in the exploitation of the aircraft 
industry in the national interest and the development of aircraft of all types. 
The job, therefore, that the MoS was expected to do in the post-war world, was 
far broader and more complex than that performed by the MAP in the war and 
it is argued, on the basis of the studies considered here, that this wider 'industry 
ministry' task introduced a confusing multiplicity of roles and compromised 
what was simple, clear and effective about MAP. Ironically, this expansion of 
its mission led almost inexorably back to the problematic situation that Churchill 
had identified in 1940 in which he judged that the users and specifiers of aircraft 
would interfere with production if all these interests were too closely associated. 
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Thus the MoS came into being under the post-war Labour government 
embodying the aspirations of Stafford Cripps for an agency that would represent 
the interests of "a progressive active government" in industrial policy, with 
over-arching responsibility for both military and civil procurement, a brief to 
promote a hoped-for move into the emerging world civil airliner market, and a 
responsibility for a general overseeing role for the aircraft industry which 
implied an industrial support function. This study shows that, interestingly, this 
essential role was not challenged by successive Conservative administrations and 
MoS continued, in essence, to follow the path that had been set out for it as the 
war ended. This implicit or institutional departmental policy continued until the 
financial pressures imposed by aviation programmes became increasingly 
exposed to question, and when a growing lack of confidence in the capacity of 
the government/industry ensemble to develop genuinely exportable and 
profitable products came to the fore in both Conservative and Labour thinking. 
Discussion 
How effective, therefore, was the Ministry of Supply in the role assigned to it 
for guiding industry in this "joint endeavour with us" to compete head on with 
the USA and to gain a sizeable share of the world civil airliner market? ' 
Certainly if the long-range strategic role anticipated in late Second World War 
policy discussions had been implemented in an effective way, we would expect 
to see more evidence of the MoS taking an entrepreneurial and considered look 
at the world aviation market for potential numbers of aircraft sales, together 
with studies of sectors and niches for particular types and sizes of aircraft. In 
the case of the Vickers V1000, for example, there is no hint of this and MoS 
seems to have had a largely reactive role, buffeted by the demands of the RAF 
and the assertions of Vickers. In effect MoS acted here, in part, like a fairly 
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uncritical bank. 
The degree to which aircraft manufacture features in the manufacturing 
economy of a nation owes less to competitive advantage than to accidents of 
history and, in particular, its defence policies and its experience of warfare. In 
the post-war period a major element of the remit for the MoS was to utilise the 
national investment that had been made in military aircraft production facilities 
to also promote civil aircraft production. In fact British firms had tentatively 
begun tentatively to try and emulate the new American high speed, all metal 
airliners during the 1930s but re-armament put a stop to this. As we have seen 
in chapter two, the intention to re-enter the civil airliner market after the Second 
World War became a major feature of British aeronautical policy. 
However, post-war defence objectives and Cold War re-armament squeezed 
British civil aircraft programmes just as pre-war rearmament had done. 
Nevertheless, there were many civil projects in this period but few viable 
entrepreneurial schemes of adequate scale that reflected sensitivity to the airline 
needs or to international markets. Thus in 1965, fully twenty years after this 
intention to compete internationally in airliner production was made an explicit 
objective, Plowden noted that "the effort to establish a self-supporting British 
civil aircraft industry has not yet succeeded". ' At a slightly later date British 
representation in the Airbus consortium, on which the British share of European 
civil airframe work now rests, came about from an independent deal arranged 
by Hawker Siddeley Aviation, and not from a considered strategic move 
developed within the MoS or its successor ministries. 
Moreover, in its purely military procurement role the success achieved under 
MoS direction was equivocal. The key indicator in this must be the production 
of the V-bomber force, judged to be the UK's main defence priority, but finally 
delivered years after the target date. Nevertheless it should be noted that, during 
2 
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Aircraft Industry, Cmnd. 2853,1965, p. 20. 
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the period under review, the industry was certainly not backward 
technologically. The Royal Aircraft Establishment, (RAE) administered by the 
MoS was pre-eminent in European aviation research while the annual 
Farnborough air show there was always a national media event. The advanced 
research of government scientists at RAE and elsewhere, stimulated by Cold 
War apprehensions also resonated with the ambitions of industry engineers. 
Thus the 'defiant modernism' of post-war Britain was sustained by impressive, 
but spasmodic, technological aviation feats such as the vertical take-off 'Flying 
Bedstead' trials (1954), the 1,132 mph world speed record by the Fairey Delta 
FD 2 (1956), and the eventual deployment of the Lightning fighter and the V- 
force bombers, with Concorde as a final act in what had been a succession of 
coups de theatre. These patchy, disconnected, often brilliant, but literally 
incoherent acts of technological bravura certainly sustained the nation's 'high 
tech' self image but, on the military side there were too few consistent 
programmes with their own long-term logic and the possibility of convincing 
military export sales which would have helped the industry resist the cuts of the 
late 1950s and early 1960s. 3 
The task of the post-war Ministry of Supply differed profoundly from that 
performed by the war-time MAP in a number of ways. The analysis of these 
suggests that war-time supply ministry proved to be an inappropriate model for 
the peacetime direction of the industry. Firstly, war-time production had swept 
away a huge number of perturbations and left officials and government with 
simplified (though not simple) choices. Post-war planning and direction turned 
out to be a very different matter. It was not simply that the number of tasks 
increased and that the role that the Ministry was asked to perform widened. The 
task of planning in the post-war era was more difficult than wartime production 
for in spite of the enormous centralisation of the post-war aircraft sector and its 
dependence on government funding there was nevertheless a return to a type of 
3 
It is significant that after the Fairey Delta FD 2 world speed record it was taken to France for 
further trials since the attitude to supersonic booms there was more relaxed. No further UK 
military developments flowed from the FD 2 but these experimental trials in France have been 
widely credited with accelerating the development of the highly successful series of Mirage 
fighters from Dassault. 
269 
mixed economy. There thus were more 'cross-currents' in the post-war world 
and more connectivity between different groups, firms and institutions. Although 
many of the participants, such as the airlines, were state controlled, this did not 
lead to a simplification of the situation since they answered to different masters 
and, in the case of the airlines, were charged with a duty to act in their own 
commercial interests. In trying to meet its obligations to national security and to 
also promote the industry, the Ministry of Supply was caught up in an almost 
irresolvable cats' cradle of tensions. The result was that, in the post-war 
decades, decisions were taken in a febrile and over-politicised milieu in which 
industrialists, politicians and public servants interacted and with these public 
servants, in particular, burdened by a multiplicity of conflicting considerations. 
Another factor was that the post-war MoS differed in composition from the 
MAP in a rather profound way which, perhaps, politicians such as Cripps had 
not anticipated. The special war-time recruitment of economists, managers and 
technical experts had been essential for planning aircraft production during the 
suspension of the market. However, the impressive assembly of managerial and 
economic talent which was assembled to run the war-time aircraft programme at 
MAP had been an exceptional response, analogous to the allocation of academic 
scientists to projects such as radar, or artists to camouflage and deception 
projects. When peace came there was an inevitable demobilisation. The 
concentration of expertise had been special to the war and could not have been 
sustained in a peacetime Ministry. 
A third difference between the war and the peace was that British war-time 
aircraft production had taken place against a backdrop of a certain `design 
maturity' of aircraft types. Although British aircraft and engines improved 
throughout the war this was an incremental process, accepting as much new 
technology as could be fed into the production programmes without incurring 
loss of output. Thus it has been noted in chapter two that the MAP's greatest 
success lay in managing relatively consistent long-run production tasks - for 
example, Lancaster and Spitfire aircraft, Rolls-Royce and Bristol engines - 
even though these had been allowed to continually evolve in a controlled way in 
search of increasing performance. 
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By contrast MAP's performance in managing advanced technology projects was 
perhaps less impressive and the case of the Whittle jet has been adduced in 
support of this contention. Other war-time programmes with a substantial 
element of new engineering development were often disappointing and, as with 
the Whittle jet, the complex Napier Sabre piston engine also went badly off 
course with, in each case, the associated new aircraft (Gloster Meteor and 
Hawker Typhoon) also trailing in development. Step changes in performance 
were rare and, when attempted, proved hard to manage, and were usually late. 
The post-war era was one of rapid technological change forced partly by the 
performance competition imposed by the Cold War, by the introduction of the 
jet engine, and by the discovery that speeds approaching or beyond the speed of 
sound was possible. In this period, with successive step changes in aviation 
technology occurring, many programmes were more akin to the troublesome, 
speculative, advanced technology programmes that had been epitomised in the 
war by the Whittle jet rather than programmes where maximising output for 
large, fairly consistent production runs was the key. These Cold War 
programmes were, in fact, intensive development exercises rather than pure 
feats of production, and production itself and speed of deployment, as in the 
case of the V-bombers, could be slow. In this environment, it is argued, the 
war-time expertise acquired by the MAP was of reduced applicability. 
We have also seen that, even as the war ended, some officials within MAP were 
concerned to see the development of greater initiative on the part of the firms 
and wished to see moves that would "stir the industry from its lethargy". 
However, it is suggested here that in attempting to administer strategic plans for 
the future of the sector and juggling the needs of the RAF and the airlines, the 
MoS actually delayed the development of an international perspective in the 
firms and the evolution of a competitive entrepreneurial culture. The existence 
of the MoS really ensured that the major focus of the aviation industry was on 
securing government contracts rather than foreign customers. Thus in the early 
1950s the companies were highly averse to accepting risk on civil airliner 
projects. For example, during the production of the de Havilland Comet in 1952 
(a time of great optimism for the jetliner and before the accidents) the company 
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resisted a partnership with government through the Export Credit Guarantee 
Department under the terms of which government risk would decrease as sales 
were made, and argued for total government underwriting of any unsold aircraft 
which they proposed should be passed to the RAF. Vickers too asked for the 
same provision. ' 
Although this attitude came to be gradually modified over the period of this 
study the bankruptcy of Rolls-Royce in 1971 can also be taken as evidence for 
the influence of MoS procedures in delaying the development of a more 
entrepreneurial stance in British companies. Although this event took place 
outside the period studied here, the programme to develop and sell a new large 
engine (the RB 211) in America, for the emerging generation of wide-body civil 
jets, started in the mid-1960s. Thus it appears that a major reason for Rolls- 
Royce being driven into receivership was that it had committed to the 
development of a new, far larger and more complex engine than it had built 
before, under a tightly drawn international contract with the Lockheed aircraft 
company, rather than under the more indulgent conditions which had previously 
tended to obtain in its dealings with the MoS where programme delays and cost 
over-runs were not fatal. ' 
The wartime reconstruction plans dissolved quite soon in the post-war milieu 
into a system which combined powerful elements of Ministry direction with 
some free market incentives but where a kind of competitive lobbying and 
influence broking were highly important. In this period, it can be argued, the 
British aviation and engine companies were only partially in the aviation 
business - they were also, crucially, in the business of winning development 
contracts from government. Indeed, it could be argued that a real business ethic 
4 
PRO AVIA 65/59, LJ Dunnett, US (Air), minute of 4 March 1952. "The attitude of de 
Havilland, though much as I expected, puts the whole question of the export of civil aircraft 
into its proper perspective. However much people like Lord Douglas of Kirtleside and Peter 
Masefield may assert that it is the easiest thing in the world to produce large numbers of civil 
aircraft, what they totally fail to appreciate is the problem of who is to carry the financial risk 
involved. This problem has come up in an acute form in the case of Vickers". 
5 
Andrew Nahum, 'Sir David Huddie', obituary, The Independent, 16 June 1998. 
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did not really exist at the time; the concerns were not so much businesses as 
agencies which retained elements of the war-time relationship with the 
sponsoring department. Thus Sir George Edwards perhaps revealed more than 
his typically pithy remark intended, when he said to Rolls-Royce managers, 
following the 1971 bankruptcy that "you've forgotten how to walk the corridors 
of power". 6 
This attitude can be viewed against the performance of Sir George Edwards' 
own company, Vickers, over the development of the V 1000 airliner which was 
analysed in chapter six, for it is apparent that the American companies 
approached civil aircraft development in a different way. The Boeing KC-135 
military tanker/transport aircraft, for example, was developed under a defence 
contract but was subsequently used by Boeing as a springboard for a self-funded 
further design effort to produce the 707 airliner with the substantial investment 
of $15m of Boeing money. By contrast the V 1000 proceeded principally with 
MoS funding and the company did not emulate Boeing and accelerate 
development by making a substantial investment of its own. The Vickers airliner 
also was based on a government-funded military aircraft (the Valiant bomber) 
but there was a substantial difference in the speed and energy with which 
Boeing tackled the design and engineering of their new airliner. Although Sir 
George Edwards claimed that the cancellation of the Vickers V 1000 was the 
"one single significant point" in the post-war history of the British aviation and 
that it occurred "at a time when the 707 only existed in its prototype form with 
a sub-standard body and a sub-standard range" this Boeing 707 prototype 
(company designation Model 367-80) had been flying for some 17 months. 7 
Although it had started at almost the same date, by this time the V 1000 
prototype only existed as a partially completed fuselage and a set of wings 
which had not been fitted. 
6 
Sir David Huddie, conversation with the author, 29 October 1997. 
7 
Sir George Edwards, quoted in Arthur Reed, Britain's Aircraft Industry: What went right? What 
went wrong?, (London, 1973), p. 4. 
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Boeing's Model 367-80 design project commenced on 20 May 1952 and the 
prototype flew on 15 July 1954. The 'substandard cabin' on the prototype, to 
which Edwards referred, had four abreast two-plus-two seating, with a width of 
132 inches, based on the popular Stratocruiser, but was enlarged to 148 inches 
to accommodate three-plus-three seating and also to exceed the cabin width of 
the emerging rival Douglas DC-8. In spite of this major change the first aircraft 
with the revised fuselage began test flights from 20 December 1957 and the type 
entered commercial service in October 1958. The MoS assessment at the time of 
cancellation was that Vickers would only have been able to deliver 6V 1000s by 
that date. 
End Words 
The model of a supply ministry, responsible for all the research and production 
of the aircraft industry sector, both for civil use and defence, proved to be 
inappropriate to the post-war world. The strains in this system became 
increasingly apparent throughout the 1950s although it was not evident how the 
situation should be tackled. Within the MoS the problem was seen largely in 
terms of the size and structure of the industry and the need for some form of 
rationalisation became a recurring theme within the MoS from about 1950, 
although the means and the will to do this were not to hand. As we have seen, 
the 1957 Defence White Paper started a major shift, although Duncan Sandys, 
as Minister of Defence, was not concerned with industrial policy, but solely 
with the cost of British defence and the problems of deterrence. Nevertheless, 
the White Paper served to extinguish a large number of projects which were 
sustaining the industry in its diffuse form. Following the post-Sandys cuts, the 
contract for the TSR2 bomber, as the sole remaining substantial aircraft project 
was used as a lever to force some amalgamation on the UK industry. 8 
8 
The TSR2 contract was awarded to Vickers and English Electric in January 1959, setting the 
companies on the road to merger as the British Aircraft Corporation in 1960. (then known by 
the designation OR 339). 
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If this implies the judgement of hindsight it is necessary to recall the proposition 
in the introductory chapter which suggested that these events be viewed as an 
`experiment in administration'. There was no existing model for the peacetime 
government administration of a high technology industry which required 
investment decisions beyond the capacity and experience of the commercial 
sector to finance, while the passage of the industry from a position of close 
administrative and technological dependence on government agencies was 
inevitably a process that took time. So to did the development of patterns and 
structures for government direction and collaboration with the industry. 
It is important, therefore, to stress again the evolutionary nature of 
arrangements in this period and the essentiality of history to an understanding 
the structure of the industry, its capacity, its relationship with government and 
its ethos. Thus we have seen that the Second World War brought huge 
expansion to a far smaller pre-war industry, and provided an administrative 
system that allowed it to work at the limit of its capacity, manufacturing 
technologically successful weapons in firms which, in many cases, had a rather 
low technological base. Government planning, through MAP, supplied an 
essential component of management to this programme while government 
research thorough the RAE and other establishments, supplied a major 
proportion of the underpinning R&D. 
Although very different to the contemporary American system this British 
pattern of procurement - collaborative, highly centralised and bureaucratically 
planned - was a rational strategy for extracting maximal war production in the 
British context. The British institutions and the relationship between British 
companies and government were distinct and specific to the re-armament and the 
war, and the political and social organisation at the time. They cannot be 
criticised for being insufficiently 'American' but the post-war era saw a 
progressive weakening of this integration of government and the firms. Thus, in 
1965, Plowden found that the average profit in the aircraft industry was only 
5.9% on capital employed and well below that for British industry in general 
which ranged between 11.3 and 13.5%. To Plowden this seemed to indicate a 
failure in the commercial approach of the firms. However, this profit figure is 
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another indicator of the transitional nature of the post-war aircraft industry and 
should be viewed against the earlier context of the war-time profits allowed by 
MAP which, as we saw in chapter two, could range from between 2.05 and 
4.4%. During the post-war period under review here many projects were set up 
effectively as risk-free development contracts and so the war-time spirit of profit 
limitation was considered appropriate. 
Those economists who had been most closely involved in MAP planning also, 
after a time, repudiated the most literal application of the system in the post-war 
era. Sir Alec Cairncross was careful to explain that the success of MAP was 
obtained in the highly specific circumstances of wartime when the market was 
suspended and with the government as the sole customer for industrial output, 
recalling that "we were virtually a communist economy". 9 Ely Devons, as 
former head of the statistical section, and 'chief planner' at MAP also attacked 
the use of planning culture in altered circumstances of post-war aircraft 
procurement while his predecessor at MAP and founder of the statistical section, 
John Jewkes, wrote the polemical book Ordeal by Planning, asserting in one 
chapter "the moral sickness of the planned society". 'o 
However, the inescapable reality, for large defence projects, is that the state is 
inevitably interwoven into planning and finance. In major civil projects the long 
payback period takes these developments beyond the scope of the capital 
markets and no nations have remained in the aircraft industry without strategic 
government finance. To sell their products engine and airframe manufacturers 
now function, in effect, as financiers for their airline customers and this role 
requires enormous sophistication and resolution on the part of the industry and 
its government partners. During the period studied here these commercial 
instincts and strategies were still in gestation. 
Sir Alec Cairncross, `The Ministry of Supply in War and Peace, 1939-73', conference at the 
Business History Unit, London School of Economics, 14 December 1992. 
10 
Ely Devons, 'The Aircraft Industry', in D Bum (ed. ), The Structure of British 
Industry, (Cambridge, 1958): 69-70. John Jewkes, Ordeal by Planning, (London, 1948). 
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In the case of defence projects government must devise the specification and the 
'mission' and hence the degree of technological risk or 'boldness'. Therefore 
some 'planning' role is inescapable. However, the state must, it has come to be 
recognised, exercise some kind of self-denying ordinance - it has to accept a 
role as customer, through its procurement departments, although, at the same 
time, through its research contracts and its own intramural research 
establishments, it is continually upping the technological stakes and the potential 
of future systems. 
In the case of defence procurement it has become evident that a too easy 
exchange between these functions can lead to a continual growth in performance 
specification and cost during the life of a project; a too rigid separation could 
deliver producible and perhaps economical aircraft which were outclassed upon 
introduction. As we saw with the TSR 2 and with the Vulcan engine programme 
in the previous chapter the industry, the government research establishments, 
and the RAF were complicit, with the manufacturers, in the upward creep of 
performance targets because this, in a sense, was their raison d'etre. " From the 
point of view of this study, the process of performance and cost escalation 
should be regarded as a socio-cultural one, in which defence priorities (or 
wishes) can be too easily communicated to the supplier firms and where the 
firms reciprocally aim to tempt their patrons with something much better, if 
more funding (usually modest compared to that already committed) can be 
found. The argument here is that the post-war MoS actually represented an 
inversion of the ethos of the war-time MAP which, for clarity and control, 
established a separation between the user/specifier and the production system 
Interestingly in recent years, for military aircraft at any rate, something 
recalling the separation of production from the service and specification 
functions has been, in a form, restored and today Ministry of Defence operates 
a kind of 'Chinese Wall' between the sections responsible for these functions. 
11 
This creative desire can explain why new developments are sometimes pursued even in apparent 
defiance of rational business strategy. David Noble has observed, in the machine tool industry, 
that development engineers, and even the heads of companies, are often more interested in 
performance than in profit. David F Noble, Forces of Production, (New York, 1984) p. 9. 
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In 1998, reflecting on the changes to the structure of the industry and its 
relationship to government Handel Davies, as a former Director-General of 
Scientific Research (Air) in the MoS and subsequently Deputy Controller of 
Aircraft (R&D) in the Ministry of Aviation, considered that "we wasted twenty 
years in sorting out the industry" with the Plowden report in 1965, marking the 
turning point towards a more rational relationship between government and the 
aircraft industry. 12 But these years were spent, in a sense experimentally, 
attempting to manage this putative major national industrial asset, and following 
the direction developed by Stafford Cripps in the late war as part of the 
reconstruction policy. This system had, in the 1950s, tremendous institutional 
inertia and the authority that derived from war-time patterns and war-time 
successes. Thus it necessarily took some years for it to become apparent that the 
combining of the central control of procurement and production with a strategic 
industry management task had set up tensions which were proving 
irreconcilable. 
Perhaps another lesson from a study of the post-war industry concerns human 
hopes, timescales and industrial'lifecycles - for these hopes were not misplaced 
but they were perhaps premature. It proved impossible to fulfil the Crippsian 
vision for transforming the wartime British aircraft building capacity into a 
powerful economic asset within the lifetime of the post-war Labour government, 
or indeed during the tenure of many administrations after that. But today, the 
British aerospace industry is in a powerful position, as the second largest (or 
second equal, with France) aircraft industry in the world, with Rolls-Royce 
having developed a really striking position of competitiveness vis-a-vis 
American aero engine builders. The British aircraft industry did eventually 
achieve a position of maturity and capability. At the end of the war optimists 
hoped that Britain would reach this position in five to six years; in fact the 
process took between five and six decades. 
12 
Handel Davies, conversation with the author, 15 April 1998. Handel Davies was an 
aerodynamicist and Deputy Director of RAE between 1959 and 1963. He became Technical 
Director of the British Aircraft Corporation in 1969. 
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